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This doctoral thesis explores the cardinal importance of cosmological and the-
ological narratives in our engagement with the contemporary ecological transition. 
Drawing upon the analyses of political philosophers Hans Jonas and Eric Voegelin, I 
argue that the category of Gnosticism provides a fruitful angle from which to approach 
the present environmental issue as well as the challenge of an ecological inhabiting of 
the earth. Originally referring to a variety of religious systems which bloomed in early 
Christianity, the concept of Gnosticism gravitates around the cardinal theme of a cul-
tural estrangement from the world. While Hans Jonas’ study of Gnosticism elucidates 
the nihilistic dimension of the structural dualism pervading modern cosmology by re-
lating the latter to a deep-ingrained tendency to escape from the world – which his 
environmental ethics of responsibility famously attempted to remedy –, Eric Voegelin 
focuses on the political manifestations of this spiritual inclination. Voegelin’s insights 
and his developments around the platonic concept of metaxy contribute to unravel what 
modern gnostic movements struggle to contain: the irreducible in-betweenness of be-
ing in the world. This enduring and ubiquitous in-betweenness of worldly processes, I 
submit, is what simultaneously moves and resists the dualistic structure of modern 
cosmology: it also lies at the core of what is being unveiled along the ecological mu-
tation, what remains unthought and yet must be thought. The perspective of Gnosti-
cism thus enables both Jonas and Voegelin to reach a greater analytical depth as well 
as a critical distance from within the system of thought they intend to approach. Fo-
cusing on the notion of inhabiting, the “hermeneutics of Gnosticism” developed in this 
research aims to further illuminate some of the cosmological tropes framing our un-
derstanding of and involvement in the present ecological mutation. It uncovers for in-
stance such pervasive ideas as that of an abyssal alienation from the world, a perpetual 
yearning to overcome the conditions of our inhabiting, or a radical dualism between 
God and the world as compelling cultural spells cast upon our inhabiting of the world. 
As I draw attention to some of these spells and how they bewitch the way we inhabit 
the world, I hope for the tropes of our inhabiting to be reclaimed on the path to a 
resilient and peaceful inhabiting of the earth. My analysis of the spectre of Gnosticism 
in our cosmologies brings into relief the relevance of alternate ways of dwelling and 
of engaging with the present ecological transition. These are mobilized by alternate 
narratives which, from process philosophy to ecofeminist thought through the poetics 
of créolité, recount a hopeful entanglement with the world, the resilient openness of 




Why and how are stories crucial in order to properly engage with the present 
challenge of an ecological transition? What is the legitimacy of a philosophical inquiry 
in this issue yet so worldly, traditionally ranging from earth sciences to political ecol-
ogy? To what extent do the narratives we both inherit and perpetuate condition the 
way we inhabit this world? Such are the interrogations which prompted this doctoral 
research. The present work arises from the intuition that our relationship to the earth 
and involvement within the ongoing ecological collapse have everything to do with 
the constellation of myths, tropes, paradigms, ideas and discourses which weave our 
conceptual landscape. With the ecofeminist author Starhawk, I propose to approach 
this constellation of narratives as “cultural spells”. As I confront some of these spells 
and uncover some of the ways they bewitch us, I unfold the cardinal thought according 
to which our inhabiting of the world – comprising of the many mundane ways in which 
we work, consume, eat, dress, travel, dwell and relate to other earthlings – ultimately 
relies upon powerful and contingent stories. Stories which we must reflect upon if we 
wish to transition toward a more sustainable model of inhabiting. Drawing upon the 
work of two political philosophers of Modernity, Hans Jonas and Eric Voegelin, I 
identify in the mythology of Gnosticism a key to approach contemporary inhabiting. 
The term Gnosticism refers to an obscure syncretism of spiritual movements blooming 
in early Christianity and converging towards an experience of the world as a hostile 
place from which humanity is radically estranged. I argue that delving into the cos-
mology of Gnosticism illuminates a cultural estrangement from the earth along with 
the dualistic architecture of thought around which this imaginary of alienation is en-
forced. Luckily, the contemporary pathologies of the inhabiting unveiled by the lens 
of Gnosticism can be addressed, and a resilient relationship with the world reclaimed 
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A world of tales and spells – why stories matter 
Studying the tales told and spread in our world, the writer and activist Star-
hawk, a prominent voice in contemporary earth-based spirituality and ecofeminism, 
defines a spell as “a story we tell ourselves that shapes our emotional and psychic 
world”. A story, she adds, “so pervasive that most people mistake it for reality”. 1 
Drawing attention to the powerful spells cast by various institutions of authority such 
as corporate media or public universities, Starhawk leans upon the cultural anthropol-
ogist Clifford Geertz’s definition of culture as « the stories we tell ourselves about 
ourselves »2, to approach culture ultimately as a set of tales and spells. In Dreaming 
the Dark, Starhawk thus enquires into the irrational, the unseen and obscure that un-
derlies the modernist paradigm of rationality, uncovering its “other side” as she reveals 
its rootedness in spiritual, mythical, symbolical and metaphorical narratives. I am in-
debted to her enquiry into the dark as I approach the contemporary, urgently empirical 
event of a global ecological crisis from an interrogation about the cultural narratives, 
tales, spells and metaphors that frame and condition our engagement with it. 
 








Following Starhawk, who emphasizes the necessity of naming the narratives 
structuring our political landscape – notably the dreams of conquest and the pursuit of 
progress – the ecofeminist philosopher Emilie Hache proposes to reclaim the founding 
tales of our cosmologies. She offers to 
 
underline the power of narratives in our lives, their ability to connect 
us to a form of powerlessness as well as to empower us, their ability 
to make us disappear, to make us doubt our own existence or, on the 
contrary, to give us confidence; their ability to help us imagine other 
worlds just as to make them impossible.3 
 
Emilie Hache signals the embeddedness of the concrete world in a constellation of 
narratives: these assume a radical power over the course of our mundane trajectories 
and pervade the sphere of intimacy as they infuse our ability to imagine and act. Which 
stories, which tales, which patterns of thought did we inherit from the evolving tissue 
of the world? Which tropes colonize our imaginary – upon which narratives do we 
lean as we think, co-create and become with the world? Who is this world populated 
with tales, “promiscuous mixtures of thinking and becoming-with”4? More precisely, 
which thinking of the world enables us to, or prevent us from, inhabiting the world? 
Could certain images and narratives impoverish our relationship to the world, thus 
hindering us from dwelling as well and fully as we may aspire to? What is summoned, 
what is brought to life and what remains unthought when we speak of “the world”? 
This preliminary interrogation is crucial. In Donna Haraway’s words, 
 
3 Emilie HACHE, « Se réapproprier le champ de la longue durée. Contribution écoféministe à une histoire 
après l’anthropocène ». Conference given in Brussels on the 23.02.2017, for the research seminar 
« Esthétiques et pratiques de la terre » organized by Thierry Drumm and Aline Wiame, GECo, ULB. 
I translate from French: 
« Pour souligner la puissance des récits dans nos vies, leur pouvoir de nous connecter a une forme 
d’impuissance comme de nous rendre puissantes, leur pouvoir de nous faire disparaitre, de nous faire 
douter de notre propre existence comme à l’inverse de nous donner confiance ; leur pouvoir de nous 
aider a imaginer d’autres mondes comme de les rendre impossibles. »  
4 Joseph WEISS, “The Erotics of Destruction and the End of the Anthropocene”, Society for Cultural 






It matters what matters we use to think other matters with; it matters 
what stories we tell to tell other stories with; it matters what knots 
knot knots, what thoughts think thoughts, what descriptions describe 
descriptions, what ties tie ties.5 
 
Emphasizing the processes through which matters and stories coevolve with each 
other, Donna Haraway reveals the inextricable bond between word and world. Her 
thought discovers a network of bodies and discourses composing a “material-semiotic” 
world.6 Approaching the literary and discursive as a mode of the bodily, the perspec-
tive of New Materialism might guide our attempt to think the words of the world with-
out falling into dichotomous patterns of thinking. The New Materialist approach sheds 
light on the production of meaning within world processes and the ways through which 
such processes come to express themselves. In this regard, being attentive to and weav-
ing the many stories through which the world tells itself is a way to celebrate its intel-
ligibility. Echoing the biosemiotics insight that “the natural world is perfused with 
signs, meanings and purposes which are material and which evolve”7, this thesis at-
tends to the perpetual emergence of the world through matter and meaning. Conscious 
of the permeability between inside and outside, it approaches our enmeshmed pro-
cesses of inhabiting the world as a creative conversation between narratives and mate-
rial processes. 
 
The reflections unfolded in this dissertation emerge in the consciousness of the 
philosophical challenge to unthink “the world” as conceptual construct. Entangled in 
mystery, they intend to both elucidate the world-making – or world-alienating – di-
mension of our symbolic systems and embrace the processes in the world giving birth 
to new stories and ideas. Not an accumulation of inert objects, not a totality, not a 
 
5 Donna HARAWAY, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, 2016, Duke University 
Press, Durham and London, p. 12. 
6 Donna HARAWAY, Simions, Cyborgs and Women, Free Association Books, New York, 1991. 
7 Wendy WHEELER, “The Biosemiotic Turn: Abduction, or, the Nature of Creative Reason in Nature 
and Culture”, in Ecocritical Theory. New European Approaches, ed. Axel Goodbody and Kate Rigby, 
University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville and London, 2011, p.279. 
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“container”8, the world is not either absorbed in the stories that weave and recount it. 
Hence, our unthinking of the world should also acknowledge the perpetual opening of 
new ways of inhabiting and becoming-with that arise from our encounters with the 
trajectories of others: not a solipsistic fiction, not either a scenic space where to per-
form a dance of intersubjectivity, the world is to be thought as a co-creative process, 
an engagement in creation. The notion of “worlding”9 embraced by New Materialism 
provides a welcome perspective through which open processes of human-non-human 
enmeshment can be considered: removing boundaries between subject and environ-
ment, it draws our attention to the world as an ontological process and an active in-
volvement in events. 
 
The environmental transition as philosophical event 
I propose to consider the complex entanglement of multidimensional phenom-
ena commonly referred to as a global ecological crisis as an event in thought: namely, 
as an event which disrupts the ways we have been thinking, a historical contingency 
which, as it arises, overflows the conceptual and symbolical framework that fails to 
contain it. This suggests that something is happening here and now that provides us 
with a wonderful opportunity to think: think anew the worlds we live in, the ones we 
fail to inhabit, the ones collapsing alongside the exhaustion of an energetic regime 
based on a logic of extraction  – and those worlds whose blossoming we could witness. 
This event is rooted in narratives as much as it requires alternative ones: it bears an 
unexpected potential for reclaiming and reshaping the narratives which condition our 
inhabiting of the world. The kaleidoscopic event of the present ecological mutation 
sanctions a wonderful intertwinement of ecology, politics, geology, earth sciences, 
ethics, economics, sociology, philosophy, religion, poetics, even arts! It is as dramati-
cally concrete as it is abstract, something so immense comprehension struggles to 
 
8 Ibid, p.14. 
9 See Helen Palmer and Vicky Hunter’s contribution to the definition of the term “worlding” in the 
Almanac of New Materialism, March 2018. 




reach; as global as it is local, intimate and public; past, present and future; an omni-
present loss. There is no way to ignore it. The environmental mutation engages our 
whole being in the world and concerns the very perpetuation of this being: contained 
and involved within it, we have to think through it. “Think we must”, Virginia Woolf 
insisted in her Three Guineas. As an ultimate resource in resisting the banality of evil 
that is being lived and witnessed, think we must.10 The insurrectional thought invoked 
by Virginia Woolf arises from a movement of suspension, a pause observed amidst 
our daily activities so as to suspend our passive involvement in processes we did not 
agree to feed and sustain. It also implies a certain refusal to submit ourselves to disci-
plinary confinements that claim to dictate our thoughts and our engagement within the 
world. The Woolfian injunction is thus an invitation to think and live beyond cosmo-
logical segregations. In order to think, we must disobey: the work of Virginia Woolf 
testifies to a philosophical thought embraced as an act of disobedience, expression and 
creation, committed to weaving subversive ties across separations and to reclaiming 
an alienated sense of our embeddedness in the world. 
 
The threshold we have crossed: what era have we plunged into?  
What I wish to suggest here is that the ecological issue contains a deeply un-
settling element touching upon the way we live and think in the world. Something 
which should not be understated, in that it represents a crack in a cosmological and 
civilizational edifice. This crack, uncovering the profound embeddedness of our sys-
tems of thought in the world, and vice-versa, is exemplified by the concept of the An-
thropocene. The latter is but one common attempt to name the specificity of the epoch 
we inhabit, “to name what is happening in the airs, waters, and places, in the rocks, 
 
10 The prominent feminist sciences scholar Donna Haraway compares the contemporary urgency to 
think in the time of the environmental mutation to the ethical injunction described by Hannah Arendt to 
resist what the philosopher called “the banality of evil”, rooted in an “incapacity to think” and a disen-
gagement from the world that is being lived.  
See Donna HARAWAY, “Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene: Staying with the Trouble”, 
05.09.2014. 




and oceans, and atmospheres.”11 First coined by the biologist Eugene F. Stoermer and 
popularized by the atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen, the term “Anthropocene” des-
ignates the unprecedented scope of human action upon the earth’s ecosystems, so sig-
nificant as to constitute a new geological epoch succeeding to the Holocene. The An-
thropocene states indeed that human processes have become the major geological force 
influencing earthly processes. Shedding light upon a multiplicity of geological forces 
and processes responding to human agency, the framework of the Anthropocene sum-
mons us to study the ecological crisis from within the entangled complexity of its 
abundant intersections. 
One major criticism formulated against the concept of Anthropocene was that 
it essentializes human action and unifies humanity into a homogenous force, thereby 
obscuring major discrepancies in the way humans live, produce and consume, along 
with the social contingency of dynamics that are internal to a capitalist model of de-
velopment. Doing so, it naturalizes and depoliticizes a mode of production specific to 
a certain sociohistorical context and conceals the role of the capital as politically heg-
emonic force in the present geological mutation. The term Capitalocene therefore al-
lows for more depth, nuance and fairness in the treatment of human processes and the 
question of our responsibility towards the present environmental collapse12. Capitalist 
infrastructures of production and consumption, as well as the energy industry sustain-
ing them, are causing powerful, self-amplifying, irreversible planetary processes and 
contribute to reshape nonhuman forces such as climate patterns, species evolution, 
drought zones, the ocean conveyor system, glacier flows or hurricanes. As Emilie 
Hache observes, conceiving capitalism as an amplifying geological force also contains 
a great potential of astonishment: 
 
The madness of capitalism has thus not only attacked and destroyed 
both the human species and “nature”, but it went so far as to modify 
the regimen of existence of an earth’s system that has been our home 
 
11 Ibid. 




for 10 000 years. Such a scale of human action totally exceeds our 
frames of thought.13 
 
Another way to get to grips with the present era was proposed by Donna Har-
away through the term of “Chtulucene”. Pointing towards something that overflows 
the scope of the Anthropos, the Chtulucene “sneaks in and through” to survive both 
capitalism and human presence on earth. It designates the tentacular always growling 
beneath the earth, the dreadful earthly processes that in the mythology of the moderns 
had been relegated to the traditional past – what would have been conquered and de-
feated by a promethean Anthropos. The Chtulucene therefore embodies the realization 
of an obstinate persistence of earthly processes amidst what we perceive as an apoca-
lypse, “a thick kind of ongoingness at stake” manifesting the victory of the tentacular, 
relentlessly composing the world even amidst the ruins of capitalism. As an alternative 
storytelling apparatus offering to complement that of the Capitalocene, the Chtulucene 
embraces the sneakiness of ongoing earthly processes of worlding, and the permanent 
composition of the world. “Simultaneously about past, present and what is to come”14, 
the thought of the Chtulucene introduces some hope and resilience in the story of the 
environmental collapse. 
 
A tale of estrangement 
This story often crystallizes as a tale of estrangement. The environmentalist 
and process philosopher John B. Cobb asks “why civilized human beings, and espe-
cially those in the modern West, have become so alienated from nature”. 15 Many ac-
counts of the environmental crisis, including within deep ecology, perpetuate the 
 
13 Emilie HACHE, « Tremblez, tremblez, les sorcières sont de retour ! », in Pensez l’Anthropocène, dir. 
Rémi Beau and Catherine Larrère, p.118. 
14 Donna Haraway interviewed by Juliana Fausto, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Déborah Danowski, 
21.08.2014, Os Mil Nomes de Gaia. 
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1x0oxUHOlA8 
Accessed 27.03.2019. 
See also Donna J. HARAWAY, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, Duke 
University Press, 2016. Chapter 2: “Tentacular Thinking: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene”. 
15 John B. COBB Jr, “Deep Ecology and Process Thought”, Process Studies, pp. 112-131, Vol.30, 
Number 1, Spring-Summer, 2001. 
8 
 
Rousseauist idea according to which the modern civilizing of humanity on the path to 
progress proved a deepening alienation from both the self and the world. Emphasizing 
ecological interdependence over the isolation of individual agents set against each 
other in the struggle for survival, most debates in environmental thought provide a 
critical account of this civilizational alienation. A major contribution of environmental 
studies thus lies in the deconstruction of the terms of this tale of estrangement, such as 
proposed by Bruno Latour who, in We Have Never Been Modern, argues that the divi-
sion between nature and culture or between object and subject is but one concept sus-
taining deceptive dualistic cosmologies. This realization fuels repeated attempts to 
mend the modern gulf between the world and the selves by weaving a tangled web of 
earthly, hybrid interconnections that cannot be solved within a dualistic pattern of 
thought. Starhawk thus understands ecology as the science of relationships16, and a 
precious start for unraveling the estrangement from and commodification of the world 
as the cultural and spiritual bases for a capitalist exploitation of resources. More re-
cently, Latour describes in Facing Gaia the active process of dis-animation required 
to empty the material world from all meaning and value. Emilie Hache proposes to 
recover from such a culture of distance and detachment by cultivating our ability to 
feel, to be touched, moved and met by what comes to us.17 She thereby suggests that 
the resolution of the ecological crisis should imply a renewed engagement with the 
sensory world. But where may we meet the world and reconcile with it? 
In “The Liminal Space between Things. Epiphany and the Physical”18, Timo-
thy Morton draws from the artist James Turrel’s understanding that art happens in the 
liminal space between things to define the field of ecocriticism as the thinking of the 
relations between things coexisting. He pleads for the development of ecocriticism as 
 
16 Conference “Permaculture and the Sacred: A Conversation with Starhawk”, Harvard Divinity School 
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zV-MsQYrW0g  
Accessed 27.03.2019. 
17 Emilie HACHE, « Se réapproprier le champ de la longue durée. Contribution écoféministe à une 
histoire après l’anthropocène ». art. cit. 
18 Timothy MORTON, “The Liminal Space between Things. Epiphany and the Physical”, in Material 




a care for the attunement between beings – human and non-human – and for their mu-
tual emergence in liminality. Their arising, Morton argues, always full of the absence 
surrounding them, should be received as an epiphany: 
 
Ecocriticism should enable a caring attunement to the irreducibility 
of a red wheelbarrow, a plum, a blade of grass, a field of grass, a 
cluster of gardening tools, the Earth on which they sit, the garden in 
which they reside. Things are a kind of liminal space made of other 
things. Art happens in and as this liminal space, this between, which 
is just what a thing is: a meeting place of other beings (“thing is Old 
English for “meeting place”). This meeting place is not ontically 
given (…). Rather, it is shot through and through with nothingness. 
It is given in the way that beauty is given: an epiphany that coexists 
anarchically alongside us, physically before us, and despite us.”19 
 
Failing to care for this epiphany and to attune ourselves to it appears to coincide 
with a political as well as cultural alienation from the world. How might we begin to 
resolve an issue that fails to be acknowledged? The disturbing obscurity, subterranean 
dimension of the environmental issue is such that the greater part of today’s politicians, 
along with those with the power to implement immediate structural changes, agree to 
deny it altogether. This denial, if not the full-blown conscious negation of the most 
urgent concern of our time reveals a deep-ranging, pathological indifference to the 
planetary paving our collective subconscious – or those of the elites ensuring the per-
petuation of a collapsing system. Popular culture provides an invaluable insight into 
this “collective subconscious”, as well as an abundant source of illustrations of the 
way it is constructed through the diffusion of certain narrative structures, ideological 
tropes and metaphors. 
The cosmological propaganda spread by some Hollywood blockbusters is par-
ticularly conspicuous in a movie like Interstellar. Christopher Nolan’s highly success-
ful sci-fi production offers indeed a crystal-clear demonstration of the political nega-
tionism as well as the disdain for the world conveyed in the dominant approach to the 
contemporary ecological crisis. While the plot is set in a dystopian future where the 
 
19 P. 279. 
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earth has become uninhabitable, and humanity is struggling with the consequences of 
what we recognize as a now familiar ecological crisis, the film carefully avoids any 
political treatment of the catastrophe. A global crop blight along with severe dust 
storms are depicted, but the causes and origins of these violent climate disruptions, 
and of course the political responsibility for them remain unmentioned: the earth seems 
to be ontologically, eternally hostile to humans, who can conceive of no other solution 
than leaving this planet and finding a new one to colonize. The film thus totally depo-
liticizes the ecological issue by actively concealing its anthropic origin and the respon-
sibility of a capitalist system sustained by decades of neoliberal policies. Not only does 
it de-responsibilize the governments involved in these policies, Interstellar also mys-
tifies the humanist, colonialist posture of a space conquest succeeding to the “discov-
ery” and colonization of the earth and its inhabitants, thereby perpetuating a predatory 
relationship to the world. As it fails to envision the end of capitalism and the peaceful 
inhabiting of the earth that might succeed from it, the film represents the ultimate stage 
of a capitalist logics of consumption and exploitation: the world an obsolete vessel 
from which all profit has been exhausted, and whose overcoming represents human-
ity’s only chance for salvation.20 
As much as it is cultural, the climate negationism illustrated in Interstellar is 
also, and perhaps most importantly political. It is therefore essential to understand what 
is often depicted as a global indifference or unconsciousness to the ecological issue as 
a deliberate choice, an institutionalized posture of contempt for that which ties us to 
the world. In Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime, Bruno Latour ar-
gues that, for the last thirty years, the whole political landscape has been organized 
around the dedication of the economic elites to escape from the common world. Ex-
ploding inequalities, massive deregulation and the intensification of a neoliberal glob-
alization all illustrate this commitment from the powerful few to live offshore and 
abandon the earth. This posture of disengagement from the world we inhabit and co-
 
20 For a more exhaustive analysis of the political culture underlying the movie, see: 
Paul RIGOUSTE, “Interstellar: l’homme du passé est l’homme de l’avenir”, in Le Cinéma est Politique, 
27.11.2014. 




create also requires a massive investment in the organization of climate change denial. 
Deconstructing the narrative of a global unconsciousness often mobilized to justify the 
institutional inertia regarding the ecological issue and unveiling it as a rhetorical strat-
egy of climate denial, Latour’s approach to the present climate mutation uncovers the 
interests of a certain oligarchy to purposely ignore what constitutes a colossal threat to 
a system of production and consumption that benefits them. Not only does Latour 
thereby assert the ultimate political dimension of the ecological issue, he also draws 
our attention to a fantasized posture of emancipation from the bonds of the world and 
reveals the deep-ranging dream to escape the earth underlying this stance21. 
 
Elucidating the embeddedness of this cultural and political alienation from the 
world is one of the root-questions of this research. It resumes an interrogation in which 
ecology arose: an interrogation about our inhabiting, our dwelling, our relationship to 
the intimate alterity we have come to call the world, and which the modern cosmology 
baptized nature. The reflections unfolded in this research draw upon Bruno Latour’s 
account of Modernity. Latour analyses Modernity first and foremost as an epistemo-
logical regime, a cosmological order segregating reality along structural binaries such 
as nature and culture, object and subject, facts and their interpretations, secular and 
religious. This purifying practice of the Moderns, along with their devotion for the god 
of reason, amounts for Latour to a matter of faith. In We Have Never Been Modern, he 
deconstructs the Modern narrative and exhibits a deceptive dualism failing to contain 
a world populated by “hybrids”22. The philosophy of Bruno Latour uncovers Moder-
nity as a political hegemony enforcing its order across the globe through an all-present 
modernization front of which the advocates of progress are the missionaries23. His in-
depth investigation of Modernity as a mode of worlding elucidates what it means to 
inhabit the earth from within the cosmology of Modernity. While the common word 
“modernity” refers loosely to the historical era that arose in the wake of the European 
 
21 Bruno LATOUR, Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime, Polity Press, 2018. 
22 Bruno LATOUR, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes, La Découverte, Paris, 1998. 
23 Bruno LATOUR, Down to Earth, op. cit. 
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Renaissance, each occurrence of the word “Modernity” in this thesis shall summon 
Bruno Latour’s legacy. 
 
How do we inhabit the earth, and how should we inhabit it? How to cohabit 
with those inhabiting this same, common world? How to dwell peacefully in a world 
into which, as we learn from the Abrahamic tales that infuse our modern western cos-
mology, we have fallen? How to engage with what surrounds us? Coined by XIXth 
century German zoologist Ernst Haeckel, the science of ecology deals with this riddle 
of the inhabiting, understood as the relationship of living things to their environments. 
The prefix “eco” from the Ancient Greek οἶκος refers indeed to the house as dwelling 
place, habitation, suggesting that ecology wonders about the relationship to our home, 
and the ecological crisis therefore points toward a crisis of our inhabiting. As the loss 
of habitat threatens a whole variety of species, it materializes an ecological crisis con-
temporary to a not less criminal refugee crisis. In June 2018, the Dutch NGO United 
for Intercultural Action (UNITED) recorded the death of 34,361 migrants in the pro-
cess of travelling to Europe from the early 1990s. The report reveals that not all deaths 
occur at sea, but also in detention blocks, asylum units, factories and town centres.24 
Meanwhile, the sixth mass extinction of life on earth, monitored as the most devastat-
ing event since the asteroid impact that wiped out the dinosaurs, also finds its roots in 
anthropogenic causes.25 Elizabeth Kolbert equates the current disbelief surrounding 
this issue, i.e. the fact that certain human behaviours may lead to the mass extinction 
of whole species, to a cultural posture of denialism. 
In Imagining Extinction26, Ursula Heise also approaches extinction as a cultural 
predicament. Her analysis of extinction discourses acknowledges the primacy of nar-
ratives and unravels biodiversity as a cultural as well as a political issue. Approaching 
the concern of multispecies justice through the prism of cultural imagination, Heise 
 
24 Niamh MCINTYRE, Mark RICE-OXLEY, “It's 34,361 and rising: how the List tallies Europe's migrant 
bodycount.”, The Guardian, 20.06.2018. 
URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/the-list-europe-migrant-bodycount   
Accessed 11.03.2019. 
25 Elizabeth KOLBERT, The Sixth Extinction. An Unnatural History. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014. 
26 Ursula HEISE, Imagining Extinction: The Cultural Meaning of Endangered Species, The University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2016. 
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draws our attention to the stories which structure the way cultures care or not about 
other species. Her literary approach to extinction thereby also invites us to think inter-
sectional structures of oppression encompassing both humans and non-humans, lead-
ing us to wonder how we may negotiate difference and extend our respect to other 
beings and species. What conditions our perception of ecological abundance and bio-
logical diversity? Which are the narratives that, conveying a cultural alienation from 
the outer world, are the heralds of a twofold crisis of the home and others? Which 
narratives might on the contrary enable us to share a world with innumerable entangled 
forms of life and embrace our obligation toward a more than human world?27 This I 
aim to explore in the present dissertation.  
  
 
27 See also Deborah Bird ROSE, Thom van DOOREN and Matthew CHERLEW, Extinction Studies: Stories 
of Time, Death and Generations, Columbia University Press, New York, 2017. 
Acknowledging the ecological, cultural and ethical dimensions of extinction, this collective volume 
dives into the “entangled significance of extinction” (p.3) and seeks to engage the complexity of specific 
sites of loss. Exploring modes of response those of us who remain might give to the lives lost to extinc-
tion, the different chapters articulate an effort to inhabit and pay tribute to an incredible biological and 
cultural diversity. The authors reassert the immense power of narratives as they claim that “it matters 
which stories we use to tell and think other stories with” and commit to “tell stories in ways that are 
open and accountable to these diverse others” (p.4). In the afterword, Vinciane Despret further unravels 
the cardinal idea according to which we populate the earth with stories. She wonders about the absence 
left by extinction: what is lost with the presence of extinct species? Who suffers? What is lost, she 
argues, is a part of the world. We as humans can mourn the loss of extinct species, but ultimately, “the 
world dies from each absence”. She writes: “every sensation of every being of the world is a mode 
through which the world lives and feels itself, and through which it exists. And every sensation of every 
being of the world causes all the beings of the world to feel and think themselves differently. When a 
being is no more, the world narrows all of a sudden, and a part of reality collapses. Each time an exist-
ence disappears it is a piece of the universe of sensations that fades away.” Before adding: “but what 
the world has lost even more is the unique, sensual, living, warm, musical, and colourful point of view 
that the passenger Pigeons created upon it and with it. This unique point of view to which the world 
owed the sensations of so many things, is no more.” (p.220). 
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2. Methodological approach 
 
Thinking beyond disciplinary structures 
Wherefrom and how do I proceed? The methodological approach adopted in this 
doctoral research is inherent to the object of its study: the environmental crisis as a 
radically complex, entangled and kaleidoscopic event which can hardly be reduced to 
a single discipline. My research thus evolves within a deeply transdisciplinary frame-
work, one blurring the boundaries between the traditional academic disciplines of en-
vironmental philosophy, religious studies, political science, cosmological anthropol-
ogy or the anthropology of worlds, ecofeminist studies and even literary hermeneutics. 
The transdisciplinary stance embraced in this research is appreciated as a condition 
for analysing and subverting the modern episteme, its disciplinary structures and its 
regime of truth. Michel Foucault describes the latter as “a system of ordered proce-
dures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and functioning of state-
ments”, reminding us thereby that truth “is produced by virtue of multiple constraints” 
and relies upon a complex disciplinary apparatus of separation.28 The notion of regime 
of truth invites us to approach the production of truth and knowledge as a political, 
economic and institutional regime of power, shedding light on the entanglement of 
scientific discourses with the exercise of power. Ecofeminist philosopher Val Plum-
wood thus identifies the “standpoint of mastery” in a series of epistemological dual-
isms conditioning beliefs about the self and its relationship to others. She argues that 
the modern dualism between reason and nature infuses an infrastructure of domination 
manifest in sexism, racism, capitalism, colonialism and the exploitation of nature, 
where women, racialized people and non-humans are subordinated to the representa-




28 Michel FOUCAULT, Surveiller et Punir, Gallimard, 1975, p.113. My translation. 
29 See Val PLUMWOOD, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, 1992. 
 and Environmental Culture: the Ecological Crisis of Reason, Routledge, 2002. 
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Reclaiming the theologico-political 
 
Drawing upon these considerations, the methodological approach adopted in this 
dissertation is one sensitive to the profound link between the religious and the political. 
The reflection unfolded in this research proposes to restore the radical power of theo-
logical conceptions in the political culture of modern western secularized societies. It 
is indebted to Carl Schmitt’s notion of the politico-theological and his now famous 
insight into the theological foundation of the modern state: “all significant concepts of 
the state are secularized concepts of God.” “Only by being aware of this analogy”, 
Schmitt pursues, “can we appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas of 
the state developed in the last centuries.”30 
Attempting to define it, religion arises as a problematic category, difficult to de-
limit and translate into non-European languages. How does it differ from the similarly 
vast spheres of culture, spirituality or even ideology? Moreover, how does the “return 
of spirituality” relate to institutional religion and to the consensus of the secularization 
of western societies? The research field of critical religion analyses the category of 
religion as cardinal to the ideological arsenal of western Modernity. Timothy Fitzger-
ald thus deconstructs the concept of religion, disguised as an unproblematic and ubiq-
uitous universal, as a modern fiction underlying the production of a fantasized secular. 
According to him, the religious, being removed to a marginal, privatised domain, 
serves to delineate and mystify the proclaimed rationality and universality of the sec-
ular order. In this regard, the blooming of contemporary spiritualities appear as an 
outgrowth of this dynamic of marginalization of institutional religion. As the binary 
opposition between religious and secular tends to neutralize the discourses that divert 
from the prescribed secular, it reveals a political agenda of legitimation of an ideolog-
ical (neoliberal capitalist) order. Following Latour’s intuition of the radically political 
dimension of the cosmological regime of Modernity anchored in cardinal binaries, 
 
30 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, Mass.: MIT, Cambridge, 1985. p.36. 
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Fitzgerald therefore argues that the modern invention of religion was simultaneously 
the invention of modern politics.31 
I suggest that both the analysis of the current ecological crisis as well as our con-
crete involvement in it would greatly benefit from the inclusion of the “religious” and 
the “spiritual” into the reflection. Here the emerging category of spirituality, as popular 
as it is versatile, arises as a contemporary subvertion of the modern binary between 
religious and secular. In a conference on Permaculture and the Sacred she gave at Har-
vard Divinity School, Starhawk argues that bringing together spirituality, ecology and 
politics creates a rich hinge allowing a more fertile look at the contemporary systems 
of thought which presently frame the environmental issue.32 She maintains, along with 
cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz, that “religion” is constitutive of culture for it 
creates a cultural ethos that defines the core values of a society and the persons living 
in it.33 Starhawk consistently formulates the urgency to disclose and cultivate the link 
between the spiritual and the political34, emphasizing how much religion, concepts of 
God and the sacred not only determine and reinforce socio-political relationships, but 
also are connected to and reveal metaphors deeply embedded in our language and 
thought. She notably observes that goodness and value were traditionally associated 
with things outside and beyond the world, while the down-below of the material world 
and anything embodied were devalued as dirty, obscure, inherently flawed and cor-
rupted (such associations, as Val Plumwood also observed, underlying and reinforcing 
sexist, racist and specist structures of domination). Starhawk then reminds us of the 
depreciative meaning of dirt – this very dirt without which we cannot live. 35 
 
31 Timothy FITZGERALD, “Critical religion and critical research on religion: Religion and politics as 
modern fictions”, Critical Research on Religion, 2015, 3 (3), pp.315-319. 






 Jone SALOMONSEN, Enchanted Feminism: The Reclaiming Witches of San Francisco, 2002, 
Routledge, p.143. 
34 STARHAWK, The Spiral Dance, Harper & Row, San Francisco, Special 20th Anniversary Edition, 
1999 (1979), Introduction. 




Identifying these deeply ingrained structures of thought and language allow us to 
distance ourselves from them and potentially subvert them with alternative beliefs: 
hence, for example, the subversive potential of the belief in the sacredness of the earth, 
or the neopagan cult of the Goddess, for 1970s environmental and ecofeminist activ-
ism. It also sparks and rehabilitates a reflection around the sacred, understood as what 
we care about, that for which we care36, what is most important to us, what mobilizes 
us, what moves us. The cultures which we inherited from have indeed located the sa-
cred outside the world, thus devaluating the latter as a worthless place. Starhawk de-
nounces a “great bewitchment, a spell cast upon the world to enforce the belief that 
the economic profit of a few stands above the living system of the earth”.37 Which 
conception of the sacred entitle us to destroy the living system that supports our life 
and other forms of life?  
 
Delving into the mythology of our inhabiting – for an environmental hermeneutics 
of metaphors 
 This thesis is concerned with the obscure power of myths, symbols and meta-
phors in dictating the way we dwell in the world. It approaches the crisis of the home 
and of the inhabiting manifested by the environmental mutation through a lens that 
unfolds the intimate union of poetics and poiesis: the marriage of literary forms and 
discourses with a transformative action in the world – in other words, of myths and 
politics. Emphasizing the belief that current policies are informed by an ideological 
structure which itself draws upon an array of theological and mythical narratives 
means going against the methodological paradigm of rationalism which postulates that 





36 Emilie HACHE, Ce à quoi nous tenons. Propositions pour une écologie pragmatique. Les Empêcheurs 
de penser en rond, 2011. 







the slippery mode of speculation and interpretation, even amidst an event so concrete 
as the global ecological mutation. 
In his introduction to Facing the Planetary, William E. Connolly argues that 
“the mythic today expresses that which circulates below the threshold of official ex-
pression”, and suggests that the study of myths might both enable an in-depth under-
standing of official narratives and cosmologies and inform an alternative, resilient en-
gagement with the latter: “the turn to myth is a turn toward an insurrection of voices 
straining to be heard beneath the clamor of dominant stories.”38 The political theorist 
draws upon the mythological potential of the Book of Job to interpret the intensifica-
tion of support for neoliberal ideology after it led to the economic meltdown of 2008, 
or the radicalization of climate denialism in face of growing evidence supporting cli-
mate change. He thereby summons the hermeneutical potential of cultural myths and 
metaphors in order to approach contemporary events otherwise difficult to grasp. 
As the present ecological transition confronts us with the colossal challenge to 
develop new categories of thought, new words and new ideas to express unprecedented 
realities, the creativity of speculative philosophy is called for. It appears indeed that 
the environmental crisis reawakens philosophy to its most essential task: that of 
dwelling amidst the openness of thought, cracking open a conceptual framework 
rendered obsolete and unable to channel emerging thought processes, and thinking on 
the edge of a vacillating world.  Applying the methods and resources of the field of 
hermeneutics to the current environmental issue, I argue, honours the task of 
philosophically engaging with the present world and its plural becomings insofar as it 
confronts and embraces our inescapable involvement – notably interpretative, but not 
only – in these same becomings. The task of hermeneutics is one of interpretation 
understood as mediation and creation of meaning: it is a task of connecting and 
engaging with the world by embracing the ontological blurring of object and subject. 
In this perspective, I propose in this doctoral dissertation to delve into the metaphors 
of our inhabiting so as to gain a new insight on the current environmental crisis. The 
metaphor of the root, for instance, might be worth investigating as it is, Cathy 
Wampole observes, “constantly evoked in situations of cultural rupture, ecological 
 
38 William E. CONNOLLY, Facing the Planetary, Duke University Press, 2017, p.1. 
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alienation, and technophobic angst.”39 Hans Blumenberg developed his own 
“paradigms for a metaphorology”, emphasizing the methodological benefit of studying 
the metaphors grounding our cosmologies: 
 
metaphorology seeks to burrow down to the substructure of thought, 




3. Research problem, apparatus and potential outcome 
 
A Hermeneutics of Gnosticism for the present environmental transition 
 
Throughout this introductory chapter, I have wondered about an ambient es-
trangement from the world and the pervasive ways in which it is conveyed in our cos-
mologies, narratives and metaphors. This defines the general interrogation leading this 
doctoral research. As we ponder over this question and attempt to answer it, I propose 
to investigate the imaginary of Gnosticism as an original, unexpected resource in the 
field of environmental humanities. Whence the alienation from the world? How to 
inhabit this unruly world? The root questions of ecology, I argue, are the same as those 
formulated by Gnosticism, an obscure name given by modern historians to describe a 
variety of ancient religious ideas and systems which arose in the Mediterranean world 
of early Christianity. A heterogenous corpus of beliefs and narratives which strikes 
however by the unity of their experience: that of the utter alienness of the world, the 
absence of sacredness in the world, and the burning desire to escape worldly existence. 
Two German political philosophers of the XXth century, Hans Jonas and Eric 
Voegelin, delved into the perplexing category of Gnosticism and analysed in their own 
 
39 Cathy WAMPOLE, Rootedness. The Ramifications of a metaphor, University of Chicago Press, 2016, 
p.31. 
40 Hans BLUMENBERG, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, trad. Robert Savage, Cornell University Press, 
2010 (1960), p.5. 
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respective ways the political modernity of the West in light of these gnostic cosmolo-
gies. While both view Gnosticism as a key to diagnose the modern predicament, their 
diagnoses of Modernity are characterized by parallels and contrasts which the first two 
chapters of this dissertation aim to explore. In many regards, Hans Jonas’ philosophy 
appears to have anticipated the issues related to the ecological crisis: committed to 
overcome the ethical nihilism pervading modern thought and politics, his ethics of 
responsibility for the technological age laid the groundwork for the field of environ-
mental ethics, while his philosophy of biology and his critique of modern dualism an-
ticipated contemporary developments in ecological ontology. Eric Voegelin’s philo-
sophical project focused on what he called the pneumo-pathological condition of mo-
dernity, manifest according to him in the rise of totalitarian ideologies within modern 
political movements. Emphasizing the organic link between politics and religion, 
Voegelin aimed to identify the spiritual disorders of political modernity. Both philos-
ophers diagnosed at the heart of Modernity an attitude of contempt for the world which 
echoes greatly with the contemporary ecological issue. 
Drawing upon their original and somehow still unacknowledged insights, this 
research attempts to unfold the potential of Hans Jonas and Eric Voegelin’s analyses 
of Gnosticism for approaching the contemporary ecological mutation. The research 
apparatus building this project proposes to transpose Jonas and Voegelin’s diagnoses 
of modern Gnosticism to the burning political context of the ecological issue – which 
in many regards appears as the crowning event of political modernity –, thereby as-
sessing their relevance from a contemporary perspective. This thought apparatus in-
tends in a way to submit Jonas and Voegelin’s insights on Gnosticism to the test of the 
present, asking whether the contemporary event of the ecological mutation confirms, 
disproves, alters or even prolongs their hypotheses, and vice-versa, to illuminate the 
riddle of the ecological issue with the unexpected help of their concept of Gnosticism. 
What does the perspective of Gnosticism, as endorsed by Jonas and Voegelin, teach 
us about the advent of the ecological crisis? Reciprocally, what does the contemporary 
context add to their diagnosis of Modern Gnosticism? The specificity of my approach 
is therefore to aim at a cross-fertilization between the concept of Gnosticism and the 
present advent of the ecological crisis. This experimental thought apparatus resembles 
in this regard what Hans Georg Gadamer described as a hermeneutic circle. A decisive 
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figure in the rise of twentieth century hermeneutics, the German philosopher developes 
a dialogic approach grounded in Heideggerian thinking and characterized by the notion 
of interpretative interdependence. Gadamer conceives interpretation as a dialogical 
and practical activity, based on a set of prior conceptions, experiences and concerns 
defining a prior hermeneutical situatedness. More particularly, his development of the 
concept of hermeneutic circle suggests that neither the object nor the subject of the 
interpretation can be understood without reference to one another. In the specific con-
text of this doctoral research, the idea of hermeneutic circle allows us to appreciate the 
fact that neither the perspective of Gnosticism nor the contemporary event of the eco-
logical mutation could be regarded as independent entities: they should instead always 
be approached as the contingent products of interpretations entangled with each other 
along a hermeneutic process engaging a kaleidoscope of perspectives. Gadamer’s re-
thinking of traditional hermeneutics moreover emphasizes how the act of interpreta-
tion always involves the prospect of application, for it is oriented toward present con-
cerns and interests which condition our entrance into the hermeneutic dialogue in the 
first place41.  
The hermeneutics of Gnosticism I propose to develop in this research is in-
tended as an attempt to renew the traditional engagement with the present ecological 
issue. Drawing upon the analyses of Hans Jonas and Eric Voegelin, I suggest that the 
concept of Gnosticism may unveil cardinal metaphors of our inhabiting, thereby ena-
bling a renewed understanding of contemporary politics’ involvement in the present 
ecological mutation. I argue that the concept of Gnosticism provides an invaluable 
hermeneutical key allowing us to think through the present environmental crisis. More 
specifically, the perspective of Gnosticism allows us to explore the religious, spiritual 
and cosmological origin of what is often depicted as a contemporary indifference for 
the world and the terrestrial. Something in the gnostic understanding – or misunder-
standing – of the ideas of immanence and transcendence appears to condition the mod-
ern engagement with the world, itself greatly determined by a dualistic concept of na-
ture. In this dissertation, I propose to explore the ways in which the hermeneutics of 
 
41 Hans Georg GADAMER, "Hermeneutics and Social Science", Cultural Hermeneutics, 2 (4), December 
1975, pp. 307–316. 
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Gnosticism might illuminate our current understanding of the ecological issue, as well 
as the ways in which this new light might enable a rediscovery of the world we inhabit.  
 
 
How legitimate is the category of Gnosticism? 
 
 The hermeneutical investigation of parallels between the cosmologies of an-
cient Gnosticism and the modern era falls within a certain tradition of thought em-
braced by other contemporary thinkers such as Hans Blumenberg42, Ludwig von Bart-
alanffy, Hans Urs von Balthasar43, Jacob Taubes44 or even Carl Jung. This tradition 
perceives strong echoes between both systems of thought and therefore emphasizes 
the outstanding relevance of the gnostic insights for the study of key aspects of modern 
cosmology and its predicaments. The gnostic ethereal insistence on the other world 
and the beyond would parallel for instance Modernity’s tendencies toward political 
and cultural millenarianism. The present research distinguishes itself radically from a 
genealogical enquiry into the historical generation of modern cosmologies. Well aware 
of the cultural contingency of this construct, it recognizes Gnosticism as a hermeneu-
tical concept of political philosophy rather than a legitimate historiographical category. 
Throughout this project, I propose to handle the concept of Gnosticism as a conceptual 
invention particularly sensitive to the presence of certain symbolic structures in our 
narratives. This requires our perpetual and dutiful attention against the temptation to 
essentialize this hermeneutical perspective and to mistake Gnosticism for an objective 
reality. I explore Gnosticism as a lens, one amongst many others, to approach the pre-
sent world and the ways in which we inhabit it – conceptually, symbolically, but also 
in the most embodied way, empirically, daily, politically, ecologically – unfolding this 
conceptual invention initiated by Jonas and Voegelin to throw light upon something 
that might otherwise remain undisclosed, unformulated, unthought.   
 
42 Hans BLUMENBERG, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1976.   
43 Hans URS VON BALTHASAR, The Scandal of the Incarnation. Irenaeous against the Heretics, Ignatus 
Press, 1990 (1981). 
44 Jacob TAUBES, Abendländische Eschatologie, Berlin, Matthes und Seitz, 2007.   
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4. Thesis outline 
 
A brief overview of how the different chapters of this dissertation fold into one 
another and how they articulate my argument will prove helpful before delving into 
the heart of our hermeneutics of Gnosticism. The dissertation can be divided into two 
main parts: the first, composed of the first three chapters, draws upon the respective 
analyses of Hans Jonas and Eric Voegelin to elaborate my own hermeneutics of Gnos-
ticism. The second part intends to articulate the contribution of this hermeneutics for 
the contemporary thought of the environmental transition, displaying how a reflection 
around the metaphors of our inhabiting disclosed by the perspective of Gnosticism 
might inform a renewed cosmological as well as political engagement with the present 
ecological issue. 
 
Chapter 1 engages Hans Jonas’ concept of Gnosticism and the ways in which 
his diagnosis of a worldless dualism might illuminate the contemporary context of the 
ecological crisis. Jonas identifies in gnostic narratives a “tripartite dualism” where the 
figure of God crystallizes a radical rupture between humanity and the world, thus dic-
tating a structural dynamic of escape from the world, or Demundanization (Entwelt-
lichung). Jonas’ study of Gnosticism from an existential perspective unveils dualism 
as a worldless, nihilistic form of engagement with the world articulated around the 
belief that the worldly and the divine are two irreconcilable poles of a definitive rup-
ture. I propose to delve into the figure of the abyss to approach this gnostic dualism 
and articulate its dynamic as one of sealing, or closure of the world.  
 
Chapter 2 elucidates Eric Voegelin’s insights on Gnosticism, originally aimed 
at a diagnosis of the pneumo-pathological element pervading the political and 
ideological movements of the XXth century. Suggesting that Gnosticism stems from 
the difficulty of dwelling in-between, Voegelin’s analyses provide a key to approach 
the present challenge of inhabiting a world of collapse and emergence, destruction and 
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creation, and of sustaining hope in the face of irreparable loss. At the roots of the 
gnostic rebellion against worldly being, the philosopher identifies a feeling of 
alienation from the world, an incapacity of dwelling translating into a perpetual revolt 
and the belief that politics is the privileged means to overcome this alienated condition. 
Voegelin qualifies this gnostic inhabiting as Anoia – a forgetfulness of the co-
penetration and co-creation involved in the process of common worlding45. His 
understanding of the platonic idea of metaxy allows us furthermore to conceptualize 
the pathology of Gnosticism as an incapacity to sustain the overflowing tension of 




Following these preliminary explorations, chapter 3 synthetizes my reflections 
around Hans Jonas and Eric Voegelin’s analyses of Gnosticism in the purpose of lay-
ing down the main features of my hermeneutics of Gnosticism. My reflections pivot 
as this third chapter harvests the fruits which emerged from my study of the work of 
Jonas and Voegelin and draws the first conclusions of a hermeneutics of Gnosticism 
for the present ecological crisis. What does the perspective of Gnosticism illuminate 
about the contemporary context? What key tropes of our contemporary inhabiting does 
the hermeneutics of Gnosticism unveil? Key ideas that arose along my study of Jonas 
and Voegelin indicate the pathology of a worldless inhabiting, a tragedy of the home 
ordaining an eminently political crisis. As the chapter proceeds, I propose to under-
stand this worldless inhabiting as resulting from a dualistic closure of the world. Both 
Jonas and Voegelin point indeed toward the idea of an ontological tension, an open in-
betweenness characterizing worldly becoming, whereby I reconceptualize Gnosticism 
as the dualistic reduction of the ontological tension of the world. I argue that a herme-
neutics of Gnosticism reveals precisely what the pathological inhabiting diagnosed by 
Jonas and Voegelin is committed to conceal, absorb and escape from: the tension of 
being in the world. 
 
45 Voegelin, Eric, Order and History – In Search of Order, Louisiana State University Press, Baton 




Chapter 4 inaugurates the most speculative and creative side of this disserta-
tion, flowing from the analyses laid out along the first part. It observes a shift in my 
approach as I propose to draw upon the hermeneutics of Gnosticism elaborated in the 
earlier chapters to unfold the ramifications of my hypothesis and develop original re-
flections about the cosmological mutation induced by the contemporary ecological cri-
sis. One key challenge of this fourth chapter is to delve deeper into the metaxic tension 
identified at the heart of Gnosticism to uncover the central concern of dwelling in-
between – in between species, people, borders, times, political systems, disciplines, 
paradigms – in order to mend the alienated inhabiting of the Gnostics. To this end, I 
explore alternative metaphors that might inform a resilient inhabiting for the present. 
Along the way, as I attempt to bridge the notion of planetary entanglement with the 
openness of worldly processes of becoming, I introduce the idea of rooted overflowing 
as a way to think the irreducible metaxy of the world disclosed anew by the present 
ecological mutation. 
 
Lastly, chapter 5 embraces the eminently political dimension of my hermeneu-
tics of Gnosticism and articulates the modalities of a possible alternative, sustainable 
and creative inhabiting to support present political action. This concluding chapter 
presents itself as the deliberately more concrete development of the cosmo-ontological 
speculations unfolded in the previous chapters, and blooms into a reflection on the 
consequences of a hermeneutics of Gnosticism for contemporary political philosophy 
as well as for a resilient politics of the present. I approach the political as the art of 
inhabiting a world of entangled becomings, and the ecological crisis as therefore ar-
chetypical of the political. I explore some of the ways in which the advent of the eco-
logical mutation summons us to redefine the conceptual framework of present politics, 
and how our hermeneutics of Gnosticism might support one such redefinition. This 
mutation of political philosophy is addressed from three angles: the apocalyptic scope 
of politics unveiled by the ecological crisis, illuminating its profound liminality as well 
as its eschatological density; the imperative of an ethics of entangled responsibility, 
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and the mission of inhabiting the world with love to heal the alienated inhabiting di-








HANS JONAS’ ANALYSIS OF GNOSTICISM: 










1) The significance of Gnosticism in Hans Jonas’ philosophy: a reflection on 
the inhabiting of the world 
 
In his study of the work of Hans Jonas justly entitled Habiter le Monde, Robert 
Theis argues that Jonas’ whole philosophical thought follows from his study of Gnos-
ticism – the existential analysis of his young years laying the groundwork for his future 
philosophy of nature, his environmental ethics of responsibility, and even the more 
speculative theological developments presented in The Concept of God after Ausch-
witz. Robert Theis goes on to suggest that Jonas’ work is led by a key idea: that of 
inhabiting the world. Micha Brumlik characterizes indeed Jonas’ philosophy as a “re-
volt against the escape from the world”46. In the present chapter, I wish to further 
Theis’ claim, arguing that Jonas’ early works on Gnosticism condition the later devel-
opment of his thought, characterized by an ontology of the world inscribing the ethical 
 
46 Micha BRUMLIK, "Revolte wider die Weltflucht. Zum Tode des Philosophen Hans Jonas," Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 8 February 1993, 8. 42. 
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duty of dwelling in the world. To the discovery in his early research on Gnosticism of 
a deep anti-cosmic dualism pervading modern cosmology, Jonas shall answer with a 
philosophy of life offering to think the “deep rootedness of the spirit and freedom in 
the very web of a nature that carries in itself the tendency towards life and conscious-
ness.”47 The Imperative of Responsibility thus represents the philosopher’s attempt to 
establish the conditions of a new ethics for the technological civilization which would 
ground the moral imperative of preserving worldly being. Doing so, Jonas goes against 
the gnostic contempt for the world and deliberately commits the sin of “naturalistic 
fallacy”, characterizing the transition from Being to Ought, or from ontology to ethics. 
Jonas’ ethical thought illustrates the quest for an ethical principle rooted in a solicitous, 
sensitive and response-able engagement with worldly being, thereby fully embracing 
the entanglement of ontology and ethics. Impregnated with the problematic of the the-
odicy which he confronted in the Concept of God after Auschwitz, the Jonassian ethics 
of responsibility displays a metaphysico-theological dimension, manifest notably in 
the will to ground the moral imperative within a cosmological system. 
 
While Jonas does not explicitly refer to this theological, more freely specula-
tive dimension of his thought when recounting the stages of his intellectual journey, it 
is our intention to demonstrate how this dimension operates as a latent, if essential 
aspect of his philosophy: 
 
Initially came my study of the Gnosticism of late antiquity from the 
perspective of existential analysis; then my encounter with the nat-
ural sciences on my way to formulating a philosophy of the organ-
ism; and finally my turn from theoretical to practical philosophy – 
that is, to ethics – in response to the urgent challenge of technology 
that could no longer be ignored.48 
 
 
47 Robert THEIS, Habiter le monde, Michalon, 2008, p.10. My translation.  
48 Hans JONAS, “Wissenschaft as Personal Experience”, Hastings Center Report, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Jul. - 
Aug., 2002), p.28. 
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Jonas draws the generation of his ethical philosophy as stemming from a philosophy 
of worldly being, itself rooted in an existential analysis. His ethical thought succeeds 
first to an original exploration, from the existential-gnostic perspective, of what mod-
ern cosmology refers to as the “subjective”, then to a study of the world, of “natural” 
and “objective” being, approached through the lens of the philosophy of organism. Led 
by the ambition to overcome the gnostic divorce between humanity and the world, 
Jonas thus goes from the subject to the object and concludes on the ethical, where he 
attempts to bridge these two poles of modern dualism. Confronted by the colossal task 
of formulating an ethics for a secular civilization in dire need to contain its hubristic 
action on the beings of the world, the Imperative of Responsibility raises the interro-
gation 
 
whether, without restoring the category of the sacred, the category 
most thoroughly destroyed by the scientific enlightenment, we can 
have an ethics able to cope with the extreme powers which we pos-
sess today.49 
 
 What may ground the perfectly immanent transcendence of that which calls for the 
protection of worldly being(s)? Jonas’ ethical thought is infused with the profound 
intuition that “no “secularization” may go so far that we forfeit the awareness or intu-
itions of transcendence which religion has made accessible and from which an inalien-
able content can be salvaged into the post-religious perspective”50, and radiates the 
strong belief in the immanent transcendence of the moral imperative: “religion in 
eclipse cannot relieve ethics of its task”51. Jonas’ work thus manifests the acute con-
sciousness of the overlap of ethics and religion, as well as the intuition of a deep on-
tological entanglement of worldly being that overflows a dualistic structure of thought. 
 
 
49 Hans JONAS, The Imperative of Responsibility, In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1987, p.23. 




 Jonas’ interpretation of Gnosticism appears to be a paramount element in his 
critique of modern dualistic cosmology, as well as a decisive step on the way to a 
renewed thought of nature. In his early work, Jonas proposes to uncover the presence 
within existentialist thought of an underlying dualism – the same dualism which he 
thinks to have unveiled throughout his hermeneutical study of Gnosticism. This origi-
nal hermeneutical enquiry seems to have determined the whole of his philosophical 
project, identifiable by a thought of the “mediation between nature and the other of 
nature”52  - between the modern concept of nature and that which overflows it: the 
spirit, the creative consciousness, or the immanent openness of the world. Such a pro-
ject implies an alternative ontology of the world which Jonas, inspired by the thought 
of Alfred North Whitehead, contributed to sketch and which still remains to be fully 
embraced and unfolded by contemporary philosophy. The advent of the ecological 
crisis only exacerbates the inadequacy of the modern dualistic cosmology in approach-
ing the ontological entanglement of worldly beings manifested by present events. The 
pivotal problematic of dualism, which Jonas first identified in the light of his analysis 
of Gnosticism, reflects itself with a particular intensity in the present ecological crisis: 
 
This situation is magnified in the case of the impact of contemporary 
humankind's technology on the natural environment. And indeed, as 
this phenomenon – namely, the threat we pose to the planet's ecol-
ogy – became more and more apparent during the second half of this 
century and finally even came to the attention of philosophers, sud-
denly one of the oldest philosophical questions, that of the relation-
ship between human being and nature, between mind and matter – 
in other words, the age-old question of dualism – took on a totally 
new form. Now this question is no longer something to meditate on 
in the calm light of theory; it is illuminated by the lightning flashes 
of an approaching storm, warnings of a crisis that we, its uninten-
tional creators, have the planetary duty of trying to avert. Thanks to 
this exceedingly practical aspect of the problem, the reconciliation 
between our presumptuous special status as humans and the uni-
verse as a whole, which is the source of our life, is becoming a cen-
tral concern of philosophy. I see in this an urgent task for philosophy 
 
52 Robert THEIS, Habiter le monde, op. cit., p.32. 
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to address, both at the present moment and into the coming cen-
tury.53 
 
Attempting to address the gnostic element pervading modern thought, Jonas had to 
proceed to an Aufhebung of the nihilistic tendency in Heideggerian philosophy, upon 
which his analysis focuses. In a proper dialectical movement, Jonas’ philosophical 
thought intends to preserve the gnostic intuition of an existential tension, a dwelling in 
between, while overcoming the nihilistic tendency to a withdrawal from the world, a 
Demundanization of our thought and inhabiting. This project relies upon a unique 




2) The Jonassian approach to Gnosticism 
 
A controversial category 
 
Hans Jonas’ approach to Gnosticism is a controversial one. While several 
scholars have discarded Jonas’ study of ancient Gnosticism, converging on the obso-
lescence of his analysis, some have come to question the legitimacy of the very cate-
gory of Gnosticism. Present scholarly research in religious historiography tends indeed 
to challenge the validity of the category of Gnosticism, denouncing its pretention to 
characterize a monolithic religious phenomenon, while the term appears to cover a 
wide range of heterogeneous traditions that fail to even converge on a specific set of 
features. Michael Williams’54 work thus contributes to uncover the category of Gnos-
ticism, which Jonas largely contributed to define, as a Modern construct, with no reli-
able evidence in ancient sources to support the unification of a profusion of mytholog-
ical narratives, leading him to plead for the dismantling of the category of Gnosticism. 
 
53 Hans JONAS, “Philosophy at the End of the Century: A Survey of Its Past and Future”, Social Re-
search, Vol. 61, No. 4, Sixtieth Anniversary 1934-1994: The Legacy of Our Past (WINTER 1994), pp. 
813-832. Here p.826. I emphasize. 
54 Michael Allen WILLIAMS, Rethinking Gnosticism: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996. 
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In an article on Jonas’ construct “Gnosticism”55, Michael Waldstein provides a con-
densed insight into the scholarly criticism raised around the Jonassian use of the term, 
and proposes to investigate the intellectual generation of the concept by Jonas. He 
notably highlights the seminal influence, along with the hermeneutic principles inher-
ited from Heidegger’s existential analytic, of Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West, 
as well as Hegel’s philosophy of history. These idealistic influences seem to have crys-
tallized the main critiques formulated against the Jonassian category of Gnosticism, its 
legitimacy having been assessed along a pure historical perspective:  
 
Jonas’ theses are fascinating in their insightful soaring above the de-
tails of the earth. But they tend to misrepresent the actual history 
suggested by the texts from Nah Hammadi. In this respect there is 
surely much merit in Williams’ plea for dismantling the category 
“Gnosticism” as inherited from Jonas.56 
 
It is quite interesting to notice here that the critiques raised against Jonas’ ap-
proach to the category of Gnosticism tend to reproduce the dualism which the Jonas-
sian understanding of Gnosticism precisely contributes to unveil, and which the phi-
losopher invites us to critically consider: namely, that opposing the “ideal”, or “con-
ceptual”, to the “historical” or “empirical”. So that Jonas’ analysis of the structural 
dualism of gnostic systems of thought appears to anticipate the critique that would 
stigmatize his perspective on Gnosticism as too “ideal”, “conceptual”, “existential”, 
“ethereal” or “spiritual”, therefore failing to relate the pure historical, factual, empiri-
cal reality of Late Antiquity spiritual movements. If we consider the main critiques 
formulated against Jonas’ analysis, and while we cannot but acknowledge the con-
structed nature of his concept of Gnosticism, we might also deem such critiques tar-
geted at the too “ideal” dimension of his interpretation irrelevant to the concern lying 
at the core of the present chapter and thesis. The critique of the excessive idealism of 
one’s thought only bears relevance to one who accepts the postulate of a dualistic sys-
tem opposing the ideal to the factual, which the present dissertation intends to chal-
lenge. What is more, Jonas’ interest in ancient Gnosticism is an “ideal” one indeed, 
 
55 Michael WALDSTEIN, “Hans Jonas’ Construct “Gnosticism”: Analysis and Critique”, Journal of Early 
Christian Studies, Volume 8, Number 3, Fall 2000, pp. 341-372. 
56 Ibid, p.370. 
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and therein, I wish to argue, lies its significance – at least to the humble extent of a 
philosophical, hermeneutical endeavour. As Arthur Darby Nock had already sensed in 
1936, “Jonas’ real interest lies in an attempt to make a synthesis. (…) He is a meta-
physician trying to shake off the yoke of history and to lead us to a higher level of 
comprehension.”57 To this extent, Jonas’ interpretation of Gnosticism must be re-
garded as a speculative exercise in systematic and hermeneutical philosophy. His doc-
toral research, undertaken under the joint supervision of Martin Heidegger and Martin 
Bultmann and aptly entitled “The Concept of Gnosis”58, was led by the quest for a 
cardinal idea underpinning the profusion of spiritual and mythological innovations 
arising in the Late Antiquity period. Jonas’ approach to Gnosticism is a particular one, 
insofar as it does not dwell on its genealogical, nor even historical dimension. While 
aware of the strong syncretism characterizing gnostic movements, gathering elements 
stemming from Jewish, Babylonian, Egyptian, Syriac, or Iranian milieus, Jonas re-
mained attentive to the potential presence of a common idea, a common posture to-
wards the world and towards existence. His study is that of a mythological, mystical, 
cosmological, conceptual, philosophical Gnosis, and ought therefore to be treated as 
such. Drawing upon the existential analytic formulated by his professor in Sein und 
Zeit (1927), Jonas’ early analysis of gnostic narratives focused more specifically on 
the existential attitude characterizing these religious experiences. He thus offered to 
study Gnosticism as a phenomenon that demands to be interpreted along an existential 
analysis delving into some fundamental experience of our being in the world. The light 
he shed on ancient Gnosticism was reflected into a fruitful hermeneutical circle with 
existential philosophy, thereby unfolding some of the hermeneutical potential of the 






57 Arthur DARBY NOCK, “Review of Jonas, Gnosis und spätantiker Geist I,” Gnomon 12 (1936): 605–
12; reprinted in Nock, Essays on Religion and the Ancient World, ed. Zeph Stewart, 2 vols. (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1972), p. 444. 
58 Hans JONAS, Der Begriff der Gnosis, Hubert, Göttingen, 1930. 
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The Hermeneutical circle between Gnosticism and Existentialism 
 
Jonas’ approach to Gnosticism is characterized by the fecund hermeneutical 
association of the gnostic and existentialist thoughts. Waldstein mentions an “intense 
mirroring between historiography and existential philosophy”59 distinctive of Jonas’ 
work on Gnosticism, while Jonas himself admits to “a certain circularity in procedure”, 
proceeding from the realization that “what I had learnt out there [about the gnostic 
existence] made me now better understand the [existentialist] shore from which I had 
set out.”60 The Heideggerian existential analytic provided indeed Jonas with the con-
ceptual tools which then allowed him to elucidate what first appeared as a highly het-
erogeneous thought movement. This proved a methodological success, as Jonas re-
garded the existential perspective to constitute a hermeneutical key to unlock Gnosti-
cism and to make sense out of the profusion of gnostic expressions. According to Jo-
nas, Gnosticism thus represents “the new discovery of the Self which showed the Self’s 
incommensurability with all world-nature” and stands for the realization that such dis-
covery occurs “through a break with the world”, thereby achieving “a cosmic turning-
point of the Spirit”61 – which might be understood here as an avatar of the 
Heideggerian category of Being. Jonas’ hermeneutic approach to Gnosticism con-
verges on the colossal task of retrieving the self-understanding of human existence 
from its objectivation in mythological projections. As we shall see, the self-under-
standing characteristic of Gnosticism lies in a strong dualism opposing humanity to 
the world and locating salvation in a movement of liberation and escape from the world 
– what Jonas conceptualized under the term Entweltlichung, literally Demundaniza-
tion. Jonas soon realized however that such hermeneutical success might rely on some 
previously unnoticed, if essential, affinity between both systems of thought. What if 
the object of study became in itself a hermeneutical tool? Jonas sensed that his concept 
of Gnosticism might as well provide a key to unlock existentialism. This cardinal in-
 
59 Michael WALDSTEIN, art. cit., p.370. 
60 Hans JONAS, “Gnosticism, Existentialism and Nihilism”, Epilogue to the Gnostic Religion, Beacon 
Press, Boston, 2001, p.320. 




sight came with another realization, namely that of the utter contingency of the exis-
tential approach, thereby deconstructing the latter’s claim to universality. This 
acknowledgement of the ontological and epistemological situatedness of the thinker’s 
perspective led Jonas to pay critical attention to the intellectual influences he had in-
herited from his professors, whose profound “Gnosticism” he shall later become more 
and more aware of62. 
 “What was there between Existentialism and Gnosticism which made the latter 
open up at the touch of the former?”63 Jonas asks. In “Gnosticism, Existentialism and 
Nihilism”, the thinker returns to the “elective affinity” which had disclosed itself 
throughout his early study of Gnosticism, and which lays at the heart of the hermeneu-
tical circle involved in his analysis. When studying gnostic texts, Jonas was “stuck by 
the familiarity of the seemingly utterly strange”64, and came to identify a community 
of inspiration between contemporary existentialist philosophy and the phenomenon of 
late antiquity gnosis. The philosopher notes that both thoughts emerged in an analo-
gous historical context characterized by an atmosphere of civilizational decay and dis-
played an existential posture towards the world one might qualify as estranged or ni-
hilistic. Jonas thus formulates the hypothesis that the hermeneutical affinity and the 
conceptual echo between both movements might be due “to the very kind of “exist-
ence” on either side”65 – thereby furthering the existential analysis inherited from his 
contemporaries. Gnostic writings may resemble more mythological imagination than 
the strict conceptual analysis led by Heidegger or Sartre; not to mention the explicitly 
religious dimension of Gnosticism, when contemporary existentialism thrives on the 
thought of the death of God. Yet such divergences should not occult the essential anx-
iety stemming from both the gnostic and existentialist self’s being-in-the-world. Both 
movements offer indeed the expression of the imprisonment of the self in a world it 
did not choose to dwell in and an alienation from which it is longing to break free. The 
themes of the alien world, of the absent God and of the resulting feeling of existential 
isolation manifest a common nihilistic tendency unfolding into a worldless and dual-
istic system of thought. While Jonas interprets the modern age as the manifestation of 
 
62 Hans JONAS, “Gnosticism, Existentialism and Nihilism”, art. cit., p.321. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid, p.320. 
65 Ibid, p.321. 
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a nihilistic crisis of meaning and orientation, he identifies the beginning of such a crisis 
in Pascal’s depiction of the existential isolation of humanity, plunged amidst the infin-
itude of the universe. From Pascal unto his own existentialist professors, Jonas distin-
guishes the articulation of a deep existential anxiety with the depiction of an ontolog-
ical alienness infusing a posture of ethical indifference to the world. For him, the es-
sence of such “gnostic” nihilism lies in a dualistic cosmology recounting an estranged 
relationship between humanity and the world. 
 
 
3) Towards a concept of Gnosticism as dualistic and acosmic cosmology  
 
Attempting to extract the ontological network of the gnostic symbolism, Jonas finds 
a deep tendency of rupture with the world, a cosmological estrangement which he 
conceptualizes under the term of Demundanization – Entweltlichungstendenz66. Jonas 
interprets this tendency of withdrawal from the world as both a modality of being in 
the world, a mode of existence and inhabiting, and a perspective of salvation. Hence, 
the gnostic Demundanization roots itself in an eschatological, anti-cosmic dualism 
articulated around the trinomial cosmos – humanity – God67. This essential acosmism 
or worldlessness of the gnostic system of thought, illustrated through the motives of 
the negation of and escape from the world, characterizes the gnostic self-understanding 
and affects all perceptions of the self and the world. Focusing on a Demundanization 
tendency which draws upon an onto-theological dualism between God and the world, 
Jonas’ conceptualization of Gnosticism thus allows a greater awareness of the acosmic 






66 Hans JONAS, Gnosis und Spätantiker Geist, op.cit., p.2. 
67 Hans JONAS, The Gnostic Religion, op. cit., p.32 sq. 
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A. The primary experience of the alienness of the world  
 
 Jonas’ account of Gnosticism roots itself in the diagnosis of a primary 
experience of alienation in and from the world. The gnostic experience of 
estrangement in the world is characterized by the sense of a cureless ontological lack, 
the absence of God in the world – which resonates in Modernity through the motive 
of the death of God –, both feelings resulting into an overwhelming desire to overcome 
the modalities of mundane existence. The dynamic of Demundanization, identified by 
Jonas as central feature of Gnosticism, thus proceeds from a particular mode of 
existence, a type of dwelling, a gnostic being-in-the-world characterized by a 
tremendous cosmic anxiety. This study of the gnostic inhabiting of the world allows 
Jonas, drawing upon the existential analytic of his peers, to identify elemental features 
of the gnostic profile amidst a profusion of mythological narratives. For Jonas, the 
theological, cosmological, anthropological and soteriological dimensions of Gnosis all 
proceed from an original and traumatic experience of being in the world.  
 
Jonas identifies various leitmotivs both running through the numerous 
mythological systems he studied and pervading modern narratives of the condition of 
the self, whose being in the world is determined by the notion of a primordial fall 
intended to express the constrained character of our worldly existence. Eric Pommier 
summarizes the gnostic dramaturgy outlined by Jonas in four acts68: the absence of 
god in the world, the figure of the Demiurge, Humanity’s entrance onto the stage of 
the world, and the escape from the world. Before delving any deeper into the tropes of 
a gnostic inhabiting, let us very briefly present the main stages of this dramaturgy. 
 
- The trope of the absence of god in the world is crucial in the development of 
the gnostic inhabiting. Gnostic narratives depict the divine as extramundane, 
otherworldly, located in some undetermined beyond the world: this topological 
dimension bears an immediate ontological signification as it unfolds into the cardinal 
distinction between god and the world. In the gnostic cosmology indeed, god and the 
world are from radically different essences, ontologically stranger to each other. One 
 
68 Eric POMMIER, Jonas, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2013, p.34 sq. 
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epistemological consequence of this ontological divorce pronounced by the radical 
transcendence of the divine lies in Humanity’s unovercomeable state of ignorance: as 
prisoners from a stranger world, we cannot know God. The idea of the 
otherworldliness of God, his absence and ontological alterity from the world thus lays 
the foundation of the gnostic doctrine of knowledge. The latter lays the accent on an 
epistemological lack and proceeds from the urge to know God as the Void-of-the-
World, Other-than-the-World. In this respect, Gnosticism appears as one of the sources 
of negative theology – primarily conceiving God in its negativity, here indeed in its 
non-being in the world. 
 
- The figure of the Demiurge pops in the gnostic drama of worldly creation to 
justify the existence of an alienating world. It appears in gnostic narratives as either a 
caricature of the God of the Ancient Testament – despotic, arrogant and malevolent – 
or as a wandering figure subject to remorse for creating a world of imperfections and 
sufferings. The Demiurge arises from a break of the divine auto-sufficiency, a 
movement of auto-differentiation of the Absolute reminiscent of the mechanism of 
cell-division. This idea of a crack in the divine allowing for the emergence of the world 
appears essential in Jonas’ analysis of Gnosticism as well as in the later development 
of his thought. In gnostic mythology, this mytheme unfolds into a polytheist theology 
intended to unify the extreme and paradoxical transcendence of the divine with its 
constitutive weakness, from which the world would proceed. 
 
- Humanity’s entrance onto the stage of the World results from another sinister 
design: the archons’ – servants of the Demiurge – presumptuous attempt at imitating 
the divine. Throughout the several stages of the gnostic decay relating the drama of 
the divine exile from the world, humanity still manages to preserve a fragment of the 
divine, which endures in the spirit. The human spirit represents the ultimate stage of 
God’s exile in the world, and as such embodies its last chance for redemption. Gnostic 
narratives convey a sense of the deep ambiguity of human existence, figuring the 
enslavement of a divine fragment cast into an ontologically alien world. The human 
condition of ignorance and blindness is key to understand the gnostic dynamic of 
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achieving redemption through a knowledge that would release humanity from its 
enslavement in the world. 
 
- The perspective of an escape from the world marks the ultimate act of the 
gnostic dramaturgy, articulated around the achievement of Gnosis. Gnosis is the 
revealed and revelatory knowledge of Humanity’s supra-natural, otherworldly, divine 
origins. It is a performative knowledge that, by breaking the forgetfulness in which 
human existence was blindly dwelling, achieves the simultaneous salvation of 
Humanity and God. Both destination of the gnostic exile and provenance of the call, 
Gnosis is the liberating knowledge allowing Humanity to tear itself away from the 
world and to be born again in the consciousness of its divine roots.  
 
Amidst this gnostic dramaturgy, I identified three themes, three tropes that might 
operate as hermeneutical keys and allow us to elucidate the nature of gnostic 
inhabiting, both in its antique and its more contemporary declinations: the Fall into 




The Fall into and Escape from the World 
 
The gnostic Being-in-the-World is characterized by the twofold expression of 
an original fall into the world, and the ensuing urge of a redemptive escape from the 
world. Jonas describes the notion of the fall as one of the fundamental symbols of 
Gnosticism: “a pre-cosmic fall of part of the divine principle underlies the genesis of 
the world and of human existence in the majority of gnostic systems”69. The mytheme 
of the fall has widely pervaded the development of Judeo-Christian cosmologies, 
which make sense of human existence as following from an original fall into the world. 
The Heideggerian notion of throwness (Geworfenheit) provides an illustration of the 
persistency in contemporary thought – even in a thinker notoriously critical of the 
 
69 Hans JONAS, Gnostic Religion, op. cit., p.62. 
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western philosophical tradition – of this representation of a fall, a sinking into the 
world emphasizing the arbitrary and sinister nature of worldly existence. Always 
attentive to the existential dimension of narratives, Jonas notes that  
 
in both cases “to have been thrown” is not merely a description of 
the past but an attribute qualifying the given existential situation as 
determined by that past. It is from the gnostic experience of the 
present situation of life that this dramatic image of its genesis has 
been projected into the past, and it is part of the mythological 
expression of this experience.70  
 
 
Just like the gnostic fall, the Heideggerian Geworfenheit figures a way for the self to 
represent the anxious wandering of its existence in the world: the gnostic Being-in-
the-World is a being-thrown, a being-fallen (Verfallenheit), a passive sinking into 
worldly existence. Displaying the passivity of the soul cast and lost into the world 
against its will, the gnostic myth depicts the fall as a degeneration.  The gnostic trope 
of the fall represents indeed the progressive loss of the divine as it descends into the 
world, and the dispersion of divine sparks, along with the call arising from the ethereal 
voice of “a stranger whose coming constitutes an entering of the beyond into the 
world”71. The idea of the fall as a movement of dispersion of divine sparks into the 
obscurity of the world conveys a depreciation of the latter, perceived in its ontological 
opposition to the realm of light. Worldly being embodies a break in the purity of the 
luminous being whose integrity was jeopardized by the creation of the world. As we 
shall see further in the following chapters, this gnostic conception of the breaking open 
of the cosmic confinement through a divine transcendence might also potentially 
evoke the presence of the possible within the world and its overflowing through its 
openness. In this respect, the Heideggerian concept of the openness of Being appears 
to prolong the gnostic thought of an ontological break within worldly being, leaving it 
open to the potential irruption of a transformative transcendence. 
 
 
70 Ibid., p.64. 
71 Robert THEIS, Jonas, op. cit, p.18 
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Succeeding to the original fall, the gnostic yearning is led by the desire to 
escape the modalities of mundane existence, and the gnostic salvation lies in a triumph 
over the world: “the world must be overcome”72. Gnosticism thus conceives of 
salvation as an extramundane event leading humanity away from the world. In this 
respect, the gnostic complaint for a way out of the world is re-enacted in Charles 
Baudelaire’s poem “Anywhere out of the world?”, as well as in the reaction of the 
Moderns to the environmental crisis as portrayed by Bruno Latour73: “free at last, 
finally we are getting rid of this rotten earth!”. The end of the gnostic mythology lies 
indeed in Humanity’s redemption through the overcoming of the world and the 
restauration of the divine – lost, dispersed, misled and wounded by worldly being. As 
they project the redemptive escape from the world along an ascensional movement 
towards the super-mundane, gnostic narratives weave an ethical and eschatological 
structure infused with a vertical imaginary in which the world is depicted as the below 
and the divine as the beyond the world. The movement of a divine transcendence 
breaking the world open is thus conceived of as vertical, stemming from an 
otherworldly, supernatural source that is not already present in worldly being. Worldly 
being on the contrary tends to be referred to in the language of horizontality and 
immanence, the interdependence entailed in worldly bounds conceived in terms of an 
enslavement from which man is yearning to break free. The mytheme of the torpor is 
recurrent in gnostic narratives and is employed to describe the condition of humanity 
enslaved in the world, inciting men to “wake up from their sleep”74 and regain the 
memory of their origins. To the realization of the state of worldly alienation succeeds 
the gnostic complaint, which may also appear as an indignation, an accusation. 
Expressions of such complaint manifest the spirit’s attempts to escape the closed 
world, to flee from time and space, both considered as elements of a demoniac system 
preventing the spirit from finding home. Voltaire thus formulates one modern 
declination of such loathing of worldly existence, illustrating the gnostic hatred of our 
rootedness: “one is angry to have been born, one is indignant to be a man”75. Gnostic 
 
72 Hans JONAS, Gnostic Religion, op.cit., p.329. 
73 Bruno LATOUR, « Comment s’orienter? Réflexions sur la possible canalisation de quelques affects 
politiques », Unpublished draft for Down To Earth, p.38. 
74 Hans JONAS, Gnosis und spätantiker Geist I, op.cit., p.127. 
75 VOLTAIRE, Concerning conspiracies against people, or proscriptions, 1766. 
URL: http://societe-voltaire.org/voltaire-conspiracies.pdf  
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narratives from then and from today are filled with expressions of the existential 
anxiety, some cosmic unease prompted by an ontological spatio-temporal adversity. 
An essential element of the Jonassian concept of Gnosticism, this urge to escape the 
world largely echoes our second theme, for it often converges with the experiences of 




The Alien and the Home 
 
Another essential element of the Gnostic thought lies in the feeling of a home-
sickness76 erected to a cosmic level and manifesting an existential crisis of the rooted-
ness. Gnostic narratives express indeed the feeling of an ontological strangeness at the 
origin of some profound unease and discontent towards this world to which the self 
does not belong. Jonas relates various expressions in Mandean texts of “the frightened 
and nostalgic state of the soul forlorn in the world”77, “the forlornness of the Life from 
beyond sojourning in the world”, and the “feeling of having been forgotten in the for-
eign land”78. The philosopher identifies essential features of Gnosticism in the repre-
sentation of a life lost in the alien world, the ensuing feelings of homelessness and 
restless wandering and the “plight of the Soul in the labyrinth of the hostile world”79. 
The Strange, das Fremde appears as another key aspect of the concept of Gnos-
ticism, drawing upon an elementary experience of life in the world. From this primary 
experience of alienness proceeds the conception of the absolute transcendence of God, 
embodied in the figure of the Alien God, which contributes to further anchor the radi-
cal dualism opposing the divine to the worldly: “the Divine is alien to the World”, is 
“the totally Other”.80 The texts studied by Jonas cultivate the notion of the deep al-
ienness of life on earth, thereby emphasizing the ontological strangeness of human life, 
 
Accessed 11.03.2019. 
76 Hans JONAS, Gnostic Religion, op. cit., p.65 sq. 
77 Ibid. p.65 
78 Ibid. p.66. 
79 Ibid. p.67. 
80 Ibid, p.327. 
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from divine origin, arising amidst a world of death and chaos. Coming from elsewhere, 
the spirit feels a stranger in the world in which it was cast: gnostic narratives recount 
the sufferings which come with the lot of the stranger: wandering, loneliness, lack of 
understanding. The notion of the Alien is still present in the gnostic experience of a 
worldly alienation, where the “dispersal” of the divine light translates on an existential 
level into the manifold distractions arising from the worldly chaos surrounding it.81 
This radical experience of worldly alienation, along with an incapacity of finding home 
within the world, conditions the perception by the gnostic mind of the ontological hos-
tility of the World. Jonas finds in Mandean literature the recurrent theme of a life that 
was thrown into a world that is ontologically strange, namely from a different nature 
than human existence. And yet, as Levinas reminds us, we are in the world82: here we 
must dwell, we must find home. 
The strangeness of the worldly habitation and the exigency to inhabit the hos-
tile make the love of the home suspicious to the Gnostics. In contrast to the Greek 
thought that situates humanity within a complete and harmonious cosmos, thereby al-
lowing for meaning and sense to be conferred upon existence, the gnostic cosmology 
is articulated around the feeling of an existence in exile, wandering in an alien world 
and yearning for a home. Whereas the Greek representation of humanity’s place in the 
cosmos is characterized by intimacy and feeling at home in the world, illustrated by 
Hellenistic cosmopolitanism, the Gnostic cosmology conceives of the world as what 
is alien to humanity. While the Hellenistic cosmos is intelligible, entails intrinsic value, 
and displays the union between consciousness and the world, the gnostic conscious-
ness is homeless, aches from the hostile indifference of an alien world and asks to 
divorce from it. In this respect, the gnostic metaphors of the alien and the home con-
tribute to further convey the cosmological dualism between humanity and the world, 
which we will approach in our next section. As Susan Taubes rightfully notes in an 
article on the gnostic essence of Heidegger’s nihilism, the framing of the ontological 
strangeness of the world and the radical alterity of the divine in dualistic terms con-
tributes to enshrine the closeness, finitude and hopelessness of the world: « the notion 
of strangeness engenders that of a beyond that limits and confines the world into a 
 
81 Ibid, p.62. 
82 Emmanuel LEVINAS, Totalité et Infini. Essai sur l’Extériorité, Livre de Poche, 1987, p.21.  
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closed system: all that is, is locked and lost within the world. 83» Gnosticism conceives 
god and the world in radical, mutually exclusive, dualistic terms where the world is 
the unhomely home of the strange and god the intimate other of the world.  
 
 
The Abyss, the Rift, and Cosmic Anxiety 
 
Condemned to wander in an alien world, the lamentations of the gnostic soul 
merge into the expression of a general Weltschmerz, thereby defining our third theme 
identified among the Jonassian account of Gnosticism. The cosmic anxiety appears 
indeed as an essential, perhaps most manifest feature of Gnosticism, primarily 
characterized by the “feeling of an absolute rift between man and that in which he finds 
himself lodged – the world.”84 
 
Jonas finds in gnostic narratives the manifold expressions of a tremendous 
existential anxiety erected to a cosmic level, a Weltangst over the inescapability of our 
being-in-the-world. Here again, the existentialist wording of Jonas’ contemporaries 
serves as a privileged access to the gnostic mind, whose existential crisis Jonas links 
to the emphasis in existentialist philosophy on the feeling of an abyss opposing the self 
to the universe. The philosopher identifies indeed both in gnostic texts and in modern 
thought a similar sense of the hostile indifference of the universe to the aspirations of 
the self85, its modern counterpart finding a prodigious expression in Blaise Pascal’s 
writings: “cast into the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and which 
know me not, I am frightened.”86 Imbued with the theme of the abyss, the gnostic-
 
83 Susan TAUBES, “The Gnostic Foundations of Heidegger’s Nihilism”, The Journal of Religion, Vol. 
34, No. 3 (Jul., 1954), p.159. 
84 Hans JONAS, The Gnostic Religion, op.cit., p.327. 
85 Ibid, p.322. 
86 Blaise PASCAL, Pensées, Brunschvieg, p.205. Quoted in Hans JONAS, The Gnostic Religion, op.cit., 
p.322. 
“When I see the blind and wretched state of man. When I survey the whole universe in its dumbness 
and man left to himself with no light, as though lost in this corner of the universe, without knowing who 
put him there, what he has come to do, what will become of him when he dies, incapable of knowing 
anything, I am moved to terror, like a man transported in his sleep to some terrifying desert island, who 
wakes up quite lost and with no means of escape. Then I marvel that so wretched a state does not drive 
people to despair.” 
45 
 
existentialist prose revolves around the attempt to express the bottomless depth 
disclosed by our existence in the world, by our standing on the edge of the groundless, 
and the feeling of vertigo that comes with the consciousness of the infinite openness 
of worldly becomings. The gnostic being-in-the-world studied by Jonas suffers 
similarly from the perception of this abyss, and its expressions are infused with the 
notion of an extreme, hopeless loneliness, an unfathomable ignorance, along with the 
feeling of being abandoned in the void of a world filled with an eternally silent 
indifference. There is no escape out of a deserted world where the complaints of the 
self are left unheard: the world has ceased to speak, its voice inaudible to the forgotten 
orphans of an absent God.  
  
Pervading gnostic imaginaries, the trope of the abyss conveys a sense of radical 
rupture between the self and the world, which Jonas identifies as an elemental feature 
of gnostic cosmologies. The latter express an indignation towards the ontological 
dependency of human existence to the world, and the feeling of man’s insignificance 
disclosed by it. The cosmic anxiety identified by Jonas in both ancient and 
contemporary forms of Gnosticism thus manifests itself through a despisal of worldly 
bonds, leading the self to deplore the liability “to be crushed at any moment by the 
forces of an immense and blind universe in which his existence is but a particular blind 
accident, no less blind than would be the accident of his destruction.”87 Jonas 
highlights the underlying dualistic premise of gnostic narratives, assuming that “as a 
thinking reed, however, [humanity] is no part of the sum, not belonging to it, but 
radically different, incommensurable: for the res extensa does not think, so Descartes 
had taught, and nature is nothing but res extensa – body, matter, external magnitude.”88 
The radical strangeness and contingency of human existence prevents the thinking 
subject to find any meaning within a nature deserted by sense. Jonas uncovers the 
presence in Gnosticism of a strong man-world dualism, emphasizing the exceptional 
character of consciousness amidst worldly being: “[humanity] alone in the world 
thinks, not because but in spite of his being part of nature”89. The why to our existence 
remains an enigma, and Gnosticism asserts our estrangement from the natural world, 
 
87 Hans JONAS, The Gnostic Religion, op.cit., p.322. 
88 Ibid. I emphasize. 
89 Ibid, p.323. 
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our distance from God and the gap within ourselves.90  In this respect, the mytheme of 
the abyss, along with the feeling of a cosmic anxiety it elicits, appears as a 
crystallization of the dualistic approach to the world characteristic of Gnosticism, filled 
with the feeling of an “unbridgeable gulf”91, namely an “estrangement between man 
and the world”92. Charles Baudelaire’s poem “The Abyss” (Le Gouffre) is full of the 
gnostic lexicon of the cosmic anxiety, and illustrates perfectly this idea of a rift 
separating the self from the world: 
 
Le Gouffre 
Pascal avait son gouffre, avec lui se mouvant.  
— Hélas! tout est abîme, — action, désir, rêve,  
Parole! Et sur mon poil qui tout droit se relève  
Mainte fois de la Peur je sens passer le vent. 
En haut, en bas, partout, la profondeur, la grève,  
Le silence, l'espace affreux et captivant... 
Sur le fond de mes nuits Dieu de son doigt savant  
Dessine un cauchemar multiforme et sans trêve. 
J'ai peur du sommeil comme on a peur d'un grand trou, 
Tout plein de vague horreur, menant on ne sait où;  
Je ne vois qu'infini par toutes les fenêtres, 
  
Et mon esprit, toujours du vertige hanté,  
Jalouse du néant l'insensibilité. 
— Ah! ne jamais sortir des Nombres et des Êtres!93 
 
The last verse – “Ah! Not to ever come out of the Numbers and Beings!” – expresses 
the regret of being in the world - as opposed to being the world -, of having been 
thrown into this life, while the poet “envies the insensitivity of the nothingness”. But 
 
90 Eric POMMIER, op.cit, p.40. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid, p.325. 




it also conveys the idea of an ontological difference, unbridgeable - of a radical 
dualism opposing human life to the rest of worldly being, here referred to as “numbers 
and beings” and “the awful and captivating space”, thereby perpetuating the idea of 
worldly existence as primarily captive, imprisoned into an infinite yet confined space. 
Baudelaire’s poem thus provides a paradigmatic expression of modern Gnosticism in 
its depiction of an existential dualism articulated around the image of the abyss. This 
expression suggests, in the continuity of Jonas’ interpretation of Gnosticism, that a 
certain existential gulf builds the foundation for the dualistic structure of thought 






In this first section dedicated to the existential dimension of Jonassian 
Gnosticism, I explored some fundamental modalities of the gnostic being-in-the-
world. I outlined the existential framework of a gnostic alienation from the world, 
primarily manifested through the themes of the fall, the strange, and the abyss. This 
portrait of the gnostic existence should allow us to now approach the cosmology which 
Jonas describes as gnostic, as well as enable a perceptive understanding of Jonas’ 
hermeneutical approach to Gnosticism – flowing from the existential to the cosmo-
ontological. In retracing Jonas’ own intellectual path towards the conceptualization of 
Gnosticism, I intend to demonstrate how the dynamic of Demundanization, identified 
by Jonas as driving force of Gnosticism, is closely tied to an estranged mode of 






B. Gnosticism as acosmic dualism 
 
 
 In the Gnostic Religion, Jonas writes that “the cardinal feature of gnostic 
thought is the radical dualism that governs the relation of God and world, and 
correspondingly that of man and world”94. This second section proposes to delve into 
the gnostic cosmology, identifiable according to Jonas by a structural acosmic dualism. 
While doing so, I propose to pay attention to the unfolding within gnostic cosmology 
of the existential dualism previously outlined, as well as the centrality of the 
theological dimension of such dualism. Jonas’ examination of gnostic systems of 
thought is led indeed by the identification of a threefold opposition of man and the 
world, spirit and soul, and god and the world, thereby uncovering a structural, deep-
ingrained dualism, defined by Jonas as “anthropological acosmism”.  
 
 
The cosmo-ontological unfolding of an existential dualism 
 
 Jonas’ account of Gnosticism emphasizes the existential generation of gnostic 
cosmological systems, characterized by a structural acosmic, or worldless dualism. 
Jonas considers such dualism as the key, unifying feature of the gnostic thought, and 
situates its origin in the experience of a divorce between the self and the world:  
 
This dualistic mood underlies the whole gnostic attitude and unifies the 
widely diversified, more or less systematic expressions which that attitude 
gave itself in gnostic ritual and belief. It is on this primary human founda-
tion of a dualistic mood, a passionately felt experience of man, that the 
articulated dualistic doctrines rest.95  
 
 
94 Hans JONAS, Gnostic Religion, op.cit., p.42. 
95 Ibid, p.251. I emphasize. 
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Jonas’ understanding of the existential roots of the cosmological dualism in Gnosti-
cism might remind us the approach advocated by Michael Jackson’s existential an-
thropology96. Drawing upon the legacies of phenomenology and existentialism, the 
anthropologist proposes to approach human experience through a perspective combin-
ing collective worldviews and individual lifeworld, thereby offering to bridge the tra-
ditional epistemological opposition between individualism and holism.  Jonas’ ap-
proach to the gnostic cosmology resembles indeed an anthropological one, emphasiz-
ing the existential experience lying at its core, as well as shedding light on its historical 
contingency.  Hence, Jonas argues that an existential estrangement between humanity 
and the world underlies the development of an anthropological dualism conceiving of 
humanity as made of two substances – body and mind, but also soul and spirit. This 
anthropological dualism unfolds unto a cosmological level with the thought of a Pas-
calian “gulf” simultaneously separating mankind from its most authentic divine es-
sence and from the world. The notion of a rupture between logos and cosmos brings 
such conception to a deeper level of abstraction and is consumed in the gnostic repre-
sentation of a redemptive knowledge releasing humanity from its worldly bonds. The 
world and the worldly beings that populate it – to which humanity does not belong –, 
figures the utter absence of sense and meaning, and from the spirit’s incapacity to 
dwell in it proceeds the gnostic drama of being in the world. As we know now, the 
gnostic doctrine of knowledge is what mediates the engagement of the gnostic self 
with the world, or more exactly, what mediates its escape from the world – the Gnosis 
comes indeed to relieve the sufferings of the self cast into an alien world. In this per-
spective, the only way to make sense out of the world is to deny its meaning and to 
escape from it. From the necessity of mediation, the gnostic thought derives the onto-
logical divergence of humanity from the world, these building two distinct realms of 
reality. This opposition between humanity and the world overlaps that between logos 
and cosmos, spirit and matter, and God and the world. The concept of the logos allows 
us to approach the dualism of gnostic cosmologies as articulated around a cardinal 
theological dualism: “the dualism between man and world posits as its metaphysical 
counterpart that between the world and God”97.  
 




 A pivotal theological dualism 
 
Hans Jonas’ conceptualization of Gnosticism is articulated around a theological 
dualism distinguishing between, and ultimately opposing, God to the world. This 
dualism is so paramount within Jonas’ understanding of Gnosticism that it seems to 
crystallise, initiate and organize the gnostic cosmology as a whole. 
 
The Jonassian interpretation of Gnosticism as acosmic dualism, in other words, 
as a structure of dualistic narratives articulating a profound dynamic of rejection of the 
world, manifests itself most clearly in the systematic opposition between divine and 
worldly being. Gnostic dualism appears indeed condensed in the theological dualism 
opposing God to the World. More precisely, the gnostic cosmology outlined by Jonas 
might be interpreted as the unfolding of a thought of the otherworldliness of God, from 
which the adivinity of the world is then derived – or is this the other way around? The 
otherworldliness of God and the adivinity of the world, both constituting essential 
features of the Jonassian concept of Gnosticism, soon appear as two sides of the same 
coin, proceeding from the same gnostic impulse of ontologically opposing the divine 
to the worldly. In this respect, and as we shall see further on, the Jonassian account of 
Gnosticism might be interpreted as the cosmological unfolding of an original, twofold 
hypostatization of god and the world as two irreconcilable poles of one primordial 
duality. The theological and ontological differentiation between god and the world 
conditions the representation of the divine as other-wordly and reciprocally, of the 
world as non-divine. The gnostic theology thus considers God as a stranger to the 
world, as the complete other which cannot be comprehended in worldly terms, and 
insists on a vertical axis opposing the worldly here below to the divine beyond. The 
high/low antithesis systematically structures in gnostic narratives the distance between 
terrestrial and divine worlds, and while gnostic theologies sometimes display some 
sense of a divine interiority unfolding within the dramatic history of the world, they 
also retain a strong interiority/exteriority, or spirit/incarnation dualism, thereby 




 The gnostic emphasis on the absolute transcendence of God from the world 
may find an echo in the tradition of apophatic theology. Introduced in Christian 
theology by the early sixth-century author Dionysius the Areopagite, the terminology 
of apophatic and cataphatic theologies distinguishes between the use of positive or 
negative statements to approach God. The ways of affirmation or negation refer to an 
already well-established theological practice reaching back into the traditions of the 
Hebrew scriptures and classical Greek philosophy. Central in Christian Mysticism, 
where it celebrates a mystery beyond expression, apophatic theology conveys the sense 
of an overwhelming transcendence of God and allows, in Andrew Louth’s words, “an 
engagement that leaves a sense of withdrawal”98. The obscurely felt presence of God 
combined with its radical incomprehensibility result in a richness of experience that 
overflows any attempt to articulate it. In apophatic theology, God is therefore 
experienced as a beyond: beyond being, beyond intellect, beyond words, concepts and 
images. In this regard, the gnostic experience of God as a beyond is reminiscent of the 
posture of apophatic theology, which offers a way to channel the gnostic intuition of 
the ineffability of a divine only manifesting itself in a movement of withdrawal from 
worldly being. But the apophatic language should not be equated with a gnostic posture 
of desolation in the face of the absence of God in the world: it can also recount the 
experience of a divine saturation99, an overwhelming presence of God even manifest 
in her absence. Still, Jonas insists that the God of the Gnostics is primarily apprehended 
in its negative relation to the world, Basilides speaking of a non-being God. This leads 
Jonas to qualify Gnosticism as a “nihilistic theology”100. He explains: 
 
the gnostic God, as distinct from the demiurge, is the totally different, the 
other, the unknown. Like his inner-human counterpart, the acosmic self or 
pneuma, whose hidden nature also reveals itself only in the negative 
experience of otherness, of non-identification and of protested indefinable 
freedom, this God has more of the nihil than the ens in his concept.101 
 
98 Andrew LOUTH, “Apophatic and Cataphatic Theology” in A. Hollywood & P. Beckman (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism, Cambridge Companions to Religion, 2012, pp. 137-146 
99 Jean-Luc Marion’s theory of saturated phenomena insists on the overwhelming presence of a beyond 
which excesses our perception and understanding, thus calling for a phenomenality of excess. He men-
tions divine revelation as one such saturated phenomenon. 
See notably Jean-Luc MARION, De surcroît : études sur les phénomènes saturés, Presses Universitaires 
de France, Paris, 2010 (2001). 
100 Hans JONAS, Gnosis und spätantiker Geist I, op.cit, p.250. 




Jonas describes the gnostic god as ultimate negation of the world: defined negatively 
in relation to the world, it endorses a nihilistic function towards all mundane bond. 
Gnostic theology thus asserts the radical a-mondanity, if not anti-mundanity of God: 
the gnostic God is absolutely transcendent, its transcendence understood here in the 
sense of an extra-mundanity. It is an absent, alien, unknown, hidden and withdrawn 
God. 
In Modernity, the gnostic thought of the otherworldliness of God declines itself 
in the concept of the deus absconditus and culminates in the motive of the Death of 
God. 
 
This gnostic idea of the absence of the divine in the world particularly shines 
through modern thought in concepts such as the deus absconditus, present in the 
theology of Martin Luther, and the motive of the death of god, mobilized in philosophy 
by figures such as Pascal, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche or Heidegger. The notion of deus 
absconditus and the motive of the death of god arise as two modern instances of a 
theology rooted in the experience of the absence of God from the world. The deus 
absconditus, or hidden God expresses the experience of a God who discloses itself 
primarily through the mode of withdrawal. Emphasising the abstrudity, 
incomprehensibility and ineffability of a God revealing neither its being, intentions 
nor commands, it perpetuates the gnostic imagery of the unknowability of the one true 
God, standing outside of the world, as well as the gnostic trope of humanity’s condition 
of ignorance. Spelling out the fundamental barrier to the human cognition of God, the 
notion of deus absconditus “confirms the abysmal separation between the human and 
the divine, which constitutes this-worldly existence and has devastating consequences 
for the ability of human beings to experience God as a god of love”.102 
 
Following the analogy between the God-World and the Humanity-World 
dichotomies, the apophatic thought endorsed in Gnosticism suggests that the spiritual 
dimension of our selves is just as undefinable as the divine, or only definable in 
 
102 Sasja Emilie MATHIASEN STOPA, “’Seeking Refuge in God against God’: The Hidden God in 
Lutheran Theology and the Postmodern Weakening of God”, Open Theology, 4, 2018, p. 663. 
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negative terms, as it first signals itself in its alterity from the world – an alterity that 
brings it closer to a god defined in its “pure acosmic alterity”103. This echoes the 
modern idea, particularly developed in existential philosophy, of the 
incomprehensibility of human existence in the world (Pascal), its unassimilable 
character within the whole of worldly being, along with the representation of a certain 
original virginity of the human mind, prone to becoming stained by the history of the 
world (Rousseau). Conceptions such as these maintain a dualistic structure of thought, 
systematically asserting the ontological divergence between Humanity and the World. 
In gnostic cosmologies, this is most conspicuously manifested in the thought of God’s 
utter alterity and exteriority from the world, condensed in the idea of the radical 
transcendence of the divine. 
 
Jonas’ interpretation of Gnosticism suggests that the relationship of divine 
transcendence to the world, as well as that between this transcendence and humanity, 
also conditions that between Humanity and the world. In this way, the apophatic timbre 
of gnostic theology appears to ground a nihilistic relationship to the world – an 
engagement with worldly being determined by the sense of the radical absence of the 
divine, a deep-felt absence whose perception was only enabled by the sporadic 
introduction in the world of an absolute transcendence through human existence. 
Humanity is indeed considered as the privileged medium of the awareness of an 
ontological perversion in the world. If the Gnosis retains the concept of god, it 
therefore portrays the figure of an absent god, a god that deserted the world and filled 
it with its absence. In this respect, the gnostic god is diametrically opposed to the 
divinities of Hellenistic cosmology and proclaims the dismissal of the latter – in Jonas’ 
words: “the God of the cosmos is dead”104. The Gnostic god is not from this world. 
And this world is not from the one true God – rather, it is the product of lower powers. 
To the extent to which the gnostic god is the negation of the world105, gnostic thought 
perceives worldly being as a negation of the divine.  
 
 
103 Eric POMMIER, op.cit, p.38. 
104 Hans JONAS, Gnosis und spätantiker Geist I, op.cit, p.331. 
105 Ibid, p.332. 
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It appears clearly how a modern motive such as the death of god might resonate 
with the nihilism of gnostic theology. Both merge into the thought of the absence of 
god in the world, and in the consecration of a latent opposition between worldly and 
divine. As Jonas reminds us, Heidegger’s analysis of the Nietzschean exclamation of 
the death of God states that “the names God and Christian God are in Nietzsche’s 
thought used to denote the transcendental (supra-sensible) world in general”106. This 
corroborates the hypothesis, inferred from Jonas’ conceptualization of Gnosticism, of 
a central theological dualism distinguishing between the immanence of the world and 
the transcendence of the divine, and therefrom pervading the whole of gnostic 
cosmologies along a structural dualism. Heidegger’s rephrasing of the Nietzschean 
announcement highlights indeed the implicit eviction of the transcendental, or the 
supra-sensible, from worldly being, and the underlying dynamic of Demundanization 
in a shift of focus towards the divine acosmic Self. Susan Taubes observes in an article 
reflecting on the gnostic roots of Heideggerian nihilism that 
 
 all interest is introverted in the contemplation of the negative 
acosmic self. The fullness of the god is finally emptiness. The 
emphasis is on an emotional relation to this emptiness.107 
 
 Here, Susan Taubes uncovers the negative nature of the gnostic relation to 
transcendence, arising from the primal perception of an ontological emptiness, a lack, 
or absence of God. From this negative relation to the divine, she draws the nihilistic 
implications of the gnostic cosmology, as she further notes that:  
 
the negativity of the gnostic god serves to undermine totally the 




 Uncovering the gnostic conception of a non-relationship of the divine to the world 
contributes to outline the question of how the cosmological understanding of the 
presence of the divine within the world conditions our intellectual, sensuous and 
 
106 Martin Heidegger in Holzwege, quoted by Jonas in The Gnostic Religion, op.cit, p.331. 




ethical engagement with worldly being. The nihilistic implications of the gnostic 
thought of the absence of God in the world, or the death of God, seem indeed to merge 
into the conception of the ontological and irredeemable a-divinity of the world. 
 
 
The gnostic concept of the radical transcendence of God, or in other words, the 
otherworldliness of the divine, reciprocally unfolds within the wider gnostic system of 
thought in the idea of the a-divinity of world. The otherworldliness of the divine and 
the a-divinity of the world appear indeed to be closely tied together in gnostic 
cosmologies, where the death of the cosmic God simultaneously figures the death of 
the Greek cosmos: the world has ceased to be divine and to bear ultimate, intrinsic 
moral values109. The cosmic chaos is now devoid of meaning or final aims, unable to 
usher human existence in the world, nor to accompany it along its wandering. The 
gnostic world is confined to the realm of immanence, deserted of any divine 
transcendence, so that the gnostic systematic movement of demundanization of God is 
mirrored in a parallel movement of de-divinization of the world. While we will have 
the opportunity to reflect more in depth on the gnostic thought of immanence and 
transcendence, it is noteworthy to specify here that the gnostic concept of immanence 
bears the meaning of alienation and worldly entrenchment, while the concept of 
transcendence is understood as what breaks open the constraint of the world and allows 
to escape from it, perpetuating the dualism between worldly immanence and divine 
transcendence. By concentrating divine being in the non-worldly (and by conceiving 
of humanity as ontologically other-worldly), the gnostic idea of God, conceived as 
“nothingness of the world”110, deprives the world of its divinity, and of whatever 
qualities are contained in such term - transcendence, infinity, freedom, creation, 
openness. Crucially here, the gnostic concept of God is a negative one, for the gnostic 
god is fathomed first and foremost as what is not the world, what is other. The 
development of gnostic theology therefore unfolds along a structural dynamic of 
demundanization of the divine, which manifests itself primarily as a dedivinization of 
the world. 
 
109 Hans JONAS, The Gnostic Religion, op. cit., p.331 




This original and pivotal movement of Gnosticism then unfurls into a 
cosmology which Jonas identifies as “cosmic nihilism”111, consisting in a systematic 
enterprise of negation, reduction and devaluation of world being. Analysing the 
Gnosticism underlying Heidegger’s philosophy, Susan Taubes observes how “the 
variety and manifoldness of the empirical world is bracketed out”112, somehow 
reminding us of the anti-worldly echoes in modern narratives of nature. 
 
 
The eschatological tension contained in the gnostic temporal dualism 
 
 The gnostic conception of time offers yet another illustration of both the 
acosmic dualism of gnostic cosmology and its ultimate theological character. 
 
Characterized by a strong dualism, the gnostic temporality displays a twofold 
contrast between past and present, and present and future. By constantly opposing the 
present to the non-present, this temporal dualism manifests another instance of the 
gnostic dynamic of demundanization, discernible in the motive of the vacuity of the 
present. Out of time, the gnostic temporality is led by a movement of escape from a 
past fall and directed towards a future salvation, thereby leaving no space for a thought 
of the presence of the present. The diagnosis of a temporality without present thus 
provides Jonas with another opportunity to draw a hermeneutical parallel between the 
gnostic and existentialist systems of thought. Jonas’ analysis of antique and modern 
nihilism suggests indeed that gnostic nihilism takes roots in the devaluation of the 
present, conceived as that against which ultimate aspirations are targeted. Gnosticism 
understands humane existence as an accidental event situated within an ontological 
tension between past and future, in which the present loses all focus and signification. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, as temporal conceptions appear to be so often inherited from, 
or at least intimately entangled with theological ones, this turning away from the 
 
111 Ibid, p.150. 
112 Susan TAUBES, art.cit., p.160. 
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present and the dynamic perspective of gnostic temporality are determined by 
eschatological conceptions: 
 
there is past and there is future, from which we stem and towards which 
we hasten, and the present only is the moment of knowledge itself, the 




 The eschatological dimension of the gnostic temporal dualism further 
illustrates the centrality of the theological in gnostic dualism. The gnostic eschatology 
presents itself as the project of an inversion of Humanity’s original fall into the world, 
thereby setting up the dynamical perspective of gnostic becoming, starting with a fall 
and ending with an ascension. The depiction in gnostic narratives of the present as an 
ontological state of crisis is supported by the theological representation of the drama 
of worldly being, conceived as a degeneration which started with the creation of the 
world, and which is to end in its overcoming. Being is firstly experienced by the 
gnostic self as a catastrophe which ought therefore to be overcome – temporarily as 
well as spatially: anywhere out of the world, anywhen but now. The gnostic 
eschatology thus situates the eschaton, or the ultimate ends, in the future, figuring an 
“out of the present world”. Following Jonas’ observation of the presence of a gnostic 
temporality in modern thought, we could identify such motive in Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s depiction of the present as degenerate state of being, or more evidently in 
the modern dogma of progress, constantly exhorting to overcome the present.  
 
 The proximity of existentialism and Gnosticism also manifests itself in their 
common depreciation of the present, primarily experienced and conceived as a state of 
crisis, an insignificant passing through, signalling the legacy of a dramatic past and 
leading us at best to a future destination. Susan Taubes thus sees in Heidegger’s 
thought of authenticity the illustration of such gnostic depreciation of the present, 
conceived as a devalued and inauthentic mode of existence in which we cannot dwell. 
Taubes reminds us that Heidegger’s conception of the present as bound to two 
 
113 Hans JONAS, Gnosis und spätantiker Geist II, op. cit., p. 375. I emphasize. 
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temporal “ekstases” reflects the projective dimension of time: the present, a drama, 
has no value in itself and only makes sense when approached from the perspective of 
the temporally ecstatic structure of existence. The ecstatic nature of time 
conceptualized by Heidegger thus declines the gnostic drive to escape the present 
mode of existence, and perpetuates the gnostic dualism between the self and the 
present world, the here below and the beyond, interiority and exteriority:  
 
Man, standing outside the immediate, spatially surrounding present 
(stasis), stands in time. Because man stands outside the present, he is able 
to gather and concentrate himself within. The beyond is introverted; it is 
more inner than the inness of the world.114 
 
 
 The expression in gnostic narratives of a drive to escape from the present and the 
devaluation of the present thus appears as a manifestation of a wider devaluation of 
the world, referred to by Jonas as Demundanization. As the gnostic eschatology fails 
to think the presence of the eschaton in the innerness of the world, locating it in a future 
and otherworldly horizon, it contributes to further negate the (eschatological) presence 
of the world. This fundamental negation of the world builds for Jonas the roots of an 





In this second section, we endeavoured to delve into the cosmological dualism 
characterizing the Jonassian concept of Gnosticism. We thus explored and retraced the 
overarching presence of a dualistic structure of thought, pervading from the existential 
to the theological dimensions of Gnosticism, and culminating into the dualistic 
apprehension of the eschaton, which the gnostic eschatology situates in a “beyond the 
world”. In so doing, we wished to point towards the essentially theological dimension 
 
114 Susan TAUBES, art.cit, p.162. I emphasize. 
While Taubes’ particularly insightful analysis of the Heideggerian philosophy appears to anticipate the 
problematic of immanentization of the beyond which Eric Voegelin would later theorize, let us focus 
for now on the denigration of the world manifested here, implying a theological dualism where the 




of gnostic dualism, crystallized in the thought of the otherworldliness of God and the 
adivinity of worldly being. Such theological dualism, we argued, lies at the core of a 
cosmological dualism which appears to articulate, on a structural level, the essential 
dynamic of Demundanization infusing gnostic narratives. It thus appeared to us that 
the dualistic structure of gnostic thought, not only manifested but also organized a 
cosmological estrangement lying at the roots of the Jonassian concept of Gnosticism, 
whose existential generation we examined in the first part of this chapter. From the 
experience of an existential estrangement from the world, the fundamental experience 
of the acosmicity of the self, to its cosmological articulation throughout a dualistic 
structure of thought, we now wish to complete our elucidation of the Jonassian concept 
of Gnosticism by examining the development on an ethical level of the dynamic of 
Demundanization identified by our author as the sap of Gnosticism. The essential 
acosmism of gnostic narratives, Jonas’ analysis suggests, unfolds in a nihilistic mode 





C. The Gnostic estrangement from the world as nihilism 
 
 
Jonas’ diagnosis of a gnostic nihilism pervading contemporary existential 
thought is closely tied to his analysis of the acosmism of gnostic narratives. His 
understanding of nihilism, both antique and contemporary, is informed by a 
conceptualization of Gnosticism as an acosmic system of thought. Consecrating the 
yearning for an escape from worldly being, Gnosticism would indeed enfold into an 
ethical nihilism which completes the scission between humanity and the world. Jonas’ 
critical analysis of nihilism thus articulates itself around the cardinal idea that ethical 
nihilism blossoms upon acosmic, worldless cosmologies, his philosophy suggesting in 
return that ethics may only find its roots within the world. 
 
In the following and final section of this chapter, I propose to explore Jonas’ 
hypothesis of the generation of ethical nihilism in the fundamental acosmicity of 
gnostic cosmologies. Jonas describes how the acosmism of gnostic thought, also 
referred to as cosmic nihilism, acts as a systematic depreciation and ultimately leads 
into a negation of the world. This acosmism typically manifests itself through a gnostic 
temporality that figures a structural escape out of the present, where the self constantly 
yearns for another time, past or future. As we shall see, Jonas notably identifies this 
acosmic temporality in the utopianism of modern politics and holds a general 
“worldlessness” to lie at the root of the nihilistic tendency of modernity, where cosmic 
nihilism enfolds into a diffuse ethical nihilism. For Jonas, this is particularly 
exemplified by the failure of Heideggerian philosophy, built upon an acosmic ontology 
of the Dasein. This observation, along with the early diagnosis of a gnostic acosmism, 
shall determine the philosophical task to recover, through the Imperative of 






Gnosticism as Negation of the World: an acosmic Nihilism 
 
 Jonas defines gnostic ethics as acosmic: just like the whole of gnostic cosmol-
ogies, it stems from a deep ingrained contempt for and revolt against the world. In the 
Gnostic Religion, he states that gnostic morality is distinctively “determined by hos-
tility toward the world and contempt for all mundane ties”115. From this acosmic pos-
ture proceeds the Gnostic anomism, illustrated either through an antinomian libertin-
ism, or through ascetic morals116. Jonas mentions Plotin’s critique of the distinctive 
anomism of the Gnostics, defined by the absence of norms or values: for the ancient 
philosopher, the Gnostics would “lack a theory of virtue”117 as they fail to find any 
good in the world. Plotin condemns indeed Gnosticism’s opposition to the antique, 
Hellenist metaphysic of the cosmic order. The Gnostics do not feel obligated to a world 
which they experience as ontologically strange, only inspiring in them a posture of 
utter detachment and non-accountability118. The dualistic acosmism of the Gnostics, 
consuming the divorce between the self and the world, evolves into a cosmic nihilism 
which then prolongs itself into an ethical nihilism. Jonas therefore posits that acos-
mism, which he most often refers to as Demundanization, the movement of disengage-
ment from and ultimate negation of the world, constitutes the very sap of Gnosticism 
and contains as such the seeds of nihilism. This acosmic nihilism identified by Jonas 
as lying at the heart of gnostic narratives shall indeed allow him to draw together Gnos-
ticism and Existentialism and to extend further the analogy on an ethical level, where 
the existential and ontological affinities of both systems of thought uncover similar 
nihilistic developments. In fact, this is on the ethical level that the similarity between 
gnostic and existentialist narratives appears for Jonas to be strongest: both recount the 
self’s anxious and wandering inhabiting of a disenchanted world, and the despair that 
comes along with the lack of any meaning or value within worldly being. 
 The depreciation of the world thus arises as a central feature of gnostic ethics, 
proceeding from an original posture of estrangement from worldly beings. We find 
 
115 Hans JONAS, The Gnostic Religion, op. cit., p.46. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid, p.266. 
118 Robert THEIS, Hans Jonas: Habiter le Monde. op.cit., p.21. 
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that this depreciation of the world is common to both Gnosticism and Existentialism 
which, if in different ways, merge in their dualistic apprehension of worldly being: 
while antique Gnosticism thinks the cosmos as the hostile creation of a demiurge, Ex-
istentialism depicts nature as indifferent, and embodies in this regard a more desperate 
variation of nihilism. In both cases, the gnostic and existentialist subject defines itself 
primarily through its opposition to this alternatively hostile or indifferent world. Exis-
tentialist philosophy conceives indeed of nature as an absolute alterity which cannot 
be reached, nor even fathomed, and which represents in Jonas’ words “an absolute 
void, the true bottomless well”119. This conception of the world, along with the ethical 
implications it bears, is what crystallizes Jonas’ dismissal of the Heideggerian philos-
ophy.120 It also conveys a temporal nihilism, besides an existential and ontological one: 
as mentioned earlier, the dynamic dimension of the temporal posture found in gnostic 
as well as existentialist narratives orients existence away from the present, and con-
tains as such the danger of annihilating present being – this annihilation arising as 
another manifestation of the gnostic tendency to Demundanization. The idea of a throw 
out of nowhere moreover implies an unrestrained leap forward, whose direction is to 
be determined amidst the ethical vacuum of a world devoid of any value. Not only has 
the gnostic mind been thrown, but it must also therefrom project itself into a future 
which no predetermined value enlightens. However, a certain asymmetry between the 
 
119 Hans JONAS, Prinzip Verantwortung, op.cit., p.236. 
120 In this regard, we may wonder whether Jonas is being too quick on condemning Heidegger’s thought 
of the world. The latter attempted indeed to overcome an objectifying view of nature that would fail to 
recognize the ontological withdrawing of worldly being. Did he not find in the presocratic concept of 
phusis a force that gives all the while withdrawing? Besides, Heidegger’s later thought of the world 
represents the attempt to turn away from a modern, dualistic and anthropocentric apprehension of na-
ture, which the ontological turn of his philosophy embodies. The concept of the quadripartite further 
conveys the representation of man, god, sky and earth as contemporaneously emerging into one deter-
minate world (see Raphael Winkler, “Heidegger and the Beyond”). This conception of the unsurpassa-
ble entanglement of the Dasein within worldly being might have led Heidegger to assert that “man is 
nature” (Martin HEIDEGGER, Einleitung zur Philosophie, GA, 27, § 37, p.328). While Jonas appears to 
hold on tight to the transcendence within the concept of nature, blaming Heidegger for his hubristic 
disregard for the finitude of human knowledge and arguing for a cosmological thought based on a pat-
tern of the whole and the parts, Heidegger’s philosophy strives to think the emergence of openness 
within worldly being. This might well represent one fundamental difference between the two philoso-
phers, as Jonas seems indeed to prolong the modern concept of nature, while Heidegger tends to oppose 
it through a thought of worldly being. 
63 
 
gnostic and existentialist forms of nihilism ought to be noted, in that ancient Gnosti-
cism regards the world as anti-divine, while modern existentialism sees it as utterly 
indifferent, and appears in this respect as a more radical, more desperate form of ethical 
nihilism. Unless one understands the divine or religious in the terms proposed by 
Michel Serres: namely, as a kind of care, a deep-rooted concern, a scrupulous attention 
to what summons our responsibility and fears our negligence.121 While the word “care” 
echoes Heidegger’s notion of Sorge, Jonas throws light on the implicit theological 
background underlying modern Existentialism, most manifest in the notion of a being-
thrown into the world, as he asks: “what is the throw without the thrower?”  How could 
the a-teological, indifferent substance of nature engender the concerned being-in-the-
world of the Dasein? Jonas identifies in the removal of a thought of the presence of an 
ontological care in nature, or, following Serres’ etymology of the world religion, the 
removal of a thought of God in the thought of the world, the paramount manifestation 
of modern nihilism:   
 
That nature does not care, one way or the other, is the true abyss. That only 
man cares, in his finitude facing nothing but death, alone with his contin-
gency and the objective meaninglessness of his projecting meanings, is a 
truly unprecedented situation122 
 
 Not only does Jonas bring our focus to the structural inconsistency of the modern 
system of thought, exemplified in Existentialism, but his concept of Gnosticism also 
suggests to approach the modern cosmology as a dualistic structure of thought which 
would have been amputated from one of its poles – the divine one. One such amputa-
tion would have resulted into the evacuation of all purpose and value from nature, and 
eventually from man: “as a product of the indifferent, its being must be indifferent 
too.”123 Secular Modernity thus arises as what Robert Theis describes as a “monist 
dualism”124, preserving a dualistic structure of thought while seemingly abolishing one 
 
121 Michel SERRES, Statues. Le Second Livre des Fondations, Flammarion, 2014, p.47.  
122 Hans JONAS, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism”, art. cit., p. 45. 
123 Hans JONAS, GSG II, p.378. 
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of its poles – the “divine” one. Seemingly because, as we shall later see, such a dual-
istic scheme of thought can only endure thanks to the irreducible tension upon which 
it is erected. In this sense, the death of God did not contribute to make Modernity more 
secular, or more monist, it only made it more nihilistic. Jonas is concerned about find-
ing a third way, away from the temptation to reduce the dualistic tension, either 
through a naturalistic (inherited from the “worldly” pole”) or idealistic (inherited from 
the “divine” pole) form of monism. This third way should “avoid the dualistic aliena-
tion” 125 in which western Modernity found itself caught, failing to seize the simulta-
neously immanent and transcendent presence of the world. 
 
 
The relation to transcendence is the relation to the world 
 
Before further expanding on the ethical nihilism of Gnosticism, let us take a 
provisory step towards a deeper understanding of Jonas’ argument on the origin of 
ethical nihilism in the acosmicity of gnostic thought, by examining an idea which 
emerged from my study of the Jonassian concept of Gnosticism. From my earlier 
considerations on both the existential and cosmological variations of Gnosticism, it 
appears indeed that the gnostic relationship to the world is essentially tied to the 
gnostic relationship to transcendence. More specifically, Jonas’ analysis suggests that 
the gnostic conception of transcendence conditions the gnostic engagement with the 
world, thereby drawing together being-in-the-world and being-to-God. At the root of 
the acosmic nihilism identified by Jonas in gnostic narratives, we might find the 
absence of positive relationship between God and the world. Jonas observes in the 
gnostic conception of transcendence the roots of an acosmic nihilism denying the 
presence of any value, and therefore of any moral command binding us to the world:  
 
a transcendence withdrawn from any normative relation to the 
world is equal to a transcendence which has lost its effective force. 
In other words, for all purposes of man’s relation to the reality that 
surrounds him this hidden God is a nihilistic conception: no nomos 
 
125 Hans JONAS, GSG II, p.379. 
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emanates from him, no law for nature and thus none for human 
action as part of the natural order.126 
 
Our philosopher’s analysis of gnostic theologies suggests that the radicality of divine 
transcendence bears nihilistic implications that unfold on an ethical level into an 
acosmic nihilism. Contained in the yearning for an escape out of the world, the gnostic 
relationship to the world is a negative one. An antinomian posture inevitably follows 
from the gnostic premises that the world is a critical manifestation of being that ought 
to be overcome in order to reunite with the divine: the gnostic mind does not indeed 
feel accountable to the world, nor to anyone, in any way. Rather, it might feel 
accountable to an acosmic god that legitimates a contempt for the material world. 
 
These considerations only further the analogy drawn between Gnosticism and 
Existentialism, both systems of thought meeting in an approach to the divine 
characterized once again by a situation of rupture between god and the world. While 
Gnosticism stands in opposition to the antique metaphysic of the cosmic order, 
Existentialism prolongs western Christian metaphysics and blossoms on the thought 
of the death of God. Both appear as manifestations of the Nietzschean observation, 
understood by Heidegger as the loss of higher values and of the effectiveness of ideas, 
the supra-sensitive, the Ideal. Even when the Gnosis retains the idea of God, it is one 
that does not have any positive relationship to the world and results in the nihilistic 
depreciation, if not negation of the world. Jonas takes it further as he states that “the 
“death of God” means not only the actual devaluation of highest values, but also the 
loss of the very possibility of obligatory values as such.” For him, the motive of the 
death of God identifies a nihilistic tendency pervading Modernity, by which “the very 
concept of law was negated in all its aspects”. 127 Nietzsche’s idea of the death of God 
intended indeed to designate the devaluation of supreme values, and above all the loss 
of their possible foundation in an absolute. This simultaneous phenomenon of loss of 
the divine, transcendent pole of being, along with the dynamic of loss of the world 
(Demundanization), I argue, points towards something essential in the concept of 
Gnosticism.  
 





 The narratives considered by Jonas as gnostic, and this includes existentialist 
philosophy, convey the joint representation of a rupture with the world and a rupture 
with God. The devaluation of the cosmos, which appears in gnostic texts primarily as 
a dedivinization, as well as the feeling of being thrown and lost into an alien world, 
are for Jonas the result of the failure of the antique doctrine of the whole and the parts, 
present notably in pantheism and in post-aristotelician physico-theology128. The 
pursuit in existentialist philosophy of the motive of the insignificance of our existence 
in the world, along with the expression of a wandering without belonging within the 
infinitude of an indifferent universe, illustrate the collapse of a cosmological 
framework providing our dwelling in the world with a ground, a meaning and an 
orientation. Jonas’ analysis of Gnosticism, and the later developments of his thought 
towards philosophical biology and moral philosophy, suggest that the dissolution of 
the link to the whole results in a weakening of the normative bond tying us to the 
world. His concept of Gnosticism thus appears to embody this situation of rupture of 
the onto-ethical link to the world. The dereliction of moral norms of action, as well as 
of a visceral sense of responsibility binding us to our fellow beings of the world, arise 
as the direct consequences of the rupture of this umbilical link with the rest of worldly 
being. Jonas had already sensed that moral collapse of Modernity is being manifested, 
with an unprecedented intensity and scale, through the advent of the environmental 
issue, which consecrates a cosmological as well as ethical rupture of our civilization 
with the world. 
 
 As we shall see again in chapter 3, Jonas’ appraisal of a parts and whole kind 
of cosmology might be problematic insofar as it appears as another declination of a 
dualistic and reductive approach to worldly being. Jonas seems indeed to assimilate 
the death of God with the death of a holistic cosmology – and this is legitimate, as the 
God whose death Nietzsche announced was indeed a holistic, almighty one, 
embodying a being superior to the world and characterized by an infinite power over 
its lower, subordinated creation. In Facing Gaia, Bruno Latour suggests that we should 
not mourn the loss of a holistic cosmology, which not only subsides through the 
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modern cosmology of nature, but also perpetuates obsolete patterns of engagement 
with worldly being that fail to approach the simultaneous immanence and overflowing 
of its agency. A Gaian approach to the world would, on the other hand, allow to catch 
even just a glimpse of the submerging complexity of worldly being, whose planetary 
entanglement overflows any dualistic cosmology. 
 
These considerations corroborate one central hypothesis of my research, 
according to which a specific thought of the tension between transcendence and 
immanence governs our understanding of and therefore our dwelling in the world. 
Robert Theis identified something crucial as he noted that what was common to both 
the gnostic assertion of God’s absolute transcendence and the existentialist claim of its 
death laid in the absence of God within the world, as well as any kind of positive 
relationship between the divine and the worldly. Unfolding this reflection leads me to 
the following hypothesis: namely, that the disappearance of the idea of God, the eclipse 
and discard of a thought of God along the development of western Modernity, was 
contemporaneous with a failure to think worldly being. Jonas’ concept of Gnosticism 
brings to light this joint failure to think the divine and the world. My interpretation 
suggests more particularly that this twofold disappearance manifests itself jointly 
through the disappearance of a thought of transcendence of the world, and of the 
immanent divinity of wordly being. This follows Jonas’ postulate, implicit in his 
analysis of antique and modern nihilism, that a godless world is an ethically empty 
world, and that the gnostic expression of the absence of god in the world – resulting in 
a Dedivinization of the world –, amounts to a loss of world, which Jonas 
conceptualized in the notion of Demundanization. Arguing that modern nihilism 
blossomed upon the spiritual emptiness established by modern science129, Jonas 
implies that the depreciation of nature is one manifestation of the Death of God. His 
diagnosis of a Gnostic acosmism infusing modernity and enabling the triumph of 
nihilism directly associates our attachment to the world with the realm of ethics, 
suggesting that the transcendence of the moral imperative finds its roots within the 
world. 
 




The relation to the world is paradigmatic of ethics 
 
Jonas’ analysis of Gnosticism and his interpretation of both antique and 
contemporary forms of nihilism convey an understanding of ethics as world-bound. 
Not only does the philosopher relate the quest for and exercise of a moral imperative 
to our belonging to the world, a cosmos, but his thought also suggests that this moral 
imperative arises from worldly being itself, thus going against the gnostic, modern 
representation of an otherworldly, transcendent ground of ethics. While the spirit of 
the Gnosis tears humanity away from the cosmos, thus making it a cosmic stranger or 
an apatrid, the Heideggerian Dasein presents it as that which projects itself freely, 
independently from any given essence. In the continuity of the existentialist tradition, 
Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” argues that Man does not belong to an objective 
or essential order, thereby not only suggesting a divorce from the world, but also a 
radical independence from any immanent, groundless origin. Existentialism thus 
represents the challenge, and blatant defeat, of groundless ethics: it stands for the 
attempt to anchor moral responsibility in the utter groundlessness, openness of being. 
In this respect, while Gnosticism figures a Demundanization of God, Existentialism 
represents a Demundanization, or an evacuation altogether, of the idea of transcendent 
ground – a notion constitutive of the modern concept of God. We saw earlier how the 
Gnostics’ acosmism, their worldlessness, unfolds itself into nihilistic ethics. This is 
manifestly what conditioned Jonas’ allegiance to a somewhat holistic cosmology, 
leading him to link the idea of cosmos to an ontological normativity, and proclaim that 
“that which has no nature has no norm”.130 Jonas opposes indeed the mechanistic 
approach to nature, which would result in the abandoning of the idea of finality in 
nature, and hence of a teleological perspective on worldly being. This presumed link 
between finality and value builds the central argument of the Jonassian ethics, 
deducing a certain hierarchy of values from the presence of ends identifiable in the 
beings of nature. Jonas, for whom values proceed from being and are manifested 
through finality, argues that the collapse of this axiological worldview allowed an 
acosmic nihilism to triumph. The indissoluble link between ontology and ethics 
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present in Jonas’ thought crystallizes the philosopher’s resistance to the modern 
dualistic paradigm: it allows him to refute Gnostic antinomianism by asserting a 
primordial, ontological link between our being-in-the-world and our being-ethical-
bound, morally responsible. Jonas’ philosophy points as such toward an understanding 
of ethics as that which morally binds us to the world. 
 
Here, a crucial issue appears in the assimilation of this moral bond to the world, 
namely the entanglement of ethics and worldly being, to the presence of a ground for 
moral action. Such a ground was traditionally found in the concept of nature, providing 
the modern subject with a firm, objective, immutable terrain, indeed a frozen landscape 
for human action. Now what the present environmental crisis enjoins us to think, lies 
precisely in the contingency and precariousness of this natural (back)ground: that the 
world can be unfathomable and yet ethically full at the same time appears as one 
central lesson of environmental and moral philosophy. Full of the existential 
imperative of grounding moral responsibility amidst the bottomless, Jonas anticipated 
the thought of the contingency of natural being in his philosophy of biology, 
environmental ethics and even the more speculative-theological dimension of his 
work, suggesting that the ethical imperative transcends the groundless contingency of 
worldly being, all the while being immanent to it. In a Whiteheadian circle, the 
immanence of the ethical imperative transcends the contingency of worldly being: 
ethics stems from the abyss of immanence and transcends it. This of course subverts 
the gnostic dualism structuring modern narratives, the latter strictly distinguishing 
between the amoral immanence of nature and the subjective transcendence of culture. 
In opposing gnostic cosmologies, Jonas’ thought contributes to blur the dualistic lines 
organizing the way we conceive of and engage with the world, and his philosophy of 
nature particularly points toward the obsolescence of the immanence-transcendence 
divide when it comes to think the imperative of moral responsibility amidst the 







Conclusion: thinking the abyss of worldly being 
  
What can we learn from Jonas’ concept of Gnosticism, and how does this relate 
to the present environmental crisis? Hans Jonas’ largely hermeneutical engagement 
with the Gnostic religion was infused with the political and intellectual challenges of 
his own time, ranging from the ethical void left by the Second World War to the 
increasing concerns surrounding the advent of a technological civilization. Surely did 
the German philosopher think his way through an intense time which witnessed the 
onset of global environmental devastation succeed to the genocides of the Second 
World War. In this perspective, the concept of Gnosticism proved a fruitful 
hermeneutical tool to approach a world involved in violent waves of transformations. 
It is my postulate that a thought of Gnosticism might enlighten our path through the 
no less intense times we live in. Jonas’ understanding of Gnosticism is articulated 
around the unifying feature of dualism, which shall later infuse his whole speculative 
work.  We saw how Jonas identifies at the core of gnostic narratives a tripartite 
dualism, where the figure of God crystallizes a radical rupture between Humanity and 
the World and manifests a structural dynamic of Demundanization. Through the 
concept of Gnosticism, Jonas unveils dualism as a type of engagement with the world, 
characterized by the primordial experience of a profound duality and reflected in the 
gnostic theological dualism between god and the world. Jonas analyzes this 
demundanized type of engagement with the world, along with the nihilistic posture it 
elicits, as existential before being cosmological. In this first chapter I proposed to 
approach this dynamic of Demundanization as manifesting a joint movement of 
Demundanization of God and Dedivinization of the world, thereby highlighting a 
primordial tension structuring gnostic dualism. Such a tension notably shines through 
the modern representations of the otherworldliness of God, but also and mostly of the 
adivinity of the world: as recent developments in environmental philosophy suggest 
(Latour, Stengers, Hache), modern cosmology deprives the world of its intrinsic value, 
agency, creativity, openness and transcendence – in a sense, from its divinity. Jonas’ 
diagnosis of the radical dualism governing the relation of God and the world as a 
cardinal feature of gnostic thought thus points toward the hermeneutical potential of 
the category of Gnosticism in approaching modern cosmology, and the advent of the 
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environmental crisis within it. More specifically, the Jonassian analysis of Gnosticism 
indicates how both movements of Demundanization and Dedivinization merge into the 
same dynamic of reduction of a primordial tension. Jonas’ concept of Gnosticism 
embodies indeed the crucial idea that God and the World are different entities, two 
irreconcilable poles of an inescapable dualism. 
 
I wish to suggest that this gnostic dualism between God and the World, 
resulting into a structural dynamic of Demundanization, is based upon an ontological 
tension whose reduction operates as an obstruction and sealing of the openness of 
worldly being. What Heidegger theorized under the “Forgetting of Being”, and what I 
propose to think in terms of sealing of the openness of the world, thus appears as a 
consequence of the dynamic of Demundanization observed by Jonas. This sealing, or 
closure of the world, notably manifests itself in the gnostic notion of the abyss. We 
saw in the first part of this chapter that the gnostic narratives studied by Jonas are 
articulated around the thought of an abyss, alienating the self from the world and 
eliciting a primordial experience of cosmic anxiety. The motives of the alienness of 
worldly being and the yearning for a home thus outline the figure of a pivotal abyss 
organizing gnostic cosmologies along a structural dualism. In this sense, the abyss 
appears to designate that which stands between the dualistic boundaries erected by 
gnostic systems of thought, and that which is simultaneously being reduced by them. 
The thought of such an abyss and what it might contain, I argue, bears great potential 
for approaching the openness of worldly being. This latter notion of openness, which 
I wish to uncover as underlying the concept of Gnosticism, shines through the gnostic 
theme of an ontological crack in divine being allowing the creation of the world.131 
Within the gnostic mythology itself, unfolding the original experience of a crack in 
divine being, we can thus anticipate the thought of an ontological openness 
conditioning worldly being. We might also discern, in the thought of the radical 
transcendence and alterity of the divine, the opportunity to reflect upon the presence 
of this transcendence and alterity within the world itself – yet without thereby giving 
in the dualistic opposition of the divine to the worldly. This tension that we are starting 
to outline, and that Jonas’ concept of Gnosticism contributes to unveil, dwelling 
 
131 Eric POMMIER, op.cit, p.34. 
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somewhere within the openness of worldly being, amidst the abyss, between the alien 
and the home, nature and culture, the divine and the worldly… seems to be crystallized 
in the immanence-transcendence duality. But these are merely preliminary 
considerations, which should introduce us to the more speculative and hermeneutical 
reflection that is to blossom in the following chapters of this dissertation. 
 
For now, I wish to conclude on the persisting presence of Gnosticism in 
contemporary systems of thought, that is, in the very narratives that are conditioning 
our engagement with the world and the way we presently inhabit it. Jonas’ analysis of 
the Gnostic religion contributes indeed to throw light on the worldless dualism 
structuring contemporary narratives. In her article on the Gnosticism of Heideggerian 
philosophy, Susan Taubes writes that “the gnostic speculative system may become 
totally immanent in its structure and yet retain at its centre the principle of 
transcendence”132. She thereby points toward the secularisation of the gnostic 
mythology in Modernity and suggests that the supposed immanentization of 
theological contents might obscure, but not evacuate the element of transcendence 
implied in the very notion of immanence. Immanence and transcendence, just as 
secular and theological, build an inextricable tension which is always contained in 
either of its poles. Any claim about the secular implies a reciprocal claim about the 
theological. Therein lies, it seems to me, the main lesson of Hans Jonas’ concept of 
Gnosticism: in the deep-ingrained dualism of our cosmologies, we can find a tension, 
like a mirror. That this tension is worth rediscovering, as we are today summoned to a 
renewed encounter with the world, builds the postulate of this research. 
 







ERIC VOEGELIN’S CONCEPT OF GNOSTICISM AND THE 







Introduction: Voegelin’s concept of Gnosticism in his philosophy 
 
Eric Voegelin’s prolific works have not benefited from the same recognition 
as the philosophy of Hans Jonas. His subversive political thought, informed by subtle 
developments in philosophy of consciousness, appears to have been somewhat omit-
ted, if not discarded by orthodox political science. Known as one of the severest critics 
of Modernity, Voegelin’s concept of Gnosticism played a central role in his theoriza-
tion of the modern predicament and modernity’s dismissal of the transcendent dimen-
sion of reality. He understood Gnosticism as the expression of a revolt against the 
structure of existence in the world, led by the belief that humans could fundamentally 
alter it through the implementation on a socio-political level of an esoteric knowledge. 
His use of the term Gnosticism reinvests three essential features which to a certain 
extent overlap with Jonas’ concept: namely, (1) a strong feeling of existential aliena-
tion, incompleteness and unfulfillment, resulting in (2) a revolt against human condi-
tion, and – that is where Voegelin distinguishes himself from previous understandings 
of Gnosticism – (3) a belief in the transformative power of esoteric knowledge and 
political action to overcome this alienated condition. Attentive to the evolution of our 
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ability to symbolize and communicate the adventures and discoveries of conscious-
ness, the Voegelinian approach to Gnosticism proposes to rehabilitate in political phi-
losophy a thought of consciousness and its symbolic manifestations. Voegelin’s inter-
pretation of Gnosticism stands out through the originality, subtlety and perceptive 
depth of his analysis, thereby delivering a contribution to the philosophy of modernity 
whose paramount importance, this chapter aims to show, is yet to be acknowledged. 
 
A Philosophy of Transcendent Order 
The philosophical thought of Eric Voegelin is one of order-disorder (as illus-
trated by the title of his multi-volume magnus opus Order and History). Indebted to 
the legacy of classical and Christian philosophy, whose key tenets were laid by authors 
such as Plato, Aristotle, St Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, his thought reflects the 
conviction that the order of being discernible within the world is surmounted by a 
transcendent source of being. Voegelin’s philosophy thus postulates the world-trans-
cendent origin of the order of being, and somehow appears to manifest an obsessive 
concern with the radically transcendent character of this order – in this concern, we 
might identify the source of his fervent opposition to the Gnosticism of Modernity. 
The Voegelinian analysis of Gnosticism revolves indeed around the polarity between 
transcendence and immanence, and lies more particularly in its definition as a dynamic 
of Immanentization, on which the present chapter shall further expand. But as Voege-
lin links the acknowledgement of the transcendent nature of the order of being to an 
existential posture of “loving openness”, he reveals the subtlety of his understanding 
of transcendence, thereby also suggesting the complexity of his concept of Gnosticism. 
In Science, Politics and Gnosticism, he writes that: 
 
The prerequisite of analysis is still the perception of the order of 
being unto its origin in transcendent being, in particular, the loving 
openness of the soul to its transcendent ground of order.133  
 
133 Eric VOEGELIN, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism. An Essay on Late Modernity, Gateway Editions, 




The approach to being outlined here, both epistemological and existential, along with 
an understanding of philosophy as “the love of being through love of divine being as 
the source of its order”134, reveal Voegelin’s fundamentally anti-gnostic stain, charac-
terized by a loving openness in and to the world. This being open to the transcendent 
ground of being, or to the transcendence in being, chimes with Voegelin’s later use of 
the concept of metaxy, and thus determines what he considers to be the cardinal prob-
lem of philosophy. The same postulate of the transcendent ground of politics lies at 
the heart of the Platonic-Aristotelian paradigm of political science, whose tradition 
Voegelin intends to perpetuate. The pervasive intuition of the transcendent order of 
being thus characterizes the Voegelinian philosophy as a whole, and provides us with 
a key to approach Voegelin’s concept of Gnosticism, as well as how it relates to his 
political thought. Voegelin set himself the goal of specifying the character of the mod-
ern crisis while uncovering its spiritual origin: as such, the purpose of his thought im-
plied an “elucidation of the symbolism and psychology of the mass movements of our 
times”135, which the concept of Gnosticism is intended to illuminate. Voegelin’s anal-
ysis of Gnosticism thus falls within a pneumatological approach to political sciences, 
one that explores the deep-ranging relationship between ideas and politics. 
 
Politics of the noetic  
In Science, Politics and Gnosticism, Voegelin emphasizes the “pneumopatho-
logical” nature of the gnostic revolt, shedding light upon the link between the pneu-
matic, or spiritual dimension of Gnosticism, and its pathological character. According 
to Thomas Lordan, the philosophy of Voegelin aims at “recovering the experiences 
that engendered the symbols of western order”136. His approach to Gnosticism calls 
for an elucidation of the spiritual roots of gnostic movements, requiring an analysis 
 
134 Eric VOEGELIN, Order and History I – Israel and Revelation.  Louisiana State University Press, 
Baton Rougem 1957, p.xiv. I emphasize.  
135 Eric VOEGELIN, Foreword to the American Edition of Science, Politics and Gnosticism, p. xix. 
136 Thomas LORDAN, “Eric Voegelin and Henri de Lubac: The Metaxy and the Suspended Middle (Part 
I)”, Voegelin View, May 2016. 




particularly attentive to this subtle element Voegelin intended to unveil in the pneu-
mopathological, which we propose to approach here through a perspective we might 
characterize as “noetico-politic”.  
Voegelin’s political philosophy reflects a concern for the noetic, that is, for the way 
beliefs, ideals, thoughts and intentions affect the world. Infused with the postulate that 
political science depends upon a study of the noetic, his analysis of modern politics is 
crucially informed by a philosophy of consciousness: 
 
The problems of human order in society and history originate in the 
order of consciousness. The philosophy of consciousness is there-
fore the centerpiece of a philosophy of politics.137 
 
Voegelin’s preoccupation with the problem of the metaxy, which I propose to explore 
in this chapter, illustrates his belief that consciousness is of paramount importance to 
the unfolding of history. James Wiser reminds us that the idea that political science is 
conditioned upon specific existential accomplishments is central to Voegelin’s under-
standing of theoretical thought.138  While Voegelin considers theory primarily as a 
mode of existence, Wiser describes our author’s intellectual inquiry as relying upon 
the “discipline of an existential love”139, whereby we recognize his intrinsically anti-
gnostic posture, committed to a loving and welcoming openness toward worldly being 
and resisting the gnostic motive of a perpetual revolt against it. Voegelin argues indeed 
that reality is best rendered by the noetic expressions of a soul “who is attuned to the 




137 Eric VOEGELIN, The New Science of Politics, University of Chicago Press, 1952, p. 1. 
138 James L. WISER, “From Cultural Analysis to Philosophical Anthropology: An Examination of 
Voegelin’s concept of Gnosticism”, The Review of Politics, Vol.42, 1, January 1980, p.98.  
139 Ibid. 
140 Eric VOEGELIN, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, in Anamnesis, On the Theory of History and 
Politics, ed. Gerhart Niemeyer, University of Missouri Press, 1978. p.97. 
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The Concept of Gnosticism as a diagnosis of the modern predicament 
Wiser argues that a correct understanding of the Voegelinian approach to the-
ory is crucial for seizing the meaning of the concept of Gnosticism for modern political 
science. Voegelin employs and develops the category of Gnosticism for the purpose 
of throwing light onto the elements that are constitutive of the modern predicament: 
Gnosticism is to qualify Political Modernity, and diagnose the pathological substance 
pervading it. In Science, Politics and Gnosticism, Voegelin thus extends and deepens 
the thesis he formulated in The New Science of Politics (1952), according to which 
“the essence of modernity is Gnosticism”. Voegelin contends that modern ideological 
mass movements and the dominant philosophical schools are in some sense continua-
tions of the various anti-Christian, gnostic sects. He argues for both a historical conti-
nuity and an experiential equivalence between the ancient movements and such mod-
ern phenomena as positivism, Marxism, Freudianism, existentialism, progressivism, 
utopianism, revolutionary activism, fascism, communism, national socialism… as 
well as all other “isms”. Voegelin seemed aware however to be engaged in the hazy 
enterprise of illuminating Modernity from within, as he concedes that “the struggle 
against the consequences of Gnosticism is being conducted in the very language of 
Gnosticism.”141 With these words indeed, Voegelin points toward the latent character 
of deep ingrained gnostic elements in our cosmologies. He thereby indicates the need 
to uncover the presence of Gnosticism in the structures of thought and language that 
condition our existence in the world, before attempting to develop an alternative 
thought. Voegelin’s philosophy is a speculative “work in progress”142, one that stands 
on the edge of thought, and which therefore perpetually requires our contribution. 
 
An apophatic thought of our dwelling in the open 
I propose to approach Voegelin’s analysis of Gnosticism as embedded in an 
apophatic thought, revolving around the notion of an existential openness of our being 
in the world. While the adjective “apophatic” is usually employed in a theological 
context to describe a discourse which concedes an unovercomeable ignorance of God, 
 




aware of the impossibility to reach a definite grasp of the divine, it can also be applied 
to a speculative thought that departs from a propositional logics and proceeds with an 
epistemological humility. In this perspective, Heidegger’s thought of the withdrawal 
of Being can be qualified as apophatic. Likewise, we could describe Voegelin’s 
thought as apophatic in the sense that it opposes the positivist project of a possessive 
knowledge of the world and renounces the quest for a definite seize upon being. In 
Plato and Aristotle, he warns us against the attempts to achieve possessive knowledge 
by formulating doctrines leading to the “desecration of a mystery”143, whereby he re-
veals his apophatic conception of truth. As he denounces the “failure of immanentist 
metaphysics”, he describes indeed truth as an “orientating force in the soul, about 
which we can speak only in analogical symbols.”144  
Echoing Plato’s way of accessing the “ultimate realities”, Voegelin’s approach 
to truth promotes a non-propositional, symbolic and analogical discourse, giving way 
to the myth as legitimate medium for communicating the fundamental experiences of 
being in the world. Voegelin is envisaging another notion of veracity as he states that 
“a myth can never be ‘untrue’ because it would not exist unless it had its experiential 
basis in the movements of the soul which it symbolizes”. He considers myths as the 
“legitimate expressions” of existential experiences and traces their evolution from a 
collective enterprise to a tool for representing “spiritual movements...of the individual 
soul”.10 Commenting on the cosmic myth of the Egyptians, the philosopher maintains 
indeed that the “truth” of their story “will arise from the unconscious, stratified in 
depth into the collective unconscious of the people.” Human beings, Voegelin argues, 
“are engaged in the creation of a mytho-speculative symbol that will satisfy their desire 
to express”145. The reduction by a positivist paradigm of such essential mytho-specu-
lative attempts at fulfilling a longing for expression would only result in a sterility all 
the more disastrous as it claims the ultimate monopoly of “objective” truth. In an en-
lightening article about Voegelin’s concept of Metaxy, James Rhodes explains that, 
 
143 Eric VOEGELIN, Order and History III – Plato and Aristotle, Louisiana State University Press, Baton 
Rouge, 1957, p. 19.  
144 Ibid, p.363. 




because the myth symbolizes the “fundamental movements in the soul”, Voegelin in-
veighs mightily against handling it with a literalism that would “split the symbol from 
the experience by hypostatizing the symbol as a proposition on objects.”11 From here 
on and throughout the present chapter, I would like to draw our attention to the pres-
ence in modern thought of a certain movement of hypostatization, of hypostatizing or 
essentializing reduction, and to the defiance manifested by Voegelin towards it. The 
condemnation of a hypostatizing way of thought, I wish to argue, is a crucial element 
in Voegelin’s critical understanding of Gnosticism and follows from the apophatic ori-
entation of his thought towards the “open”. 
The rehabilitation of the mythical or symbolic language manifested in Voege-
lin’s thought throws light on his approach to the concept of Gnosticism, as well as on 
the role it plays in his philosophy. Employed by Voegelin, the perspective of Gnosti-
cism appears subversive, notably in its epistemological postulate of a mythical lan-
guage that might uncover things left unseen by the rational scientific paradigm of Mo-
dernity. Stephen McKnight notes indeed that the gnostic pattern identified by Voegelin 
in the modern world is “crucial for analysts to explore because these elements of mo-
dernity are usually claimed to be derived from science and secularization and not from 
ancient esoteric religions.146 Defined in these terms, the perspective of Gnosticism 
echoes with the very approach I wish to promote in this dissertation. 
The apophatic character of Voegelin’s philosophy seems directly related to the 
idea of openness, which appears to stand at the centre of Voegelin’s approach. As 
already mentioned, his thought is infused with a posture, epistemological just as much 
as existential, of “loving openness” towards Being. From this being-open in the world 
results a philosophy in the open, one that embraces the speculative breadth of thought 
and claims its legitimacy as well as its urgency: 
 
Reason has the definite existential content of openness towards re-
ality (…) In face of the breakdown of philosophy in modern Western 
 
146 Stephen MCKNIGHT, “Eric Voegelin and the Changing Perspective on the Gnostic Features of Mo-
dernity.”, in International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Eric Voegelin, ed. Stephen A. 
McKnight and Geoffrey L.Price. University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1997. 
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society, the bond between reason and existential philia, between rea-
son and openness toward the ground must be made thematically ex-
plicit.147 
 
As I hope to demonstrate in the present chapter, this idea of openness is all the more 
crucial as it connects with the concept of metaxy, absolutely pivotal in Voegelin’s 
thought and which, I wish to argue, provides a key to unlock his concept of Gnosticism.  
It is my intuition that both the concepts of openness and metaxy express Voegelin’s 
“insight concerning the divine presence and operation in the cosmos”148, which only a 
speculative, hermeneutical, and poetic language may provide, resorting notably to the 
resources of mythical expression. Voegelin depicts life in openness as an existential 
posture allowing a better knowledge of reality, characterized by a conscious, creative 
and illuminating participation within worldly being. The philosopher, therefore, is 
called to wander in the openness of the in-between, in the “erotic tension” of her ex-
istence in the world, torn between the being and the beyond, and by the persisting 
experience of the joint presence of God and the world. 
 
A reclaiming of Jonas’ analysis 
Although Voegelin’s philosophy distinguishes itself radically from Jonas’, 
manifesting different sensitivities and different concerns, his resumption of the Jonas-
sian analysis of Gnosticism seems to converge on the original diagnosis of the gnostic 
character of at least some elements of Modernity. Both thinkers identify significant 
analogies between ancient Gnosticism and the modern condition, and demonstrate in 
their political analysis a particular sensitivity to the existential and spiritual condition 
of modern societies: 
The collapse of the ancient empires of the East, the loss of independ-
ence for Israel and the Hellenic and Phoenician city-states, the pop-
ulation shifts, the deportations and enslavements, and the interpene-
 
147 Eric VOEGELIN, “Reason: The Classic Experience”, art. cit, p.101. 
148 James RHODES, “What is the Metaxy? Diotima and Voegelin”, Voegelin View, June 2013. 
URL: https://voegelinview.com/what-is-the-metaxy-diotima-and-voegelin/ 
 Accessed 11.01.2019. 
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tration of cultures reduce men who exercise no control over the pro-
ceedings of history to an extreme state of forlornness in the turmoil 
of the world, of intellectual disorientation, of material and spiritual 
insecurity. The loss of meaning that results from the breakdown of 
institutions, civilizations, and ethnic cohesion evokes attempts to re-
gain an understanding of the meaning of human existence in the 
given conditions of the world.149 
 
Among the “profusion of gnostic experiences and symbolic expressions” already 
acknowledged by Jonas, Voegelin distinguishes what he considers along with his col-
league as the central feature of Gnosticism, namely “the experience of the world as an 
alien place into which man has strayed and from which he must find his way back 
home to the other world of his origin.”150 For Voegelin too, who sees in Hegel’s alien-
ated spirit or Heidegger’s being-thrown contemporary expressions of a gnostic being 
in the world, the great mythopoems of Gnosticism revolve around questions of the 
origin, of an original having been flung and the perspective of a liberating escape from 
the world. Voegelin thus shares with Jonas an existential perspective on Gnosticism, 
assuming that 
 
this similarity in symbolic expression results from a homogeneity in 
experience of the world [and that] the homogeneity goes beyond the 
experience of the world to the image of man and salvation with 
which both the modern and the ancient gnostics respond to the con-
dition of “flungness” in the alien world.151 
 
Both philosophers converge moreover in their observation that modern thought is at 
least partly rooted in a gnostic mode of inhabiting the world, the latter hinges upon the 
twofold experience of an alienation from a world deemed hostile, and a rebellion 
against the ground of being – whose divinity both Voegelin and Jonas seem to agree 
on. While Jonas’ analysis of contemporary forms of Gnosticism aimed primarily at an 
enhanced understanding of the nihilistic element pervading modern thought through 
 
149 Eric VOEGELIN, Science, Politics and Gnosticism, op. cit., p.6. My emphasis. 
150 Ibid, p.7. My emphasis. 
151 Ibid, p.8. My emphasis. 
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existentialism, Voegelin’s concern focuses on providing an articulated account of the 
political expressions of modern Gnosticism in order to develop “a new interpretation 
of European intellectual history and of modern politics”, thereby uncovering the pneu-
mopathological condition of political modernity152. Voegelin’s thought distinguishes 
itself however by a political conservatism, led by the notion of order and the idea that 
the disorders of society were caused by attempts at overcoming the transcendent order 
of being: 
 
The structure of the order of being will not change because one finds 
it defective and runs away from it. The attempt at world destruction 
will not destroy the world, but will only increase the disorder in so-
ciety.153 
 
Opposing the gnostic posture of an existential revolt against worldly being, Voegelin’s 
interpretation of Gnosticism rather suggests renewing the order of the world through 
actions grounded in the love of the world, thereby reminding us of Jonas’ radical con-
cern for the perpetuation of worldly being. 
 
Some critical considerations  
James Wiser brings our attention to Voegelin’s own detachment from his early 
statements about the nature of Modernity such as formulated in the New Science of 
Politics, in Science, Politics and Gnosticism, and in the Political Religions. In more 
recent statements, Voegelin indicated that Gnosticism, although certainly a major 
force in the development of contemporary society, should not be considered as its es-
sence. Modernity revealing itself as more complex than his original position would 
suggest, and appearing rather as a composite of several traditions, he indicated the 
need to enlarge the “investigation of contemporary consciousness so as to include an 
examination of its Gnostic, Hermetic and Alchemistic conceits”.154 Gnosticism ought 
 
152 Ibid, p.5. 
153 Ibid, p.9. 
154 Eric VOEGELIN, "Response to Professor Altizer," Journal of the American Academy Religion, 6 
(1975), 762-65, quoted by James WISER in “From Cultural Analysis to Philosophical Anthropology: An 
Examination of Voegelin’s concept of Gnosticism”, art. cit., p.93. 
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to be considered not as the exclusive source of modern cosmologies, but along other 
factors, such as the “metastatic apocalypse” or the process of immanentization with its 
origins in the revival of neo-Platonism. Stephen McKnight thus argues that the themes 
that enter modern thought through Renaissance Neoplatonism and Hermeticism have 
a thrust profoundly different from those associated with ancient and modern Gnostic 
nihilism. A mode of esoteric saving knowledge in particular, emphasizing human dom-
inance over nature and the transformation of the natural and social order into paradise, 
would have gained attention in the Renaissance and grown to become a pattern in mo-
dernity and play a key role in the development of modern utopian political ideologies. 
This pattern would have notably contributed to the modern belief that an epistemolog-
ical breakthrough separates the new age from the past and equips modern humanity 
with the power to master nature and perfect society.155 
In this light, Wiser rightfully notes that “Voegelin’s partial disclaimer of his 
own concept raises a question as to the importance of the term [of Gnosticism] itself”, 
asking whether Gnosticism is a “useful conceptual tool in our attempt to understand 
the modern condition”.156 My insight is that the interest in Gnosticism, purely herme-
neutic here, lies not so much in the concept itself but, rather, in what it contributes to 
unconceal. Following Wiser, one of the claims of this chapter is that Voegelin’s anal-
ysis of the gnostic phenomenon does provide an important theoretical insight, one that 




155 Stephen MCKNIGHT, “Eric Voegelin and the Changing Perspective on the Gnostic Features of 
Modernity”, in The Allure of Gnosticism: The Gnostic Experience in Jungian Psychology and 
Contemporary Culture, ed. Robert A.Segal, June Singer and Murray Stein, Open Court, 1995. 
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A. The Gnostic Revolution: overcoming a godless world  
 
Like Jonas, Voegelin’s philosophy of Gnosticism falls into an understanding of the 
gnostic impulse as a longing for the overcoming of the world: the gnostic drive is one 
for a revolution against the world. More precisely, Voegelin situates the source of the 
gnostic revolt in the condition of alienation by and from a de-divinized world. “The 
de-divinization of the world through Christianity and the creation of a god-empty 
world”, Voegelin argues, “are the prerequisites for Western existence as a whole” 158 
In the New Science of Politics, Voegelin maintains that the de-divinization of the tem-
poral sphere of power was historically followed by a process of re-divinization, char-
acteristic of the late Middle Ages and the subsequent modernity. 159 With the process 
of de-divinization, a spiritual vacuum was cast upon the world, which various ideolo-
gies attempted to alleviate. Gnosticism, for Voegelin, is not only the most prominent 
and explicit of these attempts, but also takes on an archetypal dimension for the flow-
ering in Modernity of liberalism, capitalism, positivism, progressivism, socialism, and 
all forms of totalitarianisms draining the world as they claim the exhaustion of truth. 
Voegelin drew strong parallels between Gnosticism and the utopian dreams of scien-
tism and political revolution characterizing modern times. What unites all these mod-
ern enterprises, and what thus defines Gnosticism in its core, I argue, is the rejection 
of the world. Three features in particular are characteristic of Voegelin’s concept of 
Gnosticism: the claim of a radical, ontological break with the times past; the claim that 
the source of this rupture is an extraordinary epistemological breakthrough providing 
humanity with both the knowledge and the ability to perfect society; and the conviction 
that this epistemological advance allows humanity to alter the conditions of existence 




158 Eric VOEGELIN, “The Spiritual and Political Future of the Western World”, quoted by Harald 
Bergbauer in “Eric Voegelin on the Early Christianity: Philosophical, Theological, and Political 
Implications”, 2010, p.9. 
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An eternal revolution 
 
 The notion of a radical rupture with the present world appears essential to 
Voegelin’s understanding of Gnosticism. The ideological and political movements he 
characterized as gnostics share indeed a common posture of rupture with the world, 
and claim the introduction of an epochal break, instigated by an epistemological one. 
Among the conceptual imaginary of Modernity, Voegelin identifies one gnostic sym-
bol in particular expressing this idea of an epochal rupture: the notion of the “Three 
Ages”, separating western history into ancient, medieval and modern times, each very 
distinctively characterized by specific epistemological landscapes. The gnostic tempo-
rality is thus a purely linear one, proceeding from the cursed times of the fall to the 
redemption of the end of times. But this end of times, the actualization of the over-
coming, the final completion of the rupture, appears to never really happen: rather, it 
is perpetually postponed, so that nothing ever seems to fulfil the gnostic revolution. 
The latter embodies an eternal dissatisfaction with the present world: it is an eternal 
revolution. The modern dogma of progress and its declination in the sanctity of eco-
nomic growth illustrate for example the gnostic movement of a perpetual overcoming, 
or escape out of present worldly being, and finds its epistemological roots in a science 
Thomas Kuhn described as “post-normal”, evolving along successive paradigmatic 
breaks. The gnostic impulse amounts to a perpetual, insatiable, ontological yearning 
for an overcoming of the world in its present manifestation. As we know, Voegelin 
proposed to investigate the existential pendant of this yearning by digging more spe-
cifically into its spiritual roots. While most thinkers of Modernity have linked the epis-
temological leap of Scientism to the process of secularization160, Voegelin interprets 
Gnosticism as a movement instigated by the “de-divinization” of the world throughout 
the development of Christianity. What matters to us for now is the notion of a break, 
rupture and rejection of the world characterizing Voegelin’s concept of Gnosticism: 
Gnostics are wishing to put an end to this world, breaking from one world to another, 
and this ontological rupture is motivated by a profound unease in, dissatisfaction with, 
 
160 See Emilie HACHE (dir.), De l’univers clos au monde infini, Dehors, 2014. 
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and hatred of the world. This fantasized rupture with the present world may only hap-
pen through the possession of a specific kind of knowledge. 
 
The knowledge that shall redeem us 
 
 A second feature of Gnosticism is the notion of a redemptive knowledge, which 
Voegelin recognizes in the modern phenomenon of ideologies. The philosopher refers 
to modern ideologies as various attempts to re-divinize a temporal order otherwise 
experienced as devoid of meaning and purpose.161 More specifically, his analysis of 
Gnosticism draws a parallel between ancient Gnosis, defined as both “the knowledge 
of falling captive to the world” and “the means of escaping it” 162, and modern concep-
tions of scientific knowledge. 
 
 Voegelin articulates the concept of Gnosticism around the idea of a saving 
knowledge. The elevation of knowledge to the rank of privileged mean to salvation is 
notably apparent in the gnostic belief in the redeeming effect of the identification of 
the sources of worldly alienation. Voegelin identifies that same belief in the modern 
concept of science, and sees in the prodigious advancement, since the XVIIth century, 
of this new instrument of cognition, the symbolic vehicle of the gnostic truth. The 
philosopher considers indeed scientism as one of the strongest gnostic movements in-
volved in the development of Western society. Against the widely acknowledged the-
ory of secularization, and the more specific idea that modern science blossomed upon 
the secularization of knowledge and society, Voegelin witnesses the evolution of sci-
ence into the equivalent of an esoteric religion, called upon by various social and po-
litical reformers. He thereby undercuts a basic tenet of modernity: in arguing that such 
root-concepts as that of knowledge or history are religious in origin and function, he 
challenges the hypothesis of secularization as a fundamental modernist theme. 
 
161 Eric VOEGELIN, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction, The University of Chicago Press, 
1952, p.107. 




Because it considers it possible to fully grasp some knowledge that until then had 
remained concealed, and yearns for the possession of this knowledge, the gnostic un-
derstanding of truth is a possessive, as well as a systemic one. It aims at achieving an 
integral, exhaustive form of knowledge that would conquer ignorance by disclosing 
the ultimate principles of Being. Voegelin rises against such attempts, which he rec-
ognizes in the modern philosophies of Thomas More, Thomas Hobbes or Georg Wil-
helm Friedrich Hegel. In identifying the human logos with the divine one, the latter 
intends indeed to make the process of history fully comprehensible. In the three cases, 
for Voegelin, “the thinker suppresses an essential element of reality”, lying in the con-
sciousness that “the constitution of being remains beyond the reach of the thinker’s 
lust for power”163 For this forgetting, Voegelin blames the libido dominandi typical of 
Gnosticism, appearing in philosophy by means of systems construction and dogmatic 
certitude. As the construction of systems relies on the obstruction of reality and the 
reduction of a perpetual mystery in Being, the “suppression” that goes with the various 
attempts at achieving systematic knowledge amounts for Voegelin to a closure against 
reality. Against the claim to actual knowledge (wirkliches Wissen) present in Hegel’s 
phenomenology and ranging through modern science, Voegelin reminds us that phi-
losophy dwells in the love of wisdom, not its possession. His conception of philosophy 
is one that opposes the gnostic hatred of worldly being infusing the desire of dominion 
that is manifest in the urge to system construction: 
 
Philosophy springs from the love of being; it is man’s loving endeav-
our to perceive the order of being and attune himself to it. Gnosis 
desires dominion over being; in order to seize control of being the 
gnostic constructs his system. The building of systems is a gnostic 




163 Ibid, p.106. My emphasis. 




Escaping the World 
 
If Gnosticism conceives knowledge as the way to achieve salvation, wherein 
exactly lies this salvation? The gnostic yearning for salvation arises from a condition 
of alienation, experienced as an unovercomeable entanglement with and entrapment 
in worldly being. The Gnostic myth of the “Hymn of the Pearl” thus expresses entrap-
ment as the fundamental condition of mankind, an entrapment characterized by a con-
dition of ignorance of our origin and ultimate purpose – hence the gnostic idea that 
knowledge is the means to redemption. Voegelin finds this element in the narratives 
of modern political revolutionaries like Auguste Comte or Karl Marx, who sought to 
use scientific knowledge in order to overcome an alienated state of existence. He ar-
gues that the development of the “social science project” took science far beyond its 
boundaries, disregarding its own limitations and using it in the same way ancient Gnos-
tics used esoteric knowledge – as a means for escaping worldly alienation and trans-
forming existence. 
For Voegelin, who shares with Jonas the common understanding of Gnosticism as 
pessimistic and dualistic view of the world, the gnostic soteriology sees redemption in 
the alteration of the conditions of existence through the mastering of worldly being. 
The aim of the gnostic revolution is therefore the plain transfiguration of the world: 
“the gnostic revolution has for its purpose a change in the nature of man and the estab-
lishment of a transfigured society”165 Voegelin stands firm on the ground prepared by 
Plato, Aristotle and St Augustine against those who dream of changing the world:  “the 
nature of a thing cannot be changed; whoever tries to ‘alter’ its nature destroys the 
thing.”166 Gnosticism thus arises as a revolted answer to the imperfection of the world 
through an attempt at its salvational fulfilment. While the Christian posture finds re-
demption through grace in death, the Gnostics situate redemption in the death of the 
present world and the advent of a new one: “the aim is destruction of the old world 
 
165 Eric VOEGELIN, The New Science of Politics, op. cit, p.211. 
166 Eric VOEGELIN, Science, Politics and Gnosticism. op.cit. p. 43. 
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and passage to the new. The instrument of salvation is gnosis itself – knowledge.” 167 
If Jonas interprets this yearning for another world as a dynamic of Demundanization, 
Voegelin defines the gnostic rebellion against worldly being as a process of Imma-
nentization. As we expand further on the notion of Immanentization, we shall see that 
these two terms are not necessarily opposed, but rather converge in a sense of closure 
of the world. Both philosophers meet indeed in their analysis of a dualistic concept of 
salvation, understood in a radical opposition to worldly being as it is presently experi-
enced. In the gnostic idea of redemption through revolution, we find indeed an abso-
lutely crucial ontological postulate proceeding from the existential experience of being 
as inherently flawed, whose conditions therefore have to be overcome. The gnostic 
self has to be saved from present, mundane being. Voegelin’s definition of Gnosticism 
distinguishes itself with the particular idea that the labour of salvation, entailing the 
dissolution of the worldly constitution of being, falls to mankind, and materializes in 
modern ideological and mass political movements. The latter would indeed exhibit “a 
definite animosity towards the very structure of existence itself.”168 Voegelin’s analy-
sis of these political movements therefore proposes approaching the whole project of 
modern western society as a political religion. 
  
 
167 Ibid. p.8. 
168 James L. WISER, “From Cultural Analysis to Philosophical Anthropology: An Examination of 
Voegelin’s concept of Gnosticism”, art. cit., p.95. 
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B. Modernity as Immanent Political Religion 
 
The Modern Political Religion 
 
In the fifth chapter of the New Science of Politics, Voegelin presents the hy-
pothesis according to which what lies at the heart of the modern predicament is a “pe-
culiar pneumopathological state”169. In order to understand modern civilization, the 
philosopher argues, we must descend to the symbolic representation of our existential 
experience in the modern world. Voegelin’s political philosophy displays an enhanced 
sensitivity to the existential dimension of political phenomena. Like Jonas, Voegelin 
submits an existential definition of Gnosticism, in which he recognizes the core fea-
tures of modern existence, underlying all modern political projects. Voegelin’s analy-
sis of Gnosticism is first and foremost an analysis of gnostic consciousness: one that 
experiences the world as fundamentally flawed, and longs for an overcoming of this 
alienated condition. It is essential to acknowledge this existential focus, in order to 
prevent any misunderstanding of the Voegelinian approach to Gnosticism and there-
fore also his analysis of political modernity. Intending to elucidate the depths of its 
consciousness, Voegelin proposes to disclose Modernity as a Political Religion. In the 
light of his analysis of consciousness, the civilizational process of modernity appeared 
to him as the historical manifestation of a “mystical work of self-salvation”170:  
 
Gnosticism most effectively released human forces for the building 
of a civilization because on their fervent application to intramundane 
activity was put the premium of salvation.171 
 
Voegelin thus interprets the whole unfolding of the modern civilizational process as 
ultimately led by a gnostic consciousness yearning for a redemption in the overcoming 
of the present world. At the core of this progressive endeavour lies the discovery of 
the gnosis, a precious type of knowledge that shall unlock the development of the 
 
169 Eric VOEGELIN, The New Science of Politics, op.cit, p.139 
170 Ibid, p.129. 
171 Ibid, p.130. 
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modern political project and lead societies to a greater stage of civilization. We might 
recognize here echoes of the narratives of progress and growth, both falling into the 
ideological framework of modern civilization. To the hegemonic development of the 
modern civilizational process and its ideological dogmas, Voegelin only sees a limit 
in totalitarian political projects. “Totalitarianism”, which manifests itself in all-encom-
passing ideologies promoting a systematic conception of truth, “is the end form of 
progressive civilisation”172.  
Voegelin’s condemnation of modern ideologies and their gnostic dimension 
allows us to approach the concept of ideology as a systemic, possessive type of 
knowledge claiming to seize the total realm of being. Closely tied to the phenomenon 
of ideologies, which he understands as modern avatars of the gnosis, Voegelin’s defi-
nition of totalitarianism overlaps with his analysis of Gnosticism. He thus considered 
liberalism, scientism, positivism, progressivism and democratism – among others 
“isms” – to be gnostic ideologies, revealing the presence of Gnosticism all over the 
modern age. Ranging through the political ideologies which emphasize movement to-
ward a goal rather than the nature of the goal pursued, its magnitude is colossal. It 
follows from Voegelin’s teaching that, despite the defeat of Nazi Germany and the 
containment of Soviet aggression, western societies have by no means exorcised the 
demon of ideological totalitarianism. Hannah Arendt had yet warned us against the 
latent danger of silent forms of totalitarianism infusing our civilization, remaining un-
conscious, concealed under the aegis of growth, progress or development, and the per-
spective of a redemptory end to history. In this context, Voegelin’s approach to Mo-
dernity as political religion provides an acute insight into modern narratives, beyond 
their claim to an enlightened and non-ideological secularism. Against the widely es-
tablished thesis of secularization, Voegelin refers to ideologies as attempts to re-divi-





172 Ibid, p.132. 
173 Ibid, p.107. 
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The Immanentization and the unworldly world 
 
 In some regards, Voegelin’s notion of Immanentization, defining the core dy-
namic of Gnosticism and thereby also Modernity, may appear as a variation of the 
secularization thesis. It acknowledges indeed to a certain extent that modern societies 
and cosmologies did not exactly expel all theological content, but rather internalized 
them, incorporating them into their structures of thought. Such a dynamic would in-
deed succeed to a prior process of de-divinization. According to Voegelin, one major 
consequence of the development of monotheistic Christianity is that it created a “world 
emptied of gods”, reducing a plurality of divinities to a metaphysical god which was 
transferred from this earthly world to an indeterminate and absent beyond. The process 
of de-divinization itself would have succeeded to the primary experience of a world 
full of a divine presence manifesting a cosmological order complete in itself, and oc-
curred as a decisive consequence of what Voegelin called the “leap in being” – on 
which the next point shall expand. The emergence of a dynamic of de-divinization thus 
refers to the experience, and the progressive noetic realization, that the divine is a “be-
yond” transcending the world, never encountered in worldly existence. In philosophi-
cal terms, what the event of de-divinization implies is that the origin, ground and pur-
pose of being are not perceived as contained in the world, but as lying “beyond” 
worldly being: the world is experienced as the groundless vestige of a divine principle 
absent from its creation, orphan of a god who fled174. 
What Voegelin conceptualized under the term of “de-divinization” appears to 
have elicited dualistic repercussions on the development of modern cosmology, 
thereby recalling Jonas’ analysis of Gnosticism. As worldly being was dissociated 
from divine being, the structure of being itself was altered and on it was super-imposed 
a dualistic architecture of being. As I suggest in the next chapter, the ontological indi-
ces of immanent and transcendent are archetypal of a dualistic ontology articulated 
around the divorce between God and the world, and the yearning to bridge the imma-
nence of worldly being to the transcendence of a divine beyond. Another manifestation 
 





of this structural dualism concurrent to the dynamic of de-divinization is found in the 
modern process of political secularization: the latter consists in the dissociation of pre-
viously unified spiritual and temporal powers, henceforth to be represented by the 
church and by the empire and then the state, thereby ensuring a “double representation 
of man in society” 175. Both events of the de-divinization of the world and the devel-
opment of a dualistic cosmology prepare and condition the process of Immanentization 
described by Voegelin: the Immanentization characterizing modern societies occurs in 
a de-divinized, dualistic world. Now what does that term cover? 
 
Lying at the core of modern Gnosticism, the process of Immanentization iden-
tified by Voegelin is first and foremost an eschatological phenomenon: it has to do 
with modern conceptions of salvation and the end of the world, and is defined as an 
Immanentization of the eschaton. In his lecture on the link between politics and reli-
gion in Voegelin’s thought, Bruno Latour offers a perceptive insight into the subtle 
relevance of Voegelin’s essential idea for our time.176 The philosopher suggests indeed 
that Voegelin’s concept of immanentization provides a key to understand the modern 
aversion for immanence. But let us first have a closer look at this immanentization 
thesis. In The New Science of Politics, Voegelin argues that XIIth century Italian the-
ologian Joachim de Flore initiated a tradition of philosophies and political movements 
locating the advent of end of time in the linearity of time. He identifies in the Joa-
chimist idea of the Third Realm the burgeoning urge to transform the world and to 
draw its historical course to a close, which would later evolve into modern utopianism. 
The “fallacious immanentization of the eschaton” thus designates the political drive to 
realize the eschaton within history, thereby putting an end to time. What is lost how-
ever in the belief that the end of time, the advent of the eschaton, is in our hands, Latour 
 
175 Linda C. RAEDER, “Voegelin on Gnosticism, Modernity, and the Balance of Consciousness”, in 








See also Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime, Harvard University Press, 2017. 
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argues, is some ontological hiatus, the suspension of linearity, the discontinuous irrup-
tion of the world as something perpetually overflowing any historical course or frame-
work. In the attempt to make politics fulfil the eschaton and thus bring the world to a 
closure, something crucial about worldly being was lost – its persistent openness. 
What motivates this political ambition? “What specific uncertainty was so dis-
turbing that it had to be overcome by the dubious means of fallacious immanentiza-
tion?”177 Voegelin argues that the dynamic of immanentization appeals to those anx-
ious about the impending, uncertain course of history, eager to achieve certainty about 
the meaning, essential “eidos” of history. In a de-divinized culture erected upon a 
world deserted by the gods, only the tenuous bond of faith remains to guide our exist-
ence, which few prove able to sustain:  
 
the attempt at immanentizying the meaning of existence is funda-
mentally an attempt at bringing our knowledge of transcendence into 
a firmer grip that the cognito fidei.178 
 
From the High Middle Ages onwards, Voegelin describes a constant descent into 
Gnosticism through a process of immanentization resulting in the progressive evacua-
tion of all transcendence from the world. As the transcendence is immanentized, the 
tension contained in both immanence and transcendence is lost. The irruption of the 
Leviathan to pacify political instabilities, embodying the figure of the state as ultimate 
authority, evacuates in the same way the inherent volatility and contingence of politics 
by inscribing them into timeless and immutable “laws of nature”. The result, Latour 
argues, is the loss of two essential instabilities, whose elemental connection was ob-
scured by modernity: that of the religious mode of existence, and that of the political. 
Reduced to the application of a transcendent plan onto reality, politics has become the 
substitution of a non-world, a utopia, to the present world. What succeeds to the failure 
of the successive attempts at the immanentization of the eschaton manifested by mod-
 
177 Eric VOEGELIN, The New Science of Politics, op.cit, p.187. 
178 Ibid, p.189. 
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ern politics, Latour explains, is the rejection of an immanence despised for, well, des-
pised for its transcendence! The immanence of the world does not let itself be har-
nessed to fit into an ideal of what it should be: it is self-transcendent. Here we discern 
the crux of a problem I wish to elucidate in the coming chapters; for now let it suffice 
to say that the attempt at immanentizing a transcendent eschaton, that is, in the realm 
of politics, at shaping the world into an idea of what it should be, resulted in a posture 
of perpetual discontent with the world, which, following Latour’s reasoning, it appears 
fair to connect to the present environmental crisis. In the tradition of Heidegger’s loss 
of being, or Jonas’ forgetting of life, Latour links more specifically the ecological issue 
with the loss of matter along the development of modernity. According to him, the 
irruption of the ecological crisis, as the study of the earth’s critical zone reacting to 
human actions reveals, proclaims an end to the inertness of matter, and thereby offers 
an opportunity to re-encounter the agency of worldly beings – an agency lost with the 
loss of immanence. Although I shall further expand on this, it is important to under-
stand here that Voegelin’s notion of immanentization refers to a loss of both the im-
manent and the transcendent dimensions of worldly being, as these may only subsist 
together: any attempt at reducing their tension, for instance by absorbing one into an-
other like in the immanentization (which presents itself as an immanentization of a 
transcendent eschaton), results in their coincident loss. This becomes particularly per-
ceptible in the light of Latour’s analysis of modern dualism, which, focussing on the 
most archetypical nature-culture divide, taught us to consider dualistic polarities as 
one concept instead of two distinct ones. The challenge outlined by Voegelin and ar-
ticulated by Latour lies therefore in the resistance to the dualistic urge to reduce the 
ontological tension in the world. Especially, it summons us to embrace the tension of 
politics, by preserving its indomitable instability, the uncertainty of its outcome, and 
by dwelling in the precariousness of worldly being as it is being manifested by the 
present environmental crisis. 
 This challenge takes on an eschatological meaning, and Voegelin’s concept of 
immanentization contributes indeed to uncover the way modern conceptions of escha-
tology decisively affect the structure of modern politics.179 In chapter 4 of the New 
 
179 Jacob TAUBES, Occidental Eschatology, Stanford University Press, 2009 (1947). 
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Science of Politics, Voegelin describes the process of immanentization of the Christian 
notion of eschatological fulfilment, and argues that teleological and axiological com-
ponents of Christian symbolism reappear in modern variants of immanentization such 
as Progressivism or Utopianism. Prolonging this reflection into the present context of 
the ecological issue, Latour argues that secularized societies cannot take in the advent 
of the ecological mutation, as it would represent a second apocalypse. The ecological 
crisis figures the actual irruption of an unprecedented, unexpected eschaton, both 
transcending, interrupting modern conceptions of eschatology and arising from the 
transcendent immanence of worldly beings. Despite the many warnings of climate sci-
entists, “the Moderns” stand after the apocalypse, after the ultimate revelations of the 
Enlightenment, the scientific revolution and the resulting process of secularization, 
bringing about the much-desired end of history. The truth has been revealed, the end 
of time has come as the eschaton was absorbed into the colossal project of moderniza-
tion.  
If Voegelin’s analysis of Gnosticism as Immanentization appears as a variation 
of the secularization thesis characterized by a focus on the eschatological dimension 
of modern political movements, it also presents a declination of the motive of the death 
of God: “the death of God is the cardinal issue of gnosis, both ancient and modern.”180 
Recalling Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx’s interpretation of the Judeo-Christian 
transcendent God as the projection into a hypostatic beyond of the best of humanity, 
Voegelin interprets the promethean yearning of modern humanism as another mani-
festation of the process of immanentization181. He thus depicts Marx as a “speculative 
gnostic”, who “construes the order of being as a process of nature complete in itself” 
by evacuating all transcendence from the world. The purpose of this speculation, 
Voegelin argues, is indeed “to shut off the process of being from transcendent being 
and have man create himself”182. In this evacuation of transcendence from worldly 
 
180 Eric VOEGELIN, Science, Politics and Gnosticism, op.cit., p. xx. 
181 As James Wiser reminds us, Voegelin was convinced that the modern process of immanentization, 
manifesting itself in the divinization of the profane spheres of the scientifico-political, “[was] not 
motivated primarily by a desire to celebrate mundane existence as such”, but rather was “based upon a 
prior rejection of reality’s transcendent grounding.” He concludes that “immanentization was only the 
first step towards the attempted construction of a second reality – a construction motivated by the 
fundamental rejection of historical existence.” James L WISER, “From Cultural Analysis to 
Philosophical Anthropology: An Examination of Voegelin’s concept of Gnosticism”, art. cit., p.95. 
182 Eric VOEGELIN, Science, Politics and Gnosticism, p.16. 
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being, Voegelin sees the main danger of a process of immanentization leaving “an 
unworldly world” emptied of its transcendence: 
 
When consciousness of the cosmic bond of being as the background 
of all philosophy declines, there arise the well-known dangers of the 
dedivinized world and the unworldy God, the unworldly world as 
nothing but a nexus of relations between immanent things, and the 
dedivinized God reduced to mere existence.183 
 
Here, Voegelin offers a wonderful expression of what he fundamentally rejects in 
Gnosticism: namely, the way it obstructs and seals off the creative process of worldly 
being in the attempt to seize it fully, thereby exhausting its self-transcendence. That 
towards which Voegelin seems to point here is that transcendence is impaired when it 
is conceived as otherworldly, or worse, nonworldly. That is to say that the open process 
of worldly being does not need to be grounded in a radical, otherworldly transcend-
ence, and the transcendent dimension of a being does not exclude its resilient, imma-
nent creativity. Perhaps this depiction of an unworldly world might echo Jonas’ inter-
pretation of the gnostic dynamic of loss of the world: both Jonas’ concept of De-
mundanization and Voegelin’s Immanentization refer indeed to a common negation of 
the world in its own ontological, self-transcending openness. For Voegelin, this occurs 
through a dynamic of reduction of the tension that defines our being in the world. 
  
 
183 Eric VOEGELIN, Anamnesis, op. cit., p.79. My emphasis. 
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C. Inhabiting in-between the worlds  
 
The leap in the abyss of Being 
 
In the first volume of Order and History - Israel and Revelation, Voegelin men-
tions “a change in the order of Being and existence itself184 following the introduction, 
inherent to the process of immanentization, of the idea of an otherworldly transcend-
ence. The “leap in Being” describes indeed the realization that the source of cosmic 
order and creation is not located within the cosmos itself, but ‘beyond’ it, therefore 
opening a breach in worldly being separating the divine principle from the world. Ac-
cording to Voegelin, this conceptual discovery was only clearly articulated in the 
Greek and Judeo-Christian symbolics. In Neolithic agricultural societies, the divine is 
not fully differentiated from a world infused with wonder and enchantment, neither is 
the world as creation distinguished from its creators. The representation of a single 
order encompassing the natural worlds and the realm of human experience conveys a 
deep sense of attunement to the cosmos. In this context, the event identified by Voege-
lin as a leap in being symbolizes the encounter with a creation whose cause or origin 
could not be found within the world, thus setting off a quest for the original cause 
characterizing a metaphysical engagement with the world. As the single ordering, orig-
inating, and preserving source of being is experienced in its absolute transcendence 
beyond the world, the leap of being figures the sense of a gulf in the hierarchy of being, 
separating divine from mundane existence. The development of monotheism thus cor-
responds to the discovery and experience of an absolute transcendent force located 
“beyond Being in tangible existence”185. Voegelin further argues that the discovery 
which plunged humanity into the abyss of being proclaimed a whole new historical 
mode of existence: one that divides the stream of time into the before and after of the 
great leap and unites all humans into a universal humanity. Thus, he analyses both the 
linear temporality and the universalism of modern cosmology as the legacy of the leap 
 




in being and the insights it released, establishing a new aeon of history that still con-
ditions modernity’s narratives and self-understanding.  
“The discovery of a transcendent source of Being beyond existence”, Thomas 
Hollweck notes, “radically alters man’s understanding of his place in the cosmos from 
his previous experience of consubstantiality”.186 On an ontological level, one main 
consequence of such a discovery is the separation of humanity from the consubstanti-
ality of the world, symbolized by the theological motive of the fall from the garden of 
Eden. Like the original fall from a place of union, the leap in being insulates human 
existence from worldly being, and results in the devaluation of its participation in the 
world. It is a leap in the abyss of being, leaving humanity in-between a divine world 
from which it has fallen, and an alien world in which it was thrown. Voegelin’s phi-
losophy proposes to investigate on an existential level the disorienting consequences 
of the leap, experienced as an exile from both God and the world. It suggests that the 
leap in being engendered a tensional in-between a creative force from beyond and ex-
istence in the world, an in-between whose conscious recognition and symbolic repre-
sentation provides a key to approaching the development of modern cosmology. By 
overlooking this element, Voegelin argues, contemporary philosophy has ignored an 
essential aspect of human existence that is the life in between. 
  
 
186 Thomas A. HOLLWECK, “Cosmos and the ‘Leap in Being’ in Voegelin’s Philosophy”, 106th 
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 26th Eric Voegelin Society Annual 






Dwelling in the Metaxy  
 
In Plato’s Symposium, the philosopher and priestess Diotima defines Eros as 
“a great daimon,” understanding the daimonic187 as a “between (metaxy) god and mor-
tal”.188 Voegelin read in this line a major platonic insight and treated the term “metaxy” 
as a substantive category whose meaning proved paramount to his philosophy. He con-
fided indeed to his doctoral student Ellis Sandoz that the greatest issue of his work was 
“to restore the problem of the Metaxy for society and history.”189 If the philosopher 
only fully explored and elaborated the idea of Metaxy in the volume V of his Order 
and History, it seems to pervade the whole of his thought. Voegelin defines the 
Metaxy, or In-Between, as 
  
the meeting-ground of the human and the divine in a consciousness 
of their distinction and interpenetration190 
 
In the present section, I propose to elucidate how the problem of the metaxy relates to 




 At the core of the thought of an ontological in-between, Voegelin identifies a 
theophanic process of differentiation of consciousness, referring to the sharpened con-
sciousness of an existential tension, experienced as a being-torn between two poles. 
This differentiating event thus discovers the metaxic nature of human consciousness: 
suspended over a gulf, dwelling between the divine and the worldly, participating in 
 
187 In his doctoral dissertation about the daimonic, Stephen A. Diamond states that it is “as much con-
cerned with creativity as with negative reactions”. He claims that “a special characteristic of the dai-
monic model is that it considers both creativity on one side, and anger and rage on the other side, as 
coming from the same source”. Stephen A. DIAMOND, “Anger, Madness, and the Daimonic: The Psy-
chological Genesis of Violence, Evil, and Creativity”. Foreword. 
188 Plato, 202d13-e1. 
189 Eric Voegelin to Ellis Sandoz, December 30, 1971. Quoted by Sandoz in his introduction to Voege-
lin, Order and History V – In Search of Order, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1987, 
p. 12. 
190 Eric VOEGELIN, Collected Works Vol. 12 - Published Essays, 1966-1985, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
State University Press, p. 233. 
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both but fixed in neither. This discovery coincides with the distinction of a single cre-
ative force, an absolutely transcendent source of Being symbolized in the concept of 
the One God. As Voegelin identifies the development of a sense of an ontological 
schism, referring in particular to the distinction between the transcendent, divine 
ground of Being and the world of immanence191, he seems to point toward the birth of 
modern dualism, articulated around such ontological divides as that between nature 
and culture, natural and supernatural, or God and the world. But the thought our phi-
losopher wishes to rehabilitate in the idea of metaxy is one of the in-between, of the 
middle ground, of that which overflows binary polarities and thereby subverts modern 
dualism. Voegelin’s concept of metaxy thus points towards exactly that which a dual-
istic cosmology misses about our being in the world: the tensional structure of exist-
ence, of an existence in-between the worlds. 
 
In the essay “Eternal Being in Time” (Ewiges Sein in der Zeit) published in his 
Anamnesis, Voegelin defines the “philosophical experience” as a pair of tensions in 
the soul, the first of which being that “between time and eternity.”192 He argues there 
that humans “experience in [themselves] the tension to divine being”193, standing in-
between poles of being symbolized by the divine and the worldly. Voegelin defines 
this inbetweenness as an existential tension, and summons us to embrace the “erotic 
tension towards the ground of being” by: 
 
consciously exist[ing] in the tension of the in-between (metaxy), in 
which the divine and the human partake of each other. 194  
 
The concept of metaxy does not refer to “an empty space between immanent and trans-
cendent objects”, merely indicating the void between dualistic poles, but designates 
 
191 Eugene WEBB, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 
Washington, 1981. 
192 James RHODES, “What is the Metaxy? Diotima and Voegelin”, art.cit. 
193 Eric VOEGELIN, Anamnesis, op.cit, pp. 128, 129. 
194 Ibid, p. 154. My emphasis. 
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rather “the area of mutual participation of divine and human reality”.195 The metaxic 
tension is one actively, positively experienced, and opening up the possibility of a 
fruitful and mutual participation (metalepsis) in and with the world. Voegelin’s intui-
tion is that Eros, the mediator of the metaxic tension, symbolizes either an attraction 
or a pull in opposite directions – between time and eternity, divine and worldly, being 
and nothingness etc.196  That which stands in between, and which Voegelin’s concept 
of metaxy intends to unveil, should not be hypostatized as an object on which propo-
sitions could be formed: it first arises as the experience of an existential tension char-
acterizing the human condition. Voegelin argues that the anthropological dimension 
of the metaxy reaches its fullest symbolic achievement in the Pauline vision of the 
Transfiguration, which expresses both humans’ ascent toward the creative force, and 
the descent of the creative force toward them in a tensional co-penetration of imma-
nence and transcendence. Voegelin thus fills the term “metaxy” with new meanings 
by treating dualistic polarities as symbols of experiential poles. He thereby provides a 
deeper interpretation of Plato, suggesting that the antique philosopher is conscious of 
existing not only between god and man, but also in between all other pairs of poles 
grounding modern philosophy – the one and the unlimited, the one and the many, con-
sciousness and unconsciousness, time and eternity… all platonic symbols of an inbe-
tweenness unfolding from the primary metaxy, understood as an existence in tension. 
197  
 
 Bridging the poles of a manifold experience in the world, the existential tension 
described by Voegelin is no human prerogative: it arises from and is grounded in 
worldly being: “there is no flux of presence in the Metaxy without its foundation in 
the biophysical existence of man on earth in the universe.”198 The tensional structure 
of existence unveiled by the concept of metaxy thus expands to the world in all the 
concreteness of its overwhelming and eerie presence: it is a cosmic metaxy. Voegelin 
 
195 Ibid, p.176. 
196 Eric Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, op.cit, p. 127.  
197 James RHODES, art. Cit. 
198 Eric VOEGELIN, The Ecumenic Age, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974, p. 333. 
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challenges the founding postulates of modern dualism as he suggests that the unfath-
omable element in cultural processes is inseparable from that of natural processes: 
 
the Mystery of the historical process is inseparable from the Mystery 
of the reality which brings forth the universe and the earth, plant and 
animal life on earth, and ultimately man and his consciousness.199 
 
 
Brendan Purcell thus proposes to approach the “metaxic issue” in terms of cosmic 
emergence, instead of limiting it to the realm of strictly anthropological, existential 
experience.200 The immanence of the “hierarchy of being” described by Voegelin as 
composed of different “stratas of reality participating into one another”201 coexists in-
deed with the transcendent openness of a cosmic metaxy, illuminated by the experi-
ence of our being in the world as an existence in between. The inbetweenness con-
tained in the concept of metaxy is as ontological as it is existential: 
 
 
once the truth of man’s existence had been understood as the In-
Between reality of noetic consciousness, the truth of the process as 
a whole could be restated as the existence of all things in the In-
Between of the One and the Apeiron.202 
 
Voegelin saw in the forgetting of the cosmic community of the metaxy, what Andrew 
Hoffman calls the “full metaxic partnership in the community of Being”203, a modern 
disease of consciousness manifested through a “withdrawal into existential solitude”204 
– the anoia. Voegelin’s concept of metaxy is closely tied to the thought of the commu-
nity and consubstantiality of worldly beings, imprinted by the intuition that “God, man, 
 
199 Ibid. 
200 Brendan PURCELL, “Human Emergence as Cosmic Metaxy”, Voegelin View, March 2009. 
URL: https://voegelinview.com/human-emergence-as-cosmic-metaxy-i/  
Accessed 11.01.2019. 
201 Eric VOEGELIN, The Ecumenic Age, op. cit, p. 335.  
202 Ibid, p. 185. 
203 Andrew HOFFMAN, “Eric Voegelin’s Leap of Being.” Voegelin View, April 2017. 
URL: https://voegelinview.com/eric-voegelins-leap-part/  
Accessed 11.01.2019. 
204 Charles Warren BURCHFIELD, Eric Voegelin’s Mystical Epistemology and Its Influence on Ethics 
and Politics, The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1994, p.183. 
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world, and society form a primordial community of Being”205 in which “consciousness 
occurs as an event of participation between partners in the community of Being” 206. 
Voegelin’s thought of the metaxy describes the depth of our being suspended in be-
tween the worlds, the breadth of our being simultaneously reaching through other 
worldly beings, and the potential luminosity of our wandering as we become conscious 
of our participation in the mysterious and creative process of being. But as the trans-
cendent openness is separated from the immanent process of being, the creators from 
their creation, and our existential wandering amidst the abyss from the yearning emer-
gence of worldly beings, something is lost. The fall from the conscious dwelling in the 
metaxy results for Voegelin in a “loss of being”. 
 
The Gnostic loss of the world 
 
Voegelin was well aware of the difficulty in embracing and maintaining the 
metaxic tension of existence. The philosopher read in the strong sense of anomie and 
estrangement pervading the consciousness of his time, traditional symptoms of Gnos-
ticism resulting from the restlessness of our being caught in-between. Drawing a par-
allel with Henri de Lubac’s thought of the “suspended middle”207, Thomas Lordan 
argues that Voegelin’s philosophy evokes experiences of “longing for something that 
one knows is not here, that it is not in the gift of the world to give.”208 As he reflects 
on the forgetfulness of the “partnership in the community of Being209”, Voegelin joins 
in the tradition of thought initiated by the Heideggerian diagnosis of a Forgetting of 
Being consumed along the development of western philosophy. According to him, the 
gnostic loss of the world manifests itself in the loss of consubstantiality, which Andrew 
Hoffman refers to as a “fall from the grace of consubstantiality”210, or which we could 
 
205 Eric VOEGELIN, Order and History I – Israel and Revelation, op. cit., p.1. 
206 Eric VOEGELIN, Order and History V – In Search of Order, op.cit, p.15. 
207 John MILBANK, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatu-
ral, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005. 
208 Thomas LORDAN, “Eric Voegelin and Henri de Lubac: The Metaxy and the Suspended Middle (Part 
I)”, art.cit, p.5. 
209 Eric VOEGELIN, Order and History I – Israel and Revelation, op.cit., p.11. 
210 Andrew HOFFMAN, art.cit., p.5: “Whereas man was previously at home in the world, when Adam 
and Eve become aware of a separate God outside of their existence, consubstantiality is lost, everything 
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approach in terms of a process of disentanglement from the world. How does such a 
loss relate to the metaxic tension brought to light by Voegelin? 
 
In Science, Politics and Gnosticism, Voegelin argues that “border experiences” 
of the metaxy are prone to be reduced by a possessive approach to knowledge, led by 
the “temptation to fall from uncertain truth into certain untruth”.211 Such an approach 
to knowledge, as we know, is a traditional feature of Gnosticism, but is also character-
istic of a metaphysico-scientific type of engagement with the world, aiming at propo-
sitional pronouncements about a reality that one ought to reduce in order to grasp. The 
main danger arising from the metaxy thus resides in its potential reduction through a 
movement of hypostatization. The hypostatization of the metaxic tension refers to its 
disjointing, its dismantling through the essentialization of its poles into two distinct 
substances or entities, leading for example to the distinction between transcendence 
and immanence, the worldly and the beyond, nature and culture, self and other… But 
attempts at reducing any event in the metaxy to an object of propositional knowledge 
result in its evasion: the tensional structure of the metaxy also indicates its evanes-
cence, and the impossibility to ultimately capture it. The annihilation of the primal 
tension in a movement of hypostatization results indeed in what Voegelin eloquently 
called a “decapitation of Being”. If Voegelin’s “decapitation of Being”, or loss of con-
substantiality, appears as another postmodern variation on the Nietzschean theme of 
the Death of God, alongside Heidegger’s Forgetting of Being and Jonas’ Forgetting of 
Life, it also provides an original insight into the metaxic context in which Modernity’s 
founding loss occurred. Voegelin’s interpretation suggests that being was “beheaded” 
as it was divided into distinct realms – worldly, divine, natural, cultural, objective, 
subjective, transcendent, immanent etc. In this regard, the gnostic dynamic of imma-
nentization constituted an absorption, an abortion of the transcendent openness of the 
world as well as a quelling covering of the organic creativity of immanence212, and the 
murder of God was at the same time a murder of the world. Voegelin’s analysis of 
 
falls apart and they are no longer at home in the garden but cast out into a world of alienation.”. My 
emphasis. 
211 Eric VOEGELIN, Science, Politics and Gnosticism, op. cit., p.75. 
212 Voegelin’s conception of transcendence stands for the metaxic openness of being.  
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Gnosticism thus indicates that worldly being was lost as the metaxic tension that ties 
all these ontological realms together and open them up to another was obliterated, the 
possibility for translation evacuated and their openness sealed. Negating the metaxy 
was like closing the door of the world – it negated its liminality, openness and thus 
creativity. In this sense, “the eclipse of transcendence constitutes the ultimate devalu-
ation of the world”213. 
Therein, I argue, lies an essential teaching of Voegelin’s concept of Gnosti-
cism, as well as the culminating point of his contribution to the philosophy of Moder-
nity: the identification of a movement of reduction, closure, or sealing of an ontologi-
cal tension between immanence and transcendence constitutive of worldly being. The 
gnostic mythology provided a rich palette of symbols expressing the restlessness and 
the alienness of a wandering felt by those who were cast inbetween, and the movement 
described by Voegelin as gnostic is one that aims to put an end to the metaxic edginess. 
But the unease of this tensional inbetweenness, as turbulent as it might be, is part of 





213 Wolfgang SMITH, Teilhardism and the New Religion. A Thorough Analysis of the Teachings of Pierre 





Eric Voegelin’s account of Gnosticism glows with the originality, subtlety and 
depth of his philosophical thought. Aimed at a diagnosis of the pneumopathological 
element pervading the political and ideological movements of the XXth century, his 
conceptualization of Gnosticism provides a key to approach the present challenge of 
thinking our dwelling in between worlds both collapsing and emerging. Voegelin’s 
analysis suggests that Gnosticism stems from the difficulty of dwelling in-between: at 
the roots of a pervasive rebellion against worldly being, the philosopher identifies an 
existential restlessness, a feeling of alienation in and from the world. The incapacity 
of feeling at home within the world would translate into a perpetual revolt, informed 
by a conception of salvatory knowledge and politics as a means to overcome the con-
ditions of existence in the world. The dualistic scheme of modern cosmology and pol-
itics identified by Jonas thus appears infused with an original posture of gnostic rejec-
tion of the world, manifest in the political project of perfecting society through the 
mastering, draining and exploitation of worldly beings. Voegelin qualifies this patho-
logical inhabiting of the world as Anoia, referring to the forgetfulness of the co-pene-
tration and co-creation implied in our inhabiting the world. This forgetting of what our 
dwelling in-between includes chimes with Jonas’ diagnosis of a loss of response-abil-
ity, in Donna Haraway’s orthography214 – with our incapacity to communicate with 
the worlds between which we reside. Voegelin’s thought of Gnosticism suggests that 
the cure to such a pathological being in the world should include a rediscovery of our 
being in-between, with and with-in the worlds. This involves bridging the abyss sepa-
rating God from the world, and embracing our dwelling in the metaxic gulf as well as 
our participation into the process of worldly becoming. 
David Walsh considers Voegelin to be one of the great figures of XXth century 
political philosophy, in that his thought is “warning us and calling our attention to the 
abyss which was opened up by that sense of unlimited human power” 215. An abyss 
 
214 Donna J. HARAWAY, When species meet. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2008. 
Donna J. HARAWAY, “Awash in urine: DES and Premarin® in multi-species response-ability”. 
Women’s Studies Quarterly, 40(1-2), 2012, pp. 301-316. 
215 David WALSH in “Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of Consciousness, Part II.” Documentary on the life 
of German philosopher Eric Voegelin. 
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was opened and persists indeed in our perception of, and thus engagement with the 
world: that segregating nature from culture, worldly from divine, object from subject, 
economics from politics, politics from religion, being from possible. Voegelin’s 
thought of the metaxy draws attention to the disastrous effects of such a segregation, 
and endeavours to bridge realms of thought that Modernity has set apart. Politics stand 
right in the middle of the metaxic challenge: it summons us to preserve the possible 
amidst the instability of times manifesting the precariousness of the world. It calls for 
a posture of caring humility and responsibility as it reminds us of its ultimately apoc-
alyptic dimension: here and now, perpetually in between the worlds, we are emerging. 
 









WHAT GNOSTICISM UNCONCEALS: 
TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTAL HERMENEUTICS OF 












As a relatively recent invention of modern political philosophy, the concept of 
Gnosticism is hermeneutic in nature: both in Jonas and in Voegelin’s analyses, it aims 
at uncovering the cultural and philosophical ramifications of a pathological being in 
the world characteristic of Modernity, and focuses on its manifestations in modern 
cosmology and politics. Hans Jonas thus considered the concept of Gnosticism to pro-
vide “an enlightening help” 216 in addressing Modernity’s elusive and yet deeply in-
grained nihilism, which he approached from an existential perspective inherited from 
Heidegger’s Daseinsanalyse. Eric Voegelin diagnosed in the political millenarianism 
of Modernity the manifestation of a gnostic obsession with the other world, unfolding 
 
216 Hans JONAS, Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man, University of 
Chicago Press, 1980, p.xix. 
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into the denial of the present world. Both authors approached the concept of Gnosti-
cism in the attempt to achieve a greater understanding of Modernity. In this third chap-
ter, I wish to elucidate the ways in which Jonas and Voegelin’s respective concept of 
Gnosticism is articulated to their critique of Modernity, how they echo with each other, 
and how we might harvest the fruits of their analyses in the perspective of a reflection 
around the contemporary context of the ecological mutation and the challenge of in-
habiting a collapsing world. This shall represent the first step towards unfolding an 
environmental hermeneutics of Gnosticism for the present times.  
What may Jonas and Voegelin’s respective analysis of Gnosticism teach us 
about the times we live in, and the advent of the environmental crisis they witness? 
This doctoral research arises from the postulate that the environmental issue provides 
us with an unprecedented opportunity to rethink the world, worldly beings, our own 
being in the world, and the way we inhabit amidst the dazzling reflections of a collaps-
ing and burgeoning diversity of beings. I propose to approach it as a kaleidoscopic 
event bathing worldly being in a bouquet of new colours, which might then be illumi-
nated from different perspectives. The hermeneutical perspective on environmental 
philosophy embraced in this dissertation thus feeds upon a play of light and shadow 
around what the environmental crisis might reveal of worldly being that had previously 
remained unthought. It asks how to articulate that which remains unthought with that 
which must be thought, and how to sustain its clearing. Drawing upon Hans Jonas and 
Eric Voegelin’s conceptualizations studied in the two previous chapters, I mobilize the 
hermeneutical potential of the category of Gnosticism to throw new light on the envi-
ronmental crisis as a philosophical issue. I raise the hypothesis that the amazing inter-
twinement of politics, science, ethics, religion, arts, myths and cosmology which the 
environmental issue crystallizes, rests upon founding symbols and metaphors condi-
tioning our engagement with the world – mostly expressions of an unrooting and of an 
abyssal distance keeping the self away from the world. I argue that it is crucial to 
acknowledge these tropes of our being in the world to gain a deeper understanding of 
the way we conceive and inhabit worldly being. Crystalizing such tropes, a Herme-
neutics of Gnosticism contributes to illuminate our being in the world as well as its 
particular configuration in the present environmental crisis. The hermeneutical poten-
tial of the perspective of Gnosticism thus unfurls upon contact with the contemporary 
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context of the environmental mutation, which reciprocally illuminates Gnosticism as 
a distinct way of inhabiting the world. Both ultimately deal with the way we dwell, the 
way we are in the world and inhabit amidst worldly beings. What does this hermeneu-
tical circle disclose about our inhabiting? What is being revealed, and which tropes of 
our inhabiting might enlighten our path as we journey through the uncanny obscurity 
of the environmental issue? Before we deploy the breadth of hermeneutical specula-
tion, let us first return to Jonas and Voegelin’s respective thought of Gnosticism, and 
to the preliminary conclusions we already drew from them. 
Like the rest of his philosophical thought, Jonas’ analysis of Gnosticism re-
volves around the key idea of a cosmological dualism cultivating a demundanized en-
gagement with the world: the Jonassian idea of Gnosticism crystallizes a dualistic, 
worldless, and ethically nihilistic variation of our inhabiting. In the first chapter of this 
dissertation, I proposed to approach the “dynamic of Demundanization”, identified by 
Jonas at the core of the gnostic system of thought, as disclosing a primordial tension 
caught in a dualistic structure of thought. Upon asking ourselves what was being “de-
mundanized” in the gnostic worldview, it was suggested that the Demundanization (of 
God) conceptualized by Jonas manifested a simultaneous Dedivinization (of the 
world). In other words, Jonas’ concept of Gnosticism embodies the cardinal experience 
of a tragic chasm separating God and the world into two separate entities, two irrecon-
cilable poles of an inescapable dualism. The hypothesis I formulated, and which I now 
wish to explore in the present chapter, is that the gnostic dualism analyzed by Jonas 
discloses a tension which also shines through modern dualism. More precisely, the 
acosmism identified by Jonas as the essence of Gnosticism is articulated around an 
ontological tension whose systematic reduction into a dualistic structure of thought 
operates as an obstruction, or sealing, of the openness of worldly Being. Throwing 
light upon the worldless dualism structuring contemporary narratives, Jonas’ analysis 
of the Gnostic Religion thus also points toward the tension within this deep-ingrained 
dualism. Unfolding Jonas’ intuition, this chapter proposes to elucidate the worldless-
ness pervading our cosmologies by researching the tension lying beneath dualism.   
 
In many respects, Eric Voegelin’s analysis of Gnosticism appears to unfold the 
Jonassian insights with the intention of a deepened philosophical critique of modernity. 
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More explicitly than Jonas, who had limited his reflections to the identification of a 
certain elective affinity between Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism, repeatedly 
highlighting the merely analogous character of an eventual presence of Gnosticism in 
Modernity, Voegelin’s understanding of Gnosticism is led by the desire to diagnose 
the “pneumopathological” element in modern societies. The critical potential of 
Voegelin’s philosophy, including his interpretation of the concept of Gnosticism, thus 
appears to be more glaring, definitely more elaborate than Jonas’. Still, our 
interpretation of Voegelin’s analysis of Gnosticism has emphasized the same tension 
which also appeared in Jonas’ reflections. Voegelin’s thought, I argued, strives indeed 
to conceptualize the modern reduction of an ontological tension, for which the political 
philosopher finds a fortunate expression in the platonic idea of metaxy – 
inbetweenness. Voegelin’s analysis suggests that Gnosticism stems from the difficulty 
of being in the world as dwelling in-between. At the roots of a pervasive rebellion 
against worldly being, which would characterize the modern political being in the 
world, the philosopher identifies the same existential restlessness, a feeling of 
alienation in and from the world, also described by Jonas. The gnostic failure to feel 
at home in the world would then translate into a perpetual revolt, which Voegelin 
notably identifies in the modern conception of science as salvatory knowledge and 
politics as a means to overcome the conditions of existence in the world. Less 
acknowledged, and, as I hope to show, perhaps even more relevant for addressing the 
politico-philosophical issues of our time, is Voegelin’s interpretation of the gnostic 
being in the world as Anoia, referring to the forgetting of the co-penetration and co-
creation implied in our inhabiting in-between the world. 
 
Without delving any deeper into the interpretation of Jonas and Voegelin’s 
ideas of Gnosticism, which we have already explored in the first two chapters, I wish 
to draw your attention toward two common themes infusing their philosophical 
thoughts – two potential hermeneutical keys that may bridge their understandings of 
Gnosticism. These two recurring themes, I submit, are those of an alienation from 
worldly being unfolding itself in a dualistic structure of thought, and of an ontological 
tension, formulated in terms of an existential inbetweenness which modern dualism 
would fail to think. I suggest that these two motives enable us to bridge the two 
113 
 
philosophers’ ideas of Gnosticism and to draw connections between their analyses of 
Modernity, in order to gain a clearer insight into contemporary issues related to our 
inhabiting. Maybe the “metaxic gulf” entailed in our existence in the world, signalling 
the poles of a ubiquitous inbetweenness and thus unbridgeable distance, chimes with 
the structural dualism of Modernity. Jonas and Voegelin’s reflections on the concept 
of Gnosticism both seem to indicate the primordial experience of a breach, some 
deeply felt alienated condition lying at the core of a gnostic engagement with the 
world, and expressed in the trope of an existential abyss. Ultimately, across the widely 
recognized feature of dualism, their analyses of Gnosticism both shed light on some 
obscure ontological tension around which gnostic systems of thought appear to be 
articulated, and whose reduction would lie at the heart of the modern predicament. In 
order to develop a hermeneutic of Gnosticism suited to contemporary issues in political 
philosophy, gravitating toward questions of inhabiting, I propose to delve into these 
two tropes of a dualistic alienation, and the ontological tension it encloses.  
 
What might a renewed understanding of Gnosticism enlighten of our 
contemporary being in the world? The first manifestation of Gnosticism, or the first 
feature it illuminates of contemporary cosmologies, is the worldlessness of our 
inhabiting – an unrooted inhabiting alienated from the world. The second teaching 
revolves around the implications of a dualistic engagement with the world, approached 
here in terms of a closure, or condemnation of the world. The third lesson we might 
draw from the perspective of Gnosticism lies in the politically subversive potential of 





  A. Uncovering the worldless inhabiting of modern politics 
 
As they reinvest the trope of a disdain for the world, manifest in feelings of an 
existential alienation, profound homesickness, and in the yearning for another world 
that would absolve this condition, both Jonas and Voegelin’s analyses of Gnosticism 
emphasize the worldlessness of modern cosmology. In the following section, I suggest 
that the current environmental crisis, allowing a rediscovery of our earth-boundedness, 
presents us with an exceptional opportunity to reflect upon the worldlessness of mod-
ern cosmology as disclosed by the concept of Gnosticism. Or could it be the other way 
around? The gnostic worldlessness might illuminate our own inhabiting of the world 
as well as how the latter shapes our treatment of the ecological issue. Either way, the 
concept of Gnosticism and the contemporary context of the environmental crisis dove-
tail into a fruitful hermeneutical couple that points toward the problematic worldless-
ness of our inhabiting. 
 
Throwing light upon the way we dwell in the world, the perspective of Gnos-
ticism adopted by Jonas and Voegelin designates a pathological form of inhabiting 
characteristic of the modern predicament, and of which the present environmental cri-
sis offers a phenomenal manifestation. I argue indeed that a hermeneutics of Gnosti-
cism points toward a crisis of our inhabiting, which should be understood as an emi-
nently political crisis. By emphasizing the experience of being in the world as being 
homeless, and formulating the drama of the unrooting of the self as a tragedy of the 
home, the category of Gnosticism allows us to consider the worldlessness infusing 
modern cosmology and politics. Jonas and Voegelin’s concepts of Gnosticism both 
provide a diagnosis of the essential worldlessness of modern politics, thus allowing us 
to reflect upon the ecological issue in terms of the relationship between present politics 
and the world. One of their most perceptive insights lies in their analysis of the funda-
mentally utopian dynamic of modern politics, which the two philosophers interpret as 
the manifestation of a desire to escape worldly being. How so? Jonas’ critique of Ernst 
Bloch’s Principle of Hope analyzes utopianism as the idolatrous pursuit of a technicist 
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dynamic, led by a nihilistic drive to overcome worldly being and failing thereby to 
exert the ethical responsibility binding us to the present world217. Echoing Jonas’ po-
sition, Voegelin’s diagnosis of the fallacy of immanentization denounces the patho-
logical blindness of modern political movements towards the structure of worldly be-
ing.218 Both political philosophers thus ultimately draw upon the concept of Gnosti-
cism to diagnose the modern failure to anchor one’s political existence into the present 
world, and portray the condition of the modern political subject as having been thrown 
into a world whose overcoming is a pre-requisite for salvation.  
 
Still organizing contemporary political narratives, the dogma of progress as 
neoliberal capitalist development and economic growth offers a concrete articulation 
of this being in the world embracing the yearning for a perpetual escape from the pre-
sent modalities of worldly existence. Crystallized in the recent discipline of Geo-engi-
neering, the modern concept of technique tends to perpetuate the understanding of hu-
man action in the world in terms of an objectifying, mastering, and overcoming of an 
alienated “natural world”, thereby assuming a dualistic opposition between humanity 
and nature that denies the very agency of the many other beings left in-between. An 
 
217 Remnants of the revolutionary Gnosis, Christian Wiese argues, do appear to permeate Ernst Bloch’s 
utopianism, notably his vision of a messianic future in which humanity will truly be at home in the 
world. Jonas’ dismissal of Bloch’s principle of hope thus roots itself in a distrust for the modern tem-
porality of messianism, oriented toward a transcendent future and therefore interpreted as a form of 
escapism. Jonas fears that the Blochian ontology of the not-yet-being might lead to a devaluation of 
being in relation to non-being. Nevertheless, the common opposition between Hans Jonas and Ernst 
Bloch – Jonas dedicated indeed several chapters of his Imperative of Responsibility to the critique of 
the Principle of Hope – should not obliterate the presence of a common aim within the philosophers’ 
intellectual journey, namely their commitment to the refoundation of contemporary ethics through the 
overcoming of nihilism. Avishag Zafrani demonstrates indeed that for both Bloch and Jonas, the re-
sistance against nihilism is conditioned by the quest for a founding principle – the hope to emancipate 
ourselves from economic and social alienation for the former, for the latter, the imperative of anchoring 
ethics in the presence of the world. 
See Christian WIESE, The Life and Thought of Hans Jonas: Jewish Dimensions, Brandeis University 
Press, Waltham, 2007, p.106. 
And Avishag ZAFRANI, « Ernst Bloch et Hans Jonas : refondation de l’Éthique », Alter, 22 | 2014. 
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/alter/29  Accessed on the 10.02.2020. 
218 "The truth of Gnosticism is vitiated… by the fallacious immanentization of the Christian eschaton. 
This fallacy is not simply a theoretical mistake concerning the meaning of the eschaton, committed by 
this or that thinker, perhaps an affair of the schools. On the basis of this fallacy, Gnostic thinkers, lead-
ers, and their followers interpret a concrete society and its order as an eschaton; and, insofar as they 
apply their fallacious construction to concrete social problems, they misrepresent the structure of im-




extreme development of Geoengineering and the modern dream of redemption through 
the domestication of, and ultimately escape from the laws of nature, can be found in 
the “Mars One” mission,219 whose proclaimed goal is to establish the “first human 
settlement on Mars”. The project brings together the modern dogma of progress, the 
colonialist impetus of humanist universalism, and the gnostic trope of the obsolescence 
of the earth in the depiction of the conquest of Mars as “the next giant leap for human-
kind” towards salvation. In the fictional realm also, we find ourselves surrounded by 
contemporary illustrations of the modern worldlessness. The hit web series Stranger 
Things created by the Duffer brothers thus deploys the science fictional trope of the 
alien, obscure and threatening, as well as the hostility of the abyssal world swarming 
under our feet. The series holds a surprisingly rich symbolic potential for a reflection 
around the condition of human civilization in the age of the Anthropocene, and we 
shall indeed expand further on its prolific hermeneutics for environmental philosophy 
in the next chapter. 
 
The theme of the worldlessness of our condition appears to be relatively wide-
spread in modern political philosophy: while Hans Jonas identified a Demundanization 
tendency (Entweltlichungstendenz) spreading from modern existentialism up to polit-
ical utopianism, Hannah Arendt in the prologue to her Human Condition deplores the 
worldless inhabiting of those who, despite being “earth-bound creatures”, “have begun 
to act as though [they] were dwellers of the universe” 220. Günther Anders’ and Ar-
endt’s joint reflections on Rilke’s Duineser Elegien develop the theme of the world-
estrangement of contemporary human beings further (Weltfremdheit des 
Menschen)221. Contemporary philosopher Bruno Latour lingers too over this key idea 
of a modern worldlessness, as he summons the earthlings to land (atterrir)222 and be 
grounded in a common world in order to face the political challenge arising with the 
 
219 See the website of the Mars One project: https://www.mars-one.com/  
Accessed 11.03.2019. 
220 Hannah ARENDT, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, 1998 (1958), p.3. 
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advent of Gaia. Günther Anders and Bruno Latour’s thoughts are both concerned with 
the implications of the ecological crisis for political philosophy and anthropology. As 
they provide us with two beautiful formulations of the worldlessness of modern poli-
tics, I argue that their analyses support a hermeneutical approach to the contemporary 
ecological issue from the symbolic perspective of Gnosticism. 
Günther Anders’ intellectual engagement in political ecology and his critique 
of the technological civilization coincide largely with the philosophical concerns of 
his close friend Hans Jonas. As one of Heidegger’s most rebellious children, the polit-
ical philosopher critically analysed contemporary figures of worldlessness in an an-
thropological philosophy defining human beings as unworldly and worldless223. An-
ders diagnosed the “burdensome extraterritoriality” of modern humans as a “pathol-
ogy of freedom” inflicted upon a being which, “in contrast to animals, is not fitted into 
any world, but must always first create a world for himself “224. Further on this pathol-
ogy of freedom, he writes that: 
 
Abstraction – the freedom in front of the world, the fact of being 
made for generality and indeterminacy, the detachment from the 
world, the practice and the transformation of this world – is the fun-
damental anthropological category, which reveals both the meta-
physical condition of the human being, and its logos, its productiv-
ity, its interiority, its free will, and its historicity.225  
 
As Anders suggests, this notion of abstraction from the world as fundamental anthro-
pological category is a modern philosophical trope which may be found again notably 
in George Bataille226, who defines humanity as both a negation and overcoming of the 
world. Interestingly, Heidegger appears to simultaneously perpetuate and reverse this 
 
223 Günther ANDERS, Mensch ohne Welt, Schriften zur Kunst und Literatur, C.H. Beck, Munich, 1984. 
224 Konrad Paul LIESSMANN, “Despair and Responsibility: Affinities and Differences in the Thought of 
Hans Jonas and Guenther Anders”, in The Legacy of Hans Jonas: Judaism and the Phenomenon of Life, 
ed. Hava TIROSH-SAMUELSON, Christian WIESE, p.137. 
225 Günther ANDERS, « Pathologie de la liberté. Essai sur la non-identification », in Recherches 
Philosophiques, 6, pp.22-54. English traduction by K. Wolfe, Deleuze Studies, 3, 2009, pp.278-310. 
226 Georges BATAILLE, L’Erotisme, Editions de Minuit, 2011 (1957). 
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trope as he states that (worldly) Being withdraws itself from us and first occurs as a 
concealment of itself: 
 
That which is to be thought turns away from us. It withdraws from 
us. But how can we have the least knowledge of something that is 
withdrawn from the outset? How can we even give it a name? What-
ever withdraws refuses arrival. But–withdrawing is not nothing. 
Withdrawal is event [appropriation, ereignis]. In fact, what with-
draws may even concern and claim man more essentially than any-
thing present that strikes and touches him.227 
 
Both perspectives, whether they focus on the human or the world, on beings or 
Being, emphasize the distance which insulates one from the other. Heidegger’s per-
ception of the distance between the Dasein and Being is however sensitive to the pres-
ence in the absence and sees in the withdrawal of Being a positive distance that gives 
and resists: not an absence, not a desertion, nor a mere hiddenness. Heidegger was 
condemned by many for the lack of concreteness of his thought and the well-known 
moral compromise permitted by a philosophy disjoined from the world, insulated by 
an existential as well as ontological solitude. But his philosophy only brought to a 
masterly synthetized formulation the worldlessness which has been infusing modern 
thought, and attempted indeed to conceptualize the unbridgeable distance characteriz-
ing our engagement with a world from which we are abstracted. That the world is never 
fully present to us, or that we never really belong to it, arises as an existential expres-
sion of the widespread paradigm of “negative anthropology”, stating that human free-
dom, culture and historicity stem from our not being fully immersed in, or adjusted to 
the world – from a fortuitous alienation. Dismissing the doctrines of humanity’s invar-
iant characteristics, the school of negative anthropology refuses to essentialize human-
ity and instead reasserts the radical contingency of its fate. But in this abstraction from 
judgment and the dedication to inscribe humanity in a nexus of socio-cultural relations, 
the modern paradigm of negative anthropology appears to rely on the assumption that 
the non-human world ontologically differs from an exclusively human condition – 
 
227 Martin HEIDEGGER, What is called thinking? Translated by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, Harper 
& Row, New York, 1968.  
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contingent, resilient, hopeful. In Modernity, the human condition is indeed appre-
hended in its radical, ontological as well as existential opposition to the world – a 
world of essence, rigidity, immutability and inescapable natural laws. As Günther An-
ders envisioned, the modern paradigm of negative anthropology thus appears closely 
tied to the gnostic trope of world-estrangement. 
 In Mensch ohne Welt, Günther Anders acknowledged the worldlessness of Mo-
dernity as he saw it more concretely condensed in the class condition of the proletariat, 
dispossessed of the means of production through which they ensure the perpetuation 
of the world of the dominant class. If members of the proletariat are in the world, they 
are not at home in it.228 Anders further identifies such a sense of being without a world 
in the condition of the unemployed, “key-figures of our age” who are “not even al-
lowed to carry [their chains]”229. What stigmatizes according to Anders the worldless-
ness of advanced-industrial societies is indeed the juxtaposition, instead of integration, 
of its members, only allowing a shallow participation in culture as producer-consumers 
– thereby echoing Herbert Marcuse’s analysis of the one-dimensional man230. The fig-
ure of the unemployed thus embodies the ultimate failure of integration into a capitalist 
world, of those prevented to act in it either as a producer or as a consumer. Anders’ 
belief in the modification of reality through the projection of an alternate world by new 
media constantly overfeeding its coerced consumers with pre-digested images and ide-
ological systems (Weltanschauugen and Weltbilder), thereby superseding the need for 
a genuine engagement with the worlds surrounding us, prolongs his thought of the 
worldlessness of our civilization. 
This diagnosis of a cultural worldlessness echoes one of Günther Anders’s 
main contributions to the political philosophy of the ecological crisis: the “Promethean 
Gap” he identified between our capacity of producing and our capacity of imagining 
the consequences of our productive and consumptive activity – the abyssal gap be-
tween the concrete relations of production and the ideological narratives that frame 
 
228 Günther ANDERS, Mensch ohne Welt. Schriften zur Kunst und Literatur, Beck, München, 1984, p.ii. 
229 Ibid, pp. xiii–xiv. 
230 Herbert MARCUSE, L’Homme unidimensionnel. Etudes sur l’idéologie de la société industrielle. Edi-
tions de Minuit, Paris, 1968. 
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them, between knowledge and consciousness, doing and feeling, action and imagina-
tion231. In other words, Anders’ Promethean Gap resides in the diagnosis of the patho-
logical discrepancy characterizing our technological civilization, and the identification 
of an abyss opposing the fictional world it elaborated (the unlimited inert universe of 
Modernity) to the ones effectively suffering from the consequences of our activity. 
Anders’ analysis of the technological civilization is thus infused with the acute aware-
ness of a hubristic gap separating human action from the world we inhabit, exemplified 
by the unconceivable width of our nuclear power. If we now read Anders’ depiction 
of contemporary civilization from a gnostic lens, then the unprecedented scale of the 
threat posed to the earth’s ecology and worldly being by nuclear power may appear as 
the extraordinarily material manifestation of a gnostic alienation from worldly being, 
and the ultimate historical embodiment of a gnostic failure to inhabit a world from 
which humans have divorced. The second volume of the Obsolescence of Man – On 
the Destruction of Life in the Age of the Third Industrial Revolution addresses this 
crucial question of the jeopardizing of the world understood as the transcendental con-
dition to our existence, and unveils the issue of being grounded in a common world as 




Resuming this problematic of inhabiting and composing a common world in 
the “new climatic regime”, Bruno Latour offers to elaborate the first principles of 
Gaian Politics. In his most recent book, Où atterrir? Comment s’orienter en poli-
tique232, the philosopher attempts to make sense out of the present geo-political land-
scape. Focusing on three phenomena which he identifies as the key events organizing 
contemporary geo-politics – the amplified deregulation of the economy, the explosion 
of inequalities and the systematic denial of climate change – Latour argues that the 
present situation is characterized by the crucial realization that there is no inhabitable 
 
231 Günther ANDERS. Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten indus-
triellen Revolution, 1956, Munich: C. H. Beck, p.18. 
232 Bruno LATOUR, Où atterrir ? Comment s’orienter en politique, La Découverte, 2017. 
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world suited to the modern civilizational project. No inhabitable world, and a world 
not inhabited: Latour suggests that contemporary times might be better understood 
from the perspective of an escape from the world, thereby throwing light on the world-
lessness characterizing our treatment of the ecological issue. 
Throughout this text, Latour’s language strongly resonates with the gnostic 
symbolism of cosmic exile and yearning for an escape from the world. His description 
of the modern condition ideally expresses the gnostic being in the world studied in the 
first two chapters, articulating the twofold dynamic of cosmic alienation and the desire 
of emancipation from the world: 
 
To get out, to escape, to emancipate ourselves – finally! Breathing 
in the fresh air of the universe, abandoning the cosmos. First picture. 
To suffocate, to lack air, to pant, to search for a shelter, a protection, 
a cosmos. Second picture.233 
 
Latour interprets the recent events of Brexit and Donald Trump’s election as illustra-
tions of the utter disorientation of a globalized civilization witnessing the collapse of 
its order and the loss of all landmarks. As he depicts the wandering of a worldless 
civilization and the exile of the modern people, disoriented amidst the deserted infini-
tude of the universe, he reports the modern uprooting and waves toward the contem-
porary challenge of inhabiting the world. The Latourian considerations on the journey 
of an acosmic Modernity and the necessity of its landing all perpetuate the gnostic 
metaphor of an original uprooting to express a being in the world experienced as an 
exile and describe the subsequent quest for a home to land on. The philosopher narrates 
the political shipwreck of our times as the drama of a loss of the world, reminding us 
of what Jonas had called Demundanization:  
the impression of vertigo, of panic almost, which goes through con-
temporary politics, comes from the collapsing of the ground beneath 
our feet.234 
 
233 Bruno LATOUR, Ibid, p.38. 




In so doing, Latour presents us here with an outstanding opportunity to link the gnostic 
symbolism to the environmental issue. What is being revealed in this hermeneutical 
circle, and what Latour’s thought particularly illuminates, I argue, is the close entan-
glement of the dualism and worldlessness of modern cosmology. While the “gnostic 
spirit” analysed by Hans Jonas situates redemption in the overcoming of the world, 
resulting in fantasized ideas of a beyond-the-world and unfolding into a dualistic cos-
mology ultimately opposing God and the World, Eric Voegelin’s interpretation fo-
cuses on the ways in which a gnostic engagement with the world corrupts a very fragile 
sense of the ontological inbetweenness, subtle metaxic tension and eschatological 
openness of worldly being. In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour famously decon-
structed the illusion of modern dualism as concealing the ontological hybridation of 
worldly beings populating the world from the entangled multiplicity of their modes of 
existence or, as I propose to call them, modes of inhabiting. His critique of the modern 
fantasy of a universal objectivity targets in particular the perspective of the global. The 
so called “view from Sirius” would have enabled the Moderns to access the world from 
afar, from an isolated point of view preserved from all worldly entanglement by a her-
metic ontological divide between object and subject, nature and culture – really, be-
tween humanity and the world. As we know, the gnostic dynamic of Demundanization 
identified by Jonas takes root in the original experience of the deep otherness, onto-
logical alterity of the world. This feeling of alienation from the world fuels a gnostic 
mythology unfolding into a dualistic architecture of thought. The latter rests upon the 
ontological opposition between humanity and the world. Jonas’ insights direct our at-
tention to the presence of a gnostic type of engagement with the world pervading mod-
ern cosmology – a cosmology both dualistic and worldless. The structural dualism 
opposing humanity to the world thus illuminates the feeling of loss of the world de-
scribed by Latour – a world whose intense complexity neither the concepts of Nature 
nor that of Culture allow us to approach. Latour has extensively criticized the modern 
construct of Nature, which conditions our treatment of the ecological issue, for con-
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veying misleading conceptions of the materiality, homogeneity, amorality and atem-
porality of world beings235. The concept of Nature would indeed define the world as 
Uchronia as well as Utopia – a timeless, spaceless fiction: no wonder that the Moderns 
are worldless if all they are left with to think to the world is the concept of Nature! 
Operating within a dualistic framework opposing humanity to this fictional world, the 
anthropocentrism of modern thought maintains the gnostic narrative of an ontological 
rupture with the world – whereby it becomes clear that the metaxic tension of our 
existence in the world, which Voegelin summoned us to preserve, was broken and 
erected into a divorce.  
 
The dualistic narrative of Modernity seems to operate as if all dualistic distinc-
tion presupposed in its very structure the hegemony of one pole over another, thereby 
inducing a systematic disdain for the “weaker pole”. At least this appears to be the case 
for the pivotal dichotomy between humanity and the world. This dualistic opposition 
manifests itself on an epistemological level through the domination of the positivist 
paradigm proclaiming the legitimacy of “natural”, or “objective” sciences over against 
more “subjective”, “socially-constructed” or “immanent” ways of knowing. In We 
Have Never Been Modern and more recently in Facing Gaia, Bruno Latour incrimi-
nates such an epistemological paradigm, arguing that the ontological dualism on which 
it relies is not only contradicted by the strong hybridity of scientific practices, but also 
eclipses much of the complexity of the world, thereby proving inaccurate as well as 
ineffective even on a strictly epistemological level. The systematic praising of a fan-
tasized objectivity – as “objective”, “positivist”, “rational”, or “universal” as they 
might proclaim themselves, scientists still stand in the world, interacting with the very 
facts they wish to observe -, and the valorisation of the perspective of a fictional global 
appears alongside a certain depreciation, if not disdain, for the perspectives that would 
stem from within the world, as opposed to a view from the outside, or from a beyond 
the world. This very modern suspicion towards the immanence of the “subjective”, of 
the socially constructed, thereby intangible, contingent, impermanent, I suggest, is 
closely tied to the gnostic repression of what we might call the mundane, the worldly, 
 
235 Bruno LATOUR, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes, La Découverte, Paris, 1998. 
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the earthly, the terrestrial as opposed to the otherworldly, the global or the universal. 
The perspective of Gnosticism thus allows us, beyond the mere analogy between two 
dualistic structures of thought, to understand the modern epistemological depreciation 
of the subjective as a form of repression of the immanence of the earthly over against 
the transcendence of the universal. In other words, it provides a symbolic framework 
which illuminates the simultaneous dualism and worldlessness of a modern cosmology 
articulated around the repression of the worldly. 
This repression was also sensed by ecofeminist thought – in many regards an-
ticipated by Virginia Woolf’s insights on modern industrial civilization236 – inasmuch 
as it throws light on the systematic organization in patriarcho-capitalist societies of the 
repression of the feminine alongside that of the natural world. In relating the oppres-
sion of women to that of nature, the ecofeminist approach draws attention to the ex-
ploitative dimension of a dualistic structure of thought, overarching the nature-culture 
divide as well as binary gender categories. Emphasizing the intersectionality of mod-
ern dualism, the ecofeminist approach helps to unveil the cosmological architecture of 
a deep-ingrained repression of our rootedness and a strong desire of emancipation from 
what engendered us. The ecofeminist perspective thus appears to corroborate the hy-
pothesis arising from our approach to modernity through the lens of Gnosticism: 
namely, that modern civilization is grounded in the repression of the engenderment, of 
our ontological dependency, hence, of our rootedness in the world. Latour’s diagnosis 
of modern and present times as being drawn by a desire of emancipation from the 
earthly, from the terrestrial towards the global and universal, only elaborates this idea 
further. 
Eric Voegelin’s interpretation of modern gnosticism also echoes Latour’s anal-
ysis of the modern condition: the perpetual quest for the emancipation from the present 
world described by Latour recalls indeed the immanentization of the eschaton into a 
fantasised world, resulting from a desperate attempt to survive the unbearable absence 
of meaning within the world. Voegelin’s as well as Jonas’ concepts of Gnosticism lay 
emphasis on the devaluation of the present world in favour of a depiction of a fictional 
 
236 Virginia WOOLF, Three Guineas, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1938. 
125 
 
non-world, a utopia, a beyond-the-world. With Latour, they affirm the eminently po-
litical character of this worldless dwelling. Jonas, Voegelin and Latour’s insights on 
Modernity thus converge toward the political nature of the issues arising from a De-
mundanization of our cosmology and the structural dualism articulating it. The con-
temporary advent of the environmental issue, as an event revealing the worldlessness 
of a system of thought which must now confront the “return of the Earth”, the earthly, 
or rather, of the earthling, only enhances the pertinence of their diagnosis. Latour’s 
interpretation of contemporary geopolitics237 suggests indeed that, yearning for an 
emancipation from the world, a worldless Modernity would now meet the world again, 
the earthlings relentlessly reminding it of its original engenderment and ontological 
interdependency. As we fail to inhabit it and dwell within its precarious and entangled 
becomings, the world, in a beautiful irony, now seems to fail us, falling away beneath 
our incredulous, disorientated feet. It is a shipwreck – the shipwreck of a civilization 
that needs to accoster, to dock as the world threatens to sink. But what stands between 
us and the world? 
 
Our interpretation of Anders’ and Latour’s diagnoses of the worldlessness of 
contemporary politics in the light of Gnosticism emphasized the image of a far-
reaching, all embracing gap. The abyss separating the Moderns from the world seems 
indeed to articulate both the worldlessness of their inhabiting and the structural 
dualism of their engagement with worldly being. The next section will delve into this 
trope which, I argue, unifies two ideas and raises them together to achieve a greater 
understanding of the modern inhabiting: it uncovers along a chiastic pattern the 
worldlessness of a dualistic engagement with worldly being as well as the dualist 
unfolding of a worldless inhabiting. The Gnostic symbolism allows us indeed to bridge 
two essential characteristics of the modern being in the world, worldless and dualistic. 
The cosmological unrooting illuminated by our hermeneutics of Gnosticism, the 
modern alienation from the worldly as well as the crisis of the inhabiting unveiled as 
an eminently political crisis, thus all appear to be tied up into a dualistic structure of 
 
237 Bruno LATOUR, Où atterrir ? Comment s’orienter en politique, op.cit. 
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thought. Let us now see what our hermeneutics of Gnosticism may uncover of this 





B. The Abyss and the dualistic closure of the world  
 
A worldless dualism 
 
One widely recognized feature of Gnosticism emphasized by both Jonas and 
Voegelin is its tendency towards dualism. Although the connection does not seem to 
have been particularly acknowledged before, I suggest that this cosmological feature 
is closely tied to the more existential sense of worldlessness previously highlighted. 
The theme of dualism is significantly present throughout Jonas’ study of Gnosticism 
as well as in the rest of his philosophical thought, identifying it as a core challenge for 
contemporary philosophy to address. Reflecting upon the philosophical ramifications 
of the modern political predicament, particularly the technological hubris 
characterizing our civilization, Jonas pinpoints the issue of cosmological dualism and 
bridges it with the concern for an ethical inhabiting and a pacified relationship between 
human beings and their environment: 
 
This situation is magnified by the impact of contemporary 
humankind’s technology on the natural environment. And indeed, as 
this phenomenon – namely, the threat we pose to the planet’s 
ecology – became more and more apparent during the second half 
of this century and finally even came to the attention of 
philosophers, suddenly one of the oldest philosophical questions, 
that of the relationship between human being and nature, between 
mind and matter – in other words, the age-old question of dualism – 
took on a totally new form. Now this question is no longer something 
to meditate on in the calm light of theory; it is illuminated by the 
lightning flashes of an approaching storm, warnings of a crisis that 
we, its unintentional creators, have the planetary duty of trying to 
avert. Thanks to this exceedingly practical aspect of the problem, the 
reconciliation between our presumptuous special status as humans 
and the universe as a whole, which is the source of our life, is 
becoming a central concern of philosophy. I see in this an urgent 
task for philosophy to address, both in the present moment and into 
the coming century.238  
 
 
238 Hans JONAS, Mortality and Morality: A Search for Good after Auschwitz, Northwestern University 




Jonas suggests here that the present ecological crisis brings back to the fore “the 
age-old question of dualism”, which he also had diagnosed at the heart of gnostic 
cosmologies. Both present and gnostic times thus share this common feature of a deep-
ingrained dualistic system of thought, infused with the sense of an abyss separating 
human beings from the world. But as the question of dualism arises again with the 
advent of a global ecological crisis, it assumes a whole new dimension, namely a very 
material one calling the thinking subject back to their worldly embodiment and close 
involvement with other earthly beings. The planetary entanglement illuminated by the 
environmental crisis thus appears to challenge the modern representation of a clean 
divide between nature and culture, object and subject, actions and ideas, humans and 
the world etc239. In a splendid ambiguity, suspended over the abyssal cliff of worldly 
being, it also brings the gnostic worldlessness of Modernity to a close: by threatening 
life on earth, it consecrates the gnostic yearning for the end of the world, and yet offers 
us an ideal opportunity to reconcile (to use Jonas’ term) with the world and the many 
beings populating it.  
 
While Voegelin’s analysis of Gnosticism focused on the dynamic of 
immanentisation characterizing modern politics and the precious metaxic tension they 
conceal, it also illuminated their abhorrence of the world and our incarnate condition. 
In so doing, Voegelin highlighted a particular form of dualism embodied by modern 
political and ideological movements, namely immanentizing ones, also conveying a 
polar opposition between the present world and the ones hoped for. We can thus 
acknowledge a permanent feature of Gnosticism, as it was analysed by Jonas and 
Voegelin, in the feeling of alienation from the present world, the yearning for a 
deliverance from it, and the dualistic engagement with the environment such feelings 
foster. The concept of Gnosticism laid out by Jonas and Voegelin throws light on the 
unresolved persistence of some cosmological dualism in the modern system of 
 
239 While this cosmological dualism is grounded in the Cartesian tradition, alternative philosophies were 
elaborated at the dawn of modern thought by thinkers such as Spinoza or Leibniz, who figure as the 
heralds of a subterranean heterodoxy of Modernity. 
See Michael MACK, Spinoza and the Spectres of Modernity: The Hidden Enlightenment of Diversity 
from Spinoza to Freud, Continuum, 2010. 
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thought, hypothetically arising from the original experience of an existential 
estrangement from the world. The existential stance adopted by our two philosophers 
suggests indeed that a deep-rooted experience of the self over against the alterity of 
the world was hypostatized into a structural dualism organizing our being in the world. 
I argue that the hermeneutical perspective of Gnosticism exposes this cosmological 
dualism as a conceptual structure of thought for the worldlessness or estrangement 
identified earlier as a feature of Modernity. The gnostic trope of the abyss allows us to 
bridge these two features of worldlessness and cosmological dualism in that it 
symbolizes the gap opposing human beings to the world and therefrom systematically 
segregating worldly being. I mentioned before that the perspective of ecofeminism, in 
calling our attention to the systematic and intersectional dimensions of our culture, 
contributes to highlight the enmeshment in modern cosmology of a dualistic structure 
of thought with a radical estrangement from the world. The dualistic worldlessness 
illuminated by the concept of Gnosticism and rendered even more acute with the 
ecological crisis also manifests a cosmological crisis of modernity as it reveals the 
boundaries of binary structures of thought which fail to contain a perpetually 
overflowing and apophatically complex world. What characterizes this cosmological 
crisis? In the following section, I suggest that the dualistic paradigm of modernity is 
articulated around the repression of an ontological tension similar to that described by 
Voegelin through the vocabulary of metaxy, thus operating as a closure of the openness 
of worldly being. 
 
The tension beneath dualism and its concealment 
 
What ties together the cosmological dualism and worldlessness of modernity, 
and what lies beneath the estranged dualistic structure of our thought? This I regard as 
one crucial question for contemporary philosophy - one which the perspective of 
Gnosticism allows us to formulate. I see it lying in abeyance within many metaphysical 
developments of the philosophy of modernity, pointing toward the underlying 
presence of an ontological tension which various philosophers, from Hegel240 to 
 
240 Friedrich HEGEL, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Reclam, Ditzingen, 2004 (1807). 
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Heidegger241 through Voegelin and William Desmond242 today, have encouraged us 
to consider. 
 
Approaching this tension, I would like to draw the reader’s attention again to 
the image of an abyss: an abyss which the Gnostics believed would define our worldly 
condition, and illustrate the tragedy of our separation from a divine and absent other. 
Let us picture this abyss: it opens a deep, obscure and groundless gap insurmountably 
isolating human beings from God, God from the world, the world from the beyond, 
the self from others – it is an abyss that ultimately insulates the self from anything in 
the world. It also designates the space delineated by these borders of segregation: that 
which stands between dualistic boundaries and which is simultaneously being 
obscured by them. Now this abyss might be seen either as hermetically sealed, setting 
apart, like our interpretation of gnostic dualism has suggested so far, two absolutely 
impenetrable realms of being; or it might also be thought of as a porous space which, 
if abyssal, can also be perpetually crossed and dwelt in. This precious space of porosity 
and translation between edges set apart but also put in relation by an abyss of 
inbetweenness, is what garners our ontological tension. This, Voegelin would argue, 
is where we stand: in the abyssal inbetweenness of the world, in the metaxic tension 
of being. I argue that the cosmological dualism common to the gnostic and modern 
systems of thought, attempting to overcome this tension, segregates the realms of being 
and hermetically seals the abyss between them: in so doing, it tends to condemn the 
openness of worldly being.  
 
You may recall that my conclusion to the first chapter had aimed to emphasize 
the presence of an ontological tension underlying the structural dualism analysed by 
Jonas - I had then approached the abyss in the Heideggerian sense of an openness of 
worldly being. I suggested indeed that the gnostic dualism between God and the World 
was grounded upon an ontological tension whose reduction operates as an obstruction 
and sealing of the openness of worldly being. In the conclusion to chapter II, it was 
mentioned how Voegelin’s thought of the metaxy draws attention to the disastrous 
 
241 Martin HEIDEGGER, Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis. Vol. 65 of the. Gesamtausgabe. Ed. F.-
W. von Herrmann, Vittorio Klosterman  Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1989.  
242 William DESMOND, Being and the Between, Suny Press, 1995. 
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effects of the segregation, or hypostatization, of the ontological abyss: I suggested that 
the dualistic paradigm of modernity operates as a negation of the inbetweenness of 
worldly being. This leaves us with the idea of an ontological abyss, and the open 
inbetweenness of worldly being disclosed by it. Whatever holds the abyssal inbetween 
open, appears both in Jonas and Voegelin as a pivotal keystone apopathically 
articulating gnostic cosmologies – hidden by them and yet revealed by them, all the 
more so present as they are concealed. The gnostic cosmologies studied by Jonas and 
Voegelin are grounded indeed upon a structural dualism which systematically 
hypostatizes the poles of an irreducible tension – self and other, divine and worldly, 
nature and culture… 
 
The hypothesis I would like to raise now is that the dualism illuminated by the 
perspective of Gnosticism is articulated upon the obliteration of this ontological 
tension: it does not strive, in a dialectical impetus, to overcome it by resolving it. 
Rather, it seems to obscure it altogether, insisting that being is inescapably divided 
into two hermetic realms and that, somehow, we are caught in the middle and yet 
perpetually fail to bridge these two poles. We drowned in the abyss. More precisely, I 
argue that the concepts of Gnosticism developed by Jonas and Voegelin, by throwing 
light upon the pervading narrative of humanity’s existential exile and the resulting 
experience of an ontological tension between self and world, enlighten modernity’s 
dualistic engagement with worldly being and the particular kind of pathological 
inhabiting it fosters. Such an engagement, I suggest, is characterized by a dualistic 
closure of worldly being. Jonas and Voegelin’s analyzes of Gnosticism merge indeed 
into the perception of a dualistic reduction, or closure, of an ontological tension, an 
open in-betweenness constitutive of worldly beings. A synthetic approach to their 
thought of Gnosticism enables us to conceptualize this modern concept of political 
philosophy as a dualistic reduction of the ontological tension of the world, resulting 
into a worldless inhabiting. If Gnosticism is to signify the obstruction of a primordial 
tension, it is because the movement of hypostatization of the tension leads to its 
eviction: in the attempt to think the poles independently from each other and 
essentialize them into two ontologically distinct realms of being, as exemplified in the 
dualistic structure of its system of thought, it obliterates the tensional, suspended and 
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yet open inbetweenness of worldly being – on which the next chapter shall expand 
further. This interpretation of Gnosticism as dualistic reduction of the metaxy of 
worldly Being would allow us to reformulate the closure by modern metaphysics of 
the openness of Being theorized by Heidegger243, and to approach alongside the 
condemnation of the possible as well as the actual threatening of the perpetual 
overflowing of the world manifested in an eminently material dimension by the present 
environmental crisis. The latter event arises indeed as a very literal condemnation of 
the becoming of worldly being, a sealing of its openness as the most concretely 
colossal consequence of the dualistic reduction of its ontological tension. The dualistic 
paradigm of Modernity thus acts as a closure of the ontological openness of worldly 
being, and the gnostic engagement with the world operates as a pathological 
concealment of worldly being – a criminal forgetfulness of its metaxic essence, of its 
perpetual withdrawal, and of our ontological involvement in its processes of becoming. 
In this process of closure, the world was also silenced, as Jonas witnesses in (the first, 
existentialist) Heidegger’s objectifying treatment of worldly being as merely present, 
vorhanden, “stripped and alienated to the mode of mute thinghood”244. The gnostic 
concealment of the world is not one that embraces the apophatic nature of worldly 
being, but rather denies it and obscures its manifestation. Against the concealment 
operated by the positivist paradigm, Jonas argues therefore that “we must remain open 
to the idea that natural sciences do not deliver the whole truth about nature” 245, 
claiming thereby a posture of epistemic openness toward the ever-ongoing epiphany 
of the world. Something inevitably escapes our comprehension, and worldly being 
perpetually overflows any attempt to seize it. 
 
This tensional structure of worldly being, which dualism, while articulated 
around it, fails to sustain, is particularly manifest in the polarity between immanence 
 
243 Around Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics and more specifically the closure of the openness of 
Being, see also Mary Jane RUBENSTEIN, Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Open-
ing of Awe, Columbia University Press, New-York, 2008. 
244 Hans JONAS, The Gnostic Religion, p.337. I emphasize. 
245 Hans JONAS, Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Insel 
Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1986 (1979). p.30. 
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and transcendence246: as we linger over this particular declination of modern dualism, 
we soon realize that both terms only bear meaning in relation to each other, and 
ultimately seem to gravitate around a movement piercing through the boundaries of 
the self, overflowing them. What is transcendence transcending? And what is 
immanence immanent to? If we remove these terms from their common striving, if we 
extract them from their inextricable tension and try to define them independently from 
one another, then we fail and their meaning escapes us. If we try to hypostatize, or 
essentialize them into strictly hermetic categories, then we lose both. This suggests 
that immanence and transcendence, united in a radical intimacy, are two sides of the 
same coin, two ways on a same path running across ontological boundaries.  
 
Alfred North Whitehead proposes a model for thinking immanence and 
transcendence in which neither realm is full without the other, for both are involved in 
common creative processes. The Whiteheadian characterisation of immanence and 
transcendence thus forgoes the traditional separation of the two terms and incriminates 
their “vicious separation” for the rupture between God and the world. Whitehead 
refuses to associate transcendence with a divine, static eminence and immanence with 
a worldly, fluent deficience: 
 
The vicious separation of the flux from the permanence leads to the 
concept of an entirely static God, with eminent reality, in relation to 




246 In “The Idea of Transcendence” Ingolf Dalferth draws a categorical distinction between theological 
and non-theological forms of transcendence, where the former surpasses the latter, always confined 
within immanence. Diverting from his account, my engagement with the concepts of immanence and 
transcendence eschews isolating theological from non-theological thinking. My understanding of the 
tension binding transcendence to immanence suggests moreover that the “confinement in immanence” 
is not a condition that could nor should ever be overcome. By this I suggest, as we shall see further, that 
being in immanence does not reciprocately imply an exile from transcendence.  
 
Ingolf U. DALFERTH, “The Idea of Transcendence”, in The Axial Age and Its Consequences, ed. Robert 
N. Bellah & Hans Joas, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 146-188. 
 
247 Alfred North WHITEHEAD, Process and Reality, The Free Press, New York, p.346. 
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Whitehead considers creative processes of becoming as part of transcendence as well 
as immanence. Commenting on the Whiteheadian account of immanence and 
transcendence, James Williams echoes Whitehead’s concern for “the denial of the 
priority of one or the other term in their separation”248 and argues that the two realms 
ought to be approached as complementary and therefore inseparable processes. As 
Williams reminds us, the Whiteheadian metaphysics is one of essential relation and 
mutual dependency, where the play of immanence and transcendence mirrors the 
relationship between God and the world. This thought is also endorsed by Gilles 
Deleuze, for whom “any thought of a pure or absolute realm” is banished in the 
“adventure of immanence in transcendence”249. Because they belong together, both 
immanence and transcendence suffer from their separation and should be considered 
as essentially and indivisibly related processes. James Williams explains:   
 
For Whitehead, separated transcendence is pure stasis, meaningless 
because no change whatsoever can take place within it, a timeless 
and momentum free block. Yet pure immanence is equally nonsen-
sical, since as pure flux we cannot explain its valued forward mo-
mentum and novelty, it becomes free of any realities and without 
sense.250 
 
While the tensional nature of modern dualism shines particularly through this 
immanence-transcendence dichotomy, the philosophy of Whitehead suggests that this 
reflection applies to other polarities and culminates in the opposition between God and 
the World: 
 
In our cosmological constructions we are, therefore, left with the fi-
nal opposites, joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and con-
junction – that is to say, the many in one – flux and permanence, 
greatness and triviality, freedom and necessity, God and the 
World.251  
 
248 James WILLIAMS, “Transcendence and Immanence as Inseparable Processes: on the Relevance of 
Arguments from Whitehead to Deleuze Interpretation”, in Deleuze and Guattari Studies, 2010, 4 (1), 
p.97. 
249 Gilles Deleuze, « Les plages d’immanence » in Deux régimes de fous, ed. David Lapoujade, 
2003, Minuit, Paris, p.245. 
250 Ibid, p.98. 




Because it concentrates the tension I have been striving to highlight in this 
section, the immanence-transcendence polarity appears archetypal of the modern 
dualistic structure of thought. It captures indeed an essential movement of overflowing, 
on which we shall expand in the next chapter, an overflowing of boundaries between 
worldly and godly, between self and other, boundaries unable to contain the experience 
of a world of abundance.  
 
This emphasis on the dualistic hypostatization of an ontological tension 
disclosed by our hermeneutics of Gnosticism reminds us of Whitehead’s diagnosis of 
the modern “bifurcation of nature”, along with his notion of the “fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness”252. Incriminating the structural dualism of modern science and its 
segregation between “causal” and “apparent” components of being, the philosopher 
identifies a crucial fallacy in the reflection that mistakes the abstraction of the concept 
from the concreteness of worldly being. This fallacy echoes and perpetuates what he 
identifies in the Concept of Nature as the “fallacy of bifurcation”: 
 
Another way of phrasing this theory which I am arguing against is 
to bifurcate nature into two divisions, namely into the nature 
apprehended in awareness and the nature which is the cause of 
awareness. The nature which is the fact apprehended in awareness 
holds within it the greenness of the trees, the song of the birds, the 
warmth of the sun, the hardness of the chairs, and the feel of the 
velvet. The nature which is the cause of awareness is the conjectured 
system of molecules and electrons which so affects the mind as to 
produce the awareness of apparent nature. The meeting point of these 
two natures is the mind, the causal nature being influent and the 
apparent nature being effluent.253 
 
Whitehead pinpoints here a gnostic trope of modern science in the central belief that 
the human mind stands between the two ontologically distinct realms of spirit and 
matter. In Latour’s words:  
 
252 Alfred North WHITEHEAD, Science and the Modern World. Free Press, Simon & Schuster, New 
York, 1997 [1925], p. 52. 
253 Alfred North WHITEHEAD, The Concept of Nature, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1964 




Bifurcation is what happens whenever we think the world is divided 
into two sets of things: one which is composed of the fundamental 
constituents of the universe – invisible to the eyes, known to science, 
yet real and valueless – and the other which is constituted of what 
the mind has to add to the basic building blocks of the world in order 
to make sense of them.254 
 
 
Against modern dualism, Whitehead’s metaphysics describe a world in which all be-
ings, all entities – and not only self-conscious or human ones – experience worldly 
being in a process of entanglement and incorporation, emphasized by his term of “pre-
hension”. His philosophy of nature summons us to resist the dualistic reduction of 
modern cosmology and to embrace our entanglement within worldly being: 
 
Natural philosophy should never ask, what is in the mind and what 
is in nature. To do so is a confession that it has failed to express 
relations between things perceptively known, namely to express 
those natural relations whose expression is natural philosophy.255 
 
Emphasizing the deep relationality of our perception of nature, Whitehead’s 
philosophy contributes to unveil the inbetweenness of our being in the world, and in-
vites us to dwell in the tension disclosed by modern dualism. The next chapter shall 
explore the cosmological and ontological implications of a thought that would embrace 
this tension, and endeavour to draw the conclusions of our hermeneutics of Gnosticism 
for a contemporary philosophy of the world. The purpose of this section was to unfold 
the gnostic trope of an ontological abyss and an existence in between, in order to draw 
our attention to the presence of something in the world that perpetually resists a dual-
istic approach to being – something lying beneath dualistic boundaries, an inbetween 
 
254  Bruno LATOUR, Preface to Isabelle STENGERS’ Thinking with Whitehead, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 2002, p. xii. 
255 Alfred North WHITEHEAD, The Concept of Nature, op.cit. p.30. 
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that “somehow precedes the binaries which it distinguishes256”. Before attempting to 
unfold this metaxic inbetweenness sensed by the Gnostics, let us suspend our objecti-
fying engagement with the world: let us instead consider the vertiginous idea that that 
which is being offered to our prehension endlessly overflows it, let us embrace the 
thought that what is worth being thought in the world is precisely what is being con-
cealed by our present cosmology. In this play of light and shadow mentioned before 
to qualify our hermeneutical approach, the perspective of Gnosticism unveils precisely 
that which it intends to escape from: the abyssal groundlessness of our being in the 
world, which the Existentialists would later also express, along with – and this remains 
to be thought – the abundant overflowing of such an abyss which no dualistic segre-
gation of being could contain. The gnostic closure of the world thus appears as that 
which epistemologically obscures and prevents the overflowing of the world, and 
which translates today into the so urgently concrete threatening of worldly becoming. 
Therein lies also the exceptional character of the present environmental mutation: in 
its beautiful incarnation of our being suspended over an abyss of nothingness and pos-
sibility, death and birth, despair and hope; and in the consecration of the inbetweenness 
of our being in the world: in between concerned beings, in between entangled organ-
isms, in between times of transition, in between shifting, collapsing and emerging 
worlds. In this regard, the environmental crisis outlines the manifold challenge of 
dwelling in between, both philosophically and ontologically, as we shall see in chapter 
4, and politically and existentially, as we shall see in chapter 5. Untied from an obsolete 
cosmology and summoned to think and inhabit the world anew, as we find ourselves 
diving into the openness of the world, metaphors appear redeeming. Unlike concepts, 
they offer the breadth of imagination required by the depth of our being in the world, 




256 Drew HYLAND, “First of All Came Chaos”, in Heidegger and the Greeks, ed. Drew Hyland and John 




C. Subverting the tropes of our inhabiting 
 
 What is the concrete unfolding of these metaphysical speculations? How could 
these reflections upon the cosmological and ontological possibly bear any political 
implications? Any philosophical enquiry and, as the reader may have noted already, 
ours in particular, arises from the awareness that ideas shape the world. And the world 
shapes our ideas. Or, to be even more accurate, that ideas and world are so entangled 
into each other that a dualistic understanding of the ideal and the material, the ethereal 
and worldly, abstract and concrete… fails to engage with their ontological co-penetra-
tion. Surely has the development of phenomenology in the 20th century emphasized 
our sensory experience of worldly being, and the bio and eco-phenomenological ap-
proaches in particular have offered to focus on the material embeddedness of the en-
counter between our consciousness and the world. But the context of the Anthropo-
cene, or Chtulucene257, namely the advent of a new geological era, suggests that some-
thing in the relationship between consciousness and what it encounters remains to be 
thought. As we become aware of the dramatic entanglement of our destiny with that 
of the world and the worldly beings inhabiting it, we are summoned to reflect not only 
upon the material origin of our ideas, but also on their destination: namely on their 
worldly embodiment, now encrusted into the earth’s geology, stamped upon the many 
hearts that have ceased to beat because of the way our civilization chose to inhabit the 
world. 
How do our ideas materialize into the world? How are they embodied in our 
inhabiting? Our attempt to deconstruct modern dualism through the hermeneutic lens 
of Gnosticism has thrown light on the symbolic dimension of our culture. The perspec-
tive of Gnosticism laid out by the analyses of Hans Jonas and Eric Voegelin invites us 
indeed to elucidate the symbolic expression of the repression of an existential tension 
– the metaxic structure of our being in the world as being in between. Our reflection 
 




has proposed to enquire about the ways in which the symbolic expression of Gnosti-
cism articulates modern cosmologies, or how the elucidation of the gnostic tropes pro-
vides at least a way to approach them in a new, opportune light. Our hermeneutics of 
Gnosticism thus offers to study the articulation of narratives, symbols and metaphors 
infusing our engagement with the world – it aims at disclosing tropes of our inhabiting. 
Because it aims at uncovering the symbolism underlying political rhetoric, cultural 
narratives and metaphysical structures of thought, all so central in the construction and 
maintenance of our political agency, this endeavour is in itself political. It suggests 
identifying the mechanisms at work in the ways symbolic tropes govern our engage-
ment with the world and our ability to envision possibilities. 
The environmental issue plunges us into an ocean of metaphors and tends as 
such to reveal the omnipresence and subconscious power of images in the way we 
engage with the world surrounding us. As Stefano Velotti notes in his study of Günther 
Anders’ Weltbilder: “images (…) do not cover the world, but rather make it visible by 
discovering features of it that would remain invisible without them.” 258 Yet not all 
images disclose worldly being in the same way. If images are integral to our dwelling 
and engagement with worldly being, some have come to cover the world more than 
they discover it: let us therefore try to digest the tropes we are fed and eventually re-
appropriate them. I wish to draw awareness towards the politically subversive potential 
of reversing the tropes conditioning our inhabiting, in the perspective of repopulating 
our symbolic universe with alternate metaphors – alternate images for alternate 
thought structures grounding alternate socio-political realities. Our hermeneutics of 
Gnosticism contributes to uncover the mythical, symbolical or metaphorical dimen-
sion of our being in the world, thus shedding light on certain recurring images shaping 
our engagement with worldly beings. One main challenge that ensues from the identi-
fication of these gnostic tropes is to reverse them as deep-rooted symbols conditioning 
our being in the world. Let us now venture into the galaxy of symbols we inhabit as 
we delve into the gnostic tropes of our inhabiting.  
 
 
258 Stefano VELOTTI, “Guenther Anders: Weltbilder, “Models of Enticement”, and the Question of 
Praxis”, Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2011, Vol. 18, pp. 169. 
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Our hermeneutics of Gnosticism has mentioned many times already the image 
of an abyss to define the gnostic expression of our worldly condition. Studying Hans 
Jonas’ existential analysis of the historiographical construct of Gnosticism, my first 
chapter identified the trope of the abyss as one allowing us to elucidate the various 
declinations of a gnostic inhabiting. In the gnostic dramaturgy, the groundless depth 
of the abyss illustrates indeed the tragedy of our separation from a divine, absent other. 
It represents a chasm fatally insulating God from the world, therefore also the human 
self from the world, and symbolizes the cosmic anxiety characteristic of the gnostic 
being in the world: motives of the alienness of worldly being and the yearning for a 
beyond-the-world further contribute to delineate the figure of an abyss keeping the self 
away from its true home. The metaphor of the abyss indicates the condition of being 
thrown into a life experienced as an absence, between the presence of a world felt as 
alien and the absence of a home so remote. Insofar as it expresses the gnostic condition 
of an existential as well as ontological exile, the trope of the abyss has enabled us to 
think both the structural dualism of modern cosmology and the sealing of worldly 
being it operates in the process of hypostatization of an existential inbetweenness. 
 
Also expressed in gnostic narratives in terms of a cosmogonical “crack” in 
divine being allowing the creation of the world259, the figure of the abyss bears the 
additional meaning of an ontological openness, or opening of worldly being as it is 
being split into two opposite realms. As we saw earlier in this chapter, the metaphor 
of the abyss not only provides a symbolical way to approach the strong dualism of 
gnostic cosmologies, but also offers a way to conceive the ontological openness 
concealed by this dualism. The figure of the abyss embodies indeed the distance 
between worldly beings – a distance which may be felt as a tragedy, that of the 
unmournable loss of an original connection, drawing an unbridgeable line between 
two absolutely impenetrable realms of being. In this first, gnostic interpretation of this 
distance, the abyss is hermetically sealed. But the metaphor of the abyss also 
designates a distance, just as bottomless as the first, which could be felt this time as an 
openness, a redeeming space for creation, resilience and exchange, drawing lines of 
 
259 Éric POMMIER, Jonas. Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2013, p.34. 
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connection that gather worldly beings thirsty for a fertile encounter. In her article 
“Lines in the Innumerable: Enmity, Exceptionalism and Entanglement”260, Catherine 
Keller explores the potential of a “theology of entangled difference” for present 
politics. She reminds us that some lines are lines of separation, and trace divisions, 
while others are lines of relation and trace affiliations. As she contends that “there is 
nothing politically innocent about interdisciplinarity”, she invites us to break free from 
the disciplinary structure imposed upon academic thought and draws our attention to 
the subversive potential of tracing sandy lines of relation – between disciplines, but 
also between cultures, people, species, beings… The same applies, I suggest, to the 
gnostic trope of the abyss: the latter can be subverted if one resolves to dwell in the 
precious space of inbetweenness opened up by it. The abyss of inbetweenness 
characterizing our inhabiting, as Voegelin’s analysis suggests, is what garners the 
ontological tension of the world – a fertile tension of creativity, if difficult to maintain. 
This metaxic tension unveiled by the perspective of Gnosticism summons us to dwell 
further, even deeper within the tropes of our inhabiting, so as to pursue or recover what 
Susanne Claxton calls a “full dwelling”.261 
 
Here I have unfolded the gnostic trope of the abyss, whose various declinations 
we may find again in the leitmotivs of the gap, the rift, the separation, the distance etc, 
but we could as well identify other gnostic tropes of our inhabiting in the themes of 
the Fall, the Escape, the Alien, the Home, the Yearning… All of these might be 
reversed if one intends to dwell in the tension contained in them. In the abyss, we 
discern an opening. The condition of being-thrown into the world expressed in the 
theme of the Fall may as well be interpreted as an offering of the world, thus converting 
the curse of the Fall into an original Gift. The familiar feeling of alienness may be 
embraced as home, and the absence as indicating an overwhelming presence. Clearing 
a space for creation and world-making, the distance setting us apart from the elsewhere 
may be felt as salvatory – “a certain degree of ‘worldlessness’”, Stefano Velotti 
reminds us, “is a necessary condition for imagining the world” 262. There is hope in our 
 
260 Catherine KELLER, “Lines in the Innumerable: Enmity, Exceptionalism and Entanglement”, 
Literature & Theology, 2018, pp.1-11.  
261 Susanne CLAXTON, Heidegger’s God. An Ecofeminist Perspective, Rowman & Littlefield, 2017, 
p.150. 
262 Stefano VELOTTI, art.cit., p. 165. 
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languor. In our yearning springs a fountain of possibility, and our abundant thirst is 
one that overflows. But to be able to perceive this overflowing presence of the world, 
one must dwell in the feelings of absence expressed in the gnostic complaints. Perhaps 
William Bronk’s approach to worldly inhabiting in his book The World, the Worldless 
could enlighten our way as we wander through this paradox: his poetry begins with an 
acceptance of the fact that, despite our peregrinations, we are always here – a claim 
that echoes Levinas’ answer to Rimbaud’s complaint that life is elsewhere: and yet we 
are in the world. We are in the world amidst other worldy beings and amidst a galaxy 






What does Gnosticism eclipse, and what does it reveal? This chapter has at-
tempted to outline the potential contribution of a hermeneutics of Gnosticism for 
reimagining our inhabiting in a time of environmental mutation. Drawing upon our 
study of the concepts of Gnosticism in Hans Jonas and Eric Voegelin’s philosophies, 
I discerned in the dualistic alienation from the world and in the concealment of an 
ontological tension, two hermeneutical keys allowing us to bridge the authors’ anal-
yses of Gnosticism, and to extend it to the present politico-philosophical context of the 
environmental crisis. In so doing, I outlined a redefinition of the concept of Gnosticism 
as a sealing of worldy being, and thus laid out the foundations for a hermeneutics of 
Gnosticism aiming at the elucidation of our contemporary being in the world. I sug-
gested that the dualistic worldlessness of modern cosmology illuminated by the per-
spective of Gnosticism results in a sealing of the openness of worldly being – a reduc-
tion of the ontological tension of the world. Manifest in the condemnation of the pos-
sible and the threatening of the creative overflowing of the world, this sealing of 
worldly being is embodied today in the environmental crisis. What this sealing implies 
for an ontology of the world, I propose to elucidate in the next chapter. For now, let us 
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contemplate what a hermeneutics of Gnosticism discloses about the way we inhabit 
the world. 
Here is why we initially summoned the concept of Gnosticism in our philo-
sophical treatment of the ecological issue: because it designates a pathological inhab-
iting of the world, and as such informs us about the way we ourselves inhabit the world. 
In Jonas as well as in Voegelin, the concept of Gnosticism involves the diagnosis of a 
pathological being in the world, led by the yearning to escape the present conditions 
of worldly being, and resulting in a political crisis. Echoing with their political philos-
ophy of Modernity, their analyses of Gnosticism point toward a political crisis of the 
modern inhabiting. As it emphasizes the worldlessness of modern cosmologies and 
throws light on the political consequence of this pathological inhabiting, the perspec-
tive of Gnosticism thus raises the question of politics as inhabiting. We shall explore 
in chapter 5 the unfolding of our hermeneutics of Gnosticism for political philosophy, 
gravitating around the problematic of inhabiting the inbetweenness or, as I propose to 
call it, the eschatological liminality of worldly being.  
 
In this notion of liminality, which the next two chapters will explore in differ-
ent ways, lies a paramount contribution of our hermeneutics of Gnosticism. The limi-
nal designates the space where we dwell – in the metaxic inbetween, the suspended 
tension, the abyssal openness of worldly being. The perspective of Gnosticism unveils 
indeed our being in the world as a standing amidst an ontological abyss, bordering on 
the familiar alienness of the world as an on the edge of a cliff. A metaxic inhabiting of 
the world thus arises as an existential-political challenge as well as a philosophical 
one: how to sustain the tension of worldly being? How to preserve the precarious open-
ness disclosed by our hermeneutics?  
In the pursuit of a resilient, ecological dwelling that would embrace the limi-
nality of our inhabiting, rather than perpetually organizing its overcoming, the contri-
bution of poets might prove a saving grace. Fulfilling the challenge of a full dwelling 
implies a perpetual rediscovery of the world, which a poetic engagement with worldly 
being incarnates. While the openness of worldly being appears beyond words, poets 
attempt to say the ineffable and, struggling to express in words what overflows prosaic 
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language, reawaken the world to its ontological overflowing. The redeeming character 
of a poetic dwelling in the world thus arises from its standing right within the openness 
of being and yet resisting the gnostic reduction of the ontological tension of the world 
– of our being perpetually on the edge of an abyss. Similarly, the subversive potential 
of poetic-metaphorical language lies in its subversion of the linguistic structure of sys-
tems of thought subduing a world that cannot be contained. Poets call us back to the 
eminently symbolic dimension of our cosmologies, including those grounded in the 
fanciful claim of their unwavering rationalism. Who are the poets? “Those who co-
respond to the wonderfully all-present””263, answers Heidegger. Those embracing 
worldly being in its vertiginous, precarious, chaotic openness, and receiving the waves, 
successively overflowing and deserting, of our inhabiting. Those who perpetually feel 
and re-feel, tell and re-tell the world, as if born anew every time it is felt. Those who, 
like the Gnostics, feel the ontological abyss, the cosmic anxiety, the eternal unrooting 
and the yearning for a home – but choose to dwell in it. The danger of the gnostic 
yearning lies in the illusory attempt to resolve the tension by overcoming it: the gnostic 
hypostatization of a beyond the world confines indeed the latter into a closed system, 
thereby negating its ontological openness. In his poem “The Raising of Lazarus”264, 
Rainer Maria Rilke calls those experiencing the gnostic yearning and summons them 
to embrace their existential thirst instead of vainly attempting to quench it – as if 
worldly being could ever cease to overflow: “That you should thirst. Submit to it.” 
And drink the waves of a world that overflows. 
 
263
 Martin HEIDEGGER, Elucidations on Hölderlin’s Poetry, Translated by Keith Hoeller. New York: 
Humanity Books, 2000, p.78. 
 
264 Rainer Maria RILKE, Selected Poems with parallel German text, trans. Susan Ranson and Marielle 







ROOTS, WAVES AND FOLDS OF THE WORLD: 





Humans and the earth are unexhausted 
and undiscovered. 
Wake and listen! 
Verily, the earth shall yet be a source of recovery. 
 
             — Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
 
 
The world always overflows nature. 
Nature is what is established; the world, what comes. 
 
 — Bruno Latour, Facing Gaia. 
 
 
I am rooted, but I flow. 
 







A flood of the world 
Let us contemplate again the idea that the ecological crisis arises as a disclo-
sure, an apocalyptical epiphany throwing light upon a world we had not yet perceived. 
A phenomenology of the environmental crisis would reveal our deepening attachment 
to the earth, along with the precarious contingency of our inhabiting, and summon us 
to exercise greater modesty in relation to the non-human beings of this world. Doing 
so, the environmental issue would present us with a chance for a Remundanization – 
a re-encounter with the world confronting the Gnosticism of modern cosmology. In 
order to recover a philosophy alive to the earth, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari pro-
pose to assemble in a Thousand Plateaus a “Geophilosophy” that would acknowledge 
the earth as the real topos of philosophical inquiry and reorient philosophical thought 
to the contingencies and complexities of terrestrial life265. Latour similarly defines the 
political task imposed by the ecological mutation as one of landing – atterrir –, coming 
down to earth to meet the earthlings and, with them, inhabit a common space266. De-
constructing the modern concept of nature as central foundation of an obsolete cosmo-
logical structure267, Latour argues that the present climatic mutation challenges our 
understanding of the world as monolithic globe: 
 
the old idea of the earth conceived as globe, the old idea of matter, 
has nothing left to do with the world we have to inhabit.268 
 
Rising from the ashes of the concept of nature and appearing in the new light 
of the Anthropocene, the world facing us now is one to be encountered. It requires a 
 
265 Gilles DELEUZE, Felix GUATTARI, Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2 : Mille Plateaux, Editions de 
Minuit, Paris, 1980. 
266 Bruno LATOUR, Où atterrir? Comment s’orienter en politique, La Découverte, Paris, 2017. 
267 Bruno LATOUR, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes, op. cit. 
268 Bruno LATOUR, “Sur une nette inversion du schème de la fin des temps », paper for a conference on 




thought able to articulate the recent discovery, variation of the Galilean claim, that “the 
earth is crying”269, that “the earth is moved”270 by our inhabiting. In other words, what 
a philosophy of the present world needs to process is the realization that the gnostic 
abyss, which modern dualism had dug between humanity and the world, was crossed: 
suddenly we find ourselves deeply involved within an astounding web of worldly be-
ings from which there is no escape, “with thousand rootlets reaching deep into the soil 
of life”271. If the ecological crisis rises as a flood, it is the flood of a world overflowing 
in an abundance, complexity and intensity which the modern philosophy of nature 
could not seize, and to which we must now render ourselves sensitive. In Facing 
Gaia272, Latour explores ideas and figures to embrace multiple modes of existence, 
experience and agency which the modern concept of nature has thus far failed to 
acknowledge within earthly beings. As we shall see in the present chapter, the devel-
opment of a Gaian thought of the world involves a shift in perception, a reversal of the 
gnostic dynamic of “plus extra” [further beyond] exhorting humanity to emancipate 
itself from the world, and engages indeed a movement of “plus intra” [further inward] 
towards the recognition of our earth-boundedness. Back to the earth, in with the old 
world of the immanence as we enter a new geological era, discover the unprecedented 
dimension of its emergence, and endeavor to dwell in an entangled infinity.273 What 
our preliminary analysis of Gnosticism may teach us in this journey towards the world, 
this fourth chapter intends to articulate. 
  
 
269 POPE FRANCIS’ Encyclical letter « Laudato Si », 2015. 
270 Michel SERRES, The Natural Contract, Translated by E. Macarthur and W. Paulson, Ann Arbor, The 
University of Michigan Press, 1995, p.86. 
271 Rainer Maria RILKE, Selected Poems with parallel German text, op.cit. « Das ist mein Streit », from 
Advent, p.2. My translation. 
272 Bruno LATOUR, Face à Gaïa: Huit Conférences sur le Nouveau Régime Climatique, La Découverte, 
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From the hermeneutics of Gnosticism towards a philosophy of the world 
 
How may our hermeneutics of Gnosticism contribute to the philosophical re-
newal called upon by the present environmental crisis? How may alternative meta-
phors of our inhabiting inspire an alternative perception of worldly being? This chapter 
explores the cosmo-ontological unfolding of the reflection outlined in the first part of 
this dissertation, and focuses on the ways in which our hermeneutics of Gnosticism 
could inform an alternative thought of worldly being. A thought that would avoid the 
gnostic pitfalls of modern cosmology – namely, its dualistic worldlessness and the 
resulting sealing of worldly being. The previous chapter has suggested that the present 
ecological mutation discloses something which cannot be contained by the cosmology 
witnessing its advent, thereby requiring new mental tools, new categories of thought, 
new images, new philosophical approaches offering to embrace the ontological tension 
of the world and therefore supporting an alternative way of dwelling. It has pointed 
towards a twofold movement of sealing and overflowing, a wide cosmological enter-
prise of subjection and domestication of a worldly being resolutely untamable and ir-
reverent. 
In this chapter, I propose to elucidate the meaning of this “ontological tension” 
obscured by modern dualism and offer conceptual as well as metaphorical ways to 
undo its sealing. This implies unfolding the tension which both Jonas and Voegelin 
had sensed would lie beneath modern Gnosticism, and delving into the metaxic dimen-
sion, or ontological inbetweenness of worldly being. The Voegelinian notion of 
metaxy allows us to reflect upon the interconnectedness of earthly beings evolving in-
between various poles of the world, thus informing a thought of worldly entanglement. 
To this extent, the metaxy of worldly being might provide a conceptual framework to 
approach a deep ontological complexity which appears to overflow from a common 
space of in-betweenness. A key-issue of this chapter shall then be to bridge, drawing 
upon the notion of metaxy, these two essential ideas of planetary entanglement and 
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overflowing of the world. The reflections unfolding in this chapter should ultimately 
uncover the ethical and political concern of dwelling in-between, to be examined in 
chapter five. 
What does the environmental crisis disclose of worldly being, which had until 
then remained unthought by modern cosmology, and which our hermeneutics of Gnos-
ticism might help uncover? Which philosophical, symbolic and metaphorical tools 
might support this recovery? The reflection I propose to conduct in this chapter unfolds 
along three key ideas, sustained by three sets of metaphors, to contribute towards a 
renewed philosophy of the world in times of ecological mutation. The first, led by the 
trope of the openness, examines the promising contribution of process thought for a 
philosophy of the world that would engage the precarious, contingent and eventful 
processes of creation at work within an emerging worldly being. The second delves 
into Gaian ontologies of planetary entanglement, and leans upon Glissant’s term of 
créolité to think the luxuriant ramifications of worldly beings and the plural rootedness 
of their creative agency. The third explores the Deleuzian metaphor of the origami 
universe and attempts to bridge the openness of worldly being with its entanglement. 
I then propose to approach, through the metaphor of the overflowing of the world, the 
process by which worldly beings are both entangled in each other while involved in an 
open becoming. The reflections gathered in this chapter towards a renewed philosophy 
of the world arise from the overarching metaphors of the roots and the waves. They 
are indebted to Virginia Woolf’s prophetic, aquatic consciousness of our being rooted 
in the world, ineluctably embedded in and with other beings, and of the uncontainable 
overflowing of our being. Her experience of the waves of the world, I argue, provides 








 — Heraclitus 
 
“There is no harmony in this contingent stream of unforeseen events.” 
 — Bruno Latour, Facing Gaia. 
 
 
The Gnostics inhabit the world haunted by the anxious awareness of its vola-
tility: their being in the world is infused with an acute sense of the inconstancy and 
restlessness of worldly processes. As we journey through a time of environmental cri-
sis and witness a global ecological and civilizational collapse involving drastic pro-
cesses of eco-systemic disruption, geological mutation and mass extinctions, we might 
ourselves feel the groundlessness of a world crumbling beneath our feet. Emphasizing 
becoming over static being, event over entity, movement rather than substance, the 
tradition of process thought captures the impermanence of the world and its propensity 
for perpetual change. In this regard, the philosophy of process, and the work of its 
defining figure Alfred North Whitehead in particular, provides environmental philos-
ophy with interesting tools to sustain the renewed thought of the world called upon by 
the advent of the Anthropocene. This philosophy of the world should acknowledge the 
precariousness, contingency and eventfulness of worldly being such as unveiled by the 
present ecological mutation. In his Natural Contract, Michel Serres crystallizes the 
paradigmatic break induced by environmental change around the pivotal realization 
that “the earth is moved”. Herald of the unprecedented scope of the environmental 
crisis, the realization of the instability and vulnerability of the Earth echoes the ap-




In our turn, we are appealing to an absent authority, when we cry, 
like Galileo, but before the court of his successors, former prophets 
turned kings: "the Earth is moved." The immemorial, fixed Earth, 
which provided the conditions and foundations of our lives, is mov-
ing, the fundamental Earth is trembling.274 
 
The trembling of the immemorial soil described by Serres reflects the findings of 
process philosophy all the more so as it is accompanied by the acknowledgement of 
the profound reciprocity and reactivity characterizing our relationship to the “natural 
world” – on which the next sections shall dwell further. The term Anthropocene artic-
ulates indeed the awareness that the earth is affected by human actions and answers to 
it in unpredictable ways. To this extent, it invites us to think the historical contingency 
of the world, along with the instability of planetary processes which the modern con-
cept of nature had conceived as fundamentally immutable. The environmental crisis 
thus ultimately reveals worldly being as a worldly becoming: intensifying and accel-
erating some processes, it opens the world to vertiginous perspectives of becoming 
and non-becoming, possible beings and possible unbeings. 
 
Within Jewish mysticism, the medieval tradition of the Lurianic Kabbalah – which 
inspired Hans Jonas’ theological reflections around the concept of God after Ausch-
witz275 - offers a seminal contribution to the theology of process. The Kabbalah devel-
oped by Isaac Luria presents a doctrine of creation unfolding in the three stages of 
divine being: its primordial contraction (tzimtzum), the shattering of the vessels (chevi-
rat ha-kélim) with the chaotic eruption of divine light into the world, and the final repair 
of the world (tikkun). The notion of Tzimtzum is paramount to the theo-cosmogonic 
process described by the Lurianic Kabbalah. Jonas explains: 
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Tzimtzum means contraction, withdrawal, self-limitation. To make 
room for the world, the En-Sof, (Infinite; literally, No-End) of the 
beginning had to contract himself so that, vacated by him, empty 
space could expand outside of him: the “Nothing” in which and from 
which God could then create the world. Without this retreat into 
himself, there could be no “other” outside God, and only his contin-
ued holding-himself-in preserves the finite things from losing their 
separate being again into the divine “all in all”.276 
 
The primordial contraction of the divine at the origin of cosmic creation may be ap-
proached both as a withdrawal into the depths of her interiority and as a concession to 
the openness of cosmic being. The first dimension of the Tzimtzum thus presents cre-
ation as a fold within, a deepening towards the inside rather than an emanation or a 
dispersion. Gerschom Sholem thus describes a God who “descended deeper into the 
recesses of His own Being, who concentrated Himself into Himself, and had done so 
from the very beginning of creation.”277 This divine contraction is perpetually renewed 
in the process of creation, so much so that the becoming of the world is defined and 
conditioned by this primordial fold within: “every new act of emanation and manifes-
tation is preceded by one of concentration and retraction”278. In this regard, the 
Tzimtzum recounts a substantive connection between God and the world, an ontolog-
ical dance where each creative emergence of the world arises as an inner folding of the 
divine. 
God’s withdrawal may also be apprehended as an eclipse where the divine, con-
ceding room for otherness to emerge, opens herself up to a world of possible. This 
connection between God’s creative withdrawal and the emergence of the other re-
sumes interestingly the themes of the open and the alien, emphasizing the open entan-
glement of creative processes of becoming with the emerging presence of others. For 
creation to occur, room must be made for an unknown other to emerge. God’s with-
drawal in the Tzimtzum is also consubstantial of a radical exposure conceding the 
possibility of non-being and therefore putting divine being at stake. From the 
Tzimtzum on, creation totters on the edge of an abyss, a primordial space freed for the 
 
276 Ibid, p.12. 




universe to unfold. For God to put herself at stake in the chaotic course of cosmic 
creation, for her to give birth to unpredictable trajectories of becoming, there must be 
a place of openness. With this primordial withdrawal, God concedes in creation the 
possibility of her negation. The Tzimtzum thus arises as an inspiring tale of openness 
combining the idea of an ontological intimacy between God and a creation that 
emerges within her, with the sense of a primordial abyss, a mysterious chaos and cre-
ative depth within her. Breaking with the traditional attribute of God’s omnipotence, 
the doctrine of the Tzimtzum also bears a potential for thinking God’s presence in her 
absence from the world, the latter’s perpetual emergence being conditioned by a sus-
tained act of loving withdrawal.279 
In Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming280, Catherine Keller deviates from 
the dominant theory of creation ex nihilo and explores the hypothesis of a creation ex 
profundis for an alternative representation of the cosmic creative process. Her under-
standing of the watery depths of creation draws too upon Hebrew myths of creation 
and discloses tehomophobic tendencies (fearful of the deep) in Western Christian tra-
dition, which she connects to the repression of feminized abysses and divine maternity. 
Keller argues that this fear of a beginning out of chaos, of darkness, of wild nature and 
of the feminine depth infuses the patriarchal paradigm and motivates the systematized 
oppression of the feminine. This cultural repression of an impenetrable depth at the 
heart of the divine creative process reminds us of what discloses itself as we lean over 
the edge of the abyss described in gnostic narratives: an obscure openness, an unfath-
omable entanglement in the world, and the untamable creative overflowing of the deep. 
 
Drawing attention to worldly processes of emergence and extinction that had been 
suspended, petrified in the realm of nature, the ecological mutation also illuminates 
how such chaotic processes involve human actions, which were contained as an empire 
 
279 This idea of a loving withdrawal from Being conditioning the unfolding of the world is also present 
in Jean-Luc Marion’s God without Being.  
See Jean-Luc MARION, Dieu sans l’être, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2013 (1982). 
280 Catherine KELLER. Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming. Routledge, London, 2003. 
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within an empire under the aegis of the realm of culture. Doing so, it brings to light 
the complexity of worldly processes overflowing the framework of dualist ontology. 
John Cobb, a major figure of process philosophy who has consistently explored its 
links with environmental philosophy while emphasizing ecological interdependency, 
argues that the recognition of the “intimate interconnectedness of all things”281 brings 
together environmental consciousness and Whiteheadian philosophy. The architecture 
of Whitehead’s process metaphysics provides indeed illuminating insights to the con-
temporary thought of planetary entanglement and worldly becoming. The notion of 
“concrescence” expresses the process of creative internalization, feeling and expres-
sion by worldly beings of their relatedness to other event-like entities of the world, 
units of worldly becoming which Whitehead names “actual occasions”. This dual pro-
cess of internalization and externalization of the world by the world appears to articu-
late perfectly the metaxy of worldly being which gnostic cosmologies had failed to 
integrate. Drawing upon Whitehead’s thought of the chaotic emergence of events, po-
litical philosopher William Connolly contends that we live in a world of becoming282 
and contribute to the processes of its emergence, co-creating it as we dwell in it. The 
philosopher presents the attunement to a world of becoming as an eminently political 
issue and argues that the acceptance of the contingency of worldly being would prevent 
the hegemonic imposition of a monolithic worldview upon plural horizons of becom-
ing. Likewise, the acknowledgement of our being intimately involved in processes of 
worldly becoming would command an ontological responsibility towards such pro-
cesses and the many beings involved in and affected by them. 
 
The account by process philosophy of the contingency of worldly being and of our 
involvement within worldly processes of becoming is set against approaches which 
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tend to freeze these processes. While a world of becoming holds within itself an elu-
sive, ever-flowing transcendence sustaining the perpetual emergence of worldly pro-
cesses – therefore unable to ground any fixed ideology –, gnostic cosmologies tend to 
reduce this immanent transcendence – which we analyzed in the preceding chapter as 
constitutive of the ontological, metaxic tension of worldly being. Through promoting 
an approach of the world as becoming rather than being, the philosophy of process 
dwells in the fluidity of processes which overflow dualistic partitions between being 
and non-being, thereby embracing the dynamic tension that infuse worldly processes 
of becoming. Process thought thus allows us to articulate the ontological tension of the 
world identified in our analysis of Gnosticism, and to integrate it within a philosophy 
of the world which engages the possibilities of becoming and non-becoming arising 
from worldly being. Following Hegel’s dialectic or Nietzschean philosophy, process 
thought provides a philosophical way to espouse the movement inherent to life and 
resist the gnostic “mummifying”283 of worldly being. If the present ecological crisis 
unveils the Gnosticism in modern cosmology, the philosophy of process appears as an 
answer to the challenge of an alternative perception of the world. Captured in the idea 
of the Anthropocene, the environmental mutation engages indeed a transition from an 
ontology of substance to an ontology of process which focuses on becoming and move-
ment as radical dimensions of worldly being, rather than perpetuating the gnostic de-
piction of a world condemned to the cage of the eternal here below. Exposing the pre-
cariousness and contingency of eco-systems and terrestrial life, the Anthropocene 
manifests the impermanence of processes of worldly becoming continuously emerging 
and fading. It also brings to the fore the interconnectedness and interdependency of 
this worldly becoming, thereby pointing toward the ultimate responsibility that binds 
us to processes of perpetuation and renewal of the world: in so doing, process thought 
defies the gnostic divorce of the human self from the non-human world. A third po-
tential contribution of process philosophy for a philosophy of the world resisting the 
 
283 See Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols, tr. R.J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968 
(1889), p.35. He writes of philosophers, draining life out of ideas while they should extract ideas out of 
life: “There is […] their hatred of even the idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they are 
doing a thing honour when they dehistoricise it, sub specie aeterni—when they make a mummy of it. 
All that philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies; nothing actual has 
escaped their hands alive. They kill, they stuff, when they worship, these conceptual idolaters—they 
become a mortal danger to everything when they worship. Death, change, age, as well as procreation 
and growth, are for them objections—refutations even.” 
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gnostic stance lies in its unfolding of the idea of openness of worldly becoming, which 
might allow us to approach the eventfulness of the environmental crisis. 
It might seem surprising at first, if not indecent, to propose to think the environ-
mental crisis in terms of openness. Is not the global environmental degradation we are 
presently witnessing rather about irreversible loss? Do not phenomena of eco-systemic 
collapse, mass extinctions, depletion of resources, loss of biodiversity, habitat destruc-
tions… point towards some kind of condemnation, a closure of the manifold processes 
of worldly becoming? Drawing upon the philosophy of process, I suggest that the pre-
sent environmental mutation might be approached in terms of an ambiguous openness 
– a metaxic clearing of possibilities that we might benefit from engaging with as we 
stand on the abyssal edge of worldly becoming. Threatening the perpetuation of many 
life-forms on earth and witnessing the irreversible disappearance of species at the un-
precedented rate of 1,000 to 10,000 times the background extinction rate284, the present 
environmental crisis acts as a phenomenal reminder of the precariousness and imper-
manence of worldly becoming. The manifold processes of worldly becoming involve 
dynamics of both destruction and creation, extinction and emergence, death and birth. 
The image of the abyss mentioned in the previous chapter illuminates again this met-
axic dimension of processes of worldly becoming, and the world’s wandering amidst 
a profusion of possible horizons whose actualization is never guaranteed, only ever 
enabled or threatened – always open. 
 
The philosophy of openness I advocate for, while indebted to Martin Heidegger’s 
intuitive awareness of the self-emergence of Being, insists that openness should not be 
understood as an existential prerogative of the human Dasein – thrown into the world 
and consecutively projecting itself onto the possible trajectories open before it. I rather 
propose to approach openness as an ontological disposition of all multispecies trajec-
tories of becoming. Heidegger’s lexical field of the clearing and the concealing might 
still lead us as we reflect upon this ontological openness of the world. In an essay on 
 
284 E. CHIVIAN, A. BERNSTEIN (eds.), Sustaining life: How human health depends on biodiversity. Centre 
for Health and the Global Environment. Oxford University Press, New York, 2008. 
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the Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger draws a distinction between the world and 
the earth which, I suggest, echoes the profoundly metaxic dimension of our inhabiting: 
 
The world is the self-disclosing openness of the broad paths of the 
simple and essential decisions in the destiny of an historical people. 
The earth is the spontaneous forthcoming of that which is continu-
ally self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing. 
World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet 
are never separated. The world grounds itself on the earth, and earth 
just through world. But the relation between world and earth does 
not wither away into the empty unity of opposites unconcerned with 
one another. The world, in resting upon the earth, strives to surmount 
it. As self-opening it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, how-
ever, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world 
into itself and keep it there. 
The opposition of world and earth is a striving.285 
 
Heidegger depicts a twofold movement of self-disclosure and self-sheltering, where 
“the world” opens and “the earth” conceals, describing an organic relationship between 
poles of being intimately drawn to another and thus engaged in an active, tensional, 
birth giving metaxy. Heidegger’s metaxic thought of the world points toward the ne-
cessity for contemporary philosophy to distance itself from the modern concept of na-
ture in order to acknowledge the striving complexity that is the world. The tension 
which Heidegger describes between the clearing and the concealing, the delicate dance 
of sheltering and disclosure shines a light upon the unthought of the modern concept 
of nature, which crystallizes overflowing processes of becoming into the fiction of an 
eternal, immovable materiality. Engulfing its dynamic tension along with its ontolog-
ical openness, the concept of nature does not enable us to think the world as what 
“strives to surmount” or “cannot endure anything closed”. It eclipses the haunting con-
cern for its precarious becomings, the longing that moves within its depths and the 
yearning that infuses its wandering. The “self-opening” of the world described by 
Heidegger is in gnostic cosmologies a prerogative of the human-self, of the existential 
 
285 Martin HEIDEGGER, Basic Writings, “On the Origin of the Work of Art”, 1st Harper Perennial 
Modern Thought Edition, ed. David Farrell Krell, New York, Harper Collins, 2008, p. 174. 
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and divine pole of being. Ontologically closed, hermetically sealed, nature does not 
yearn. It is not moved by encounters with fellow trajectories giving birth to burgeoning 
possibilities of becoming, nor does it ever wander amidst flourishing and sinking ho-
rizons of becoming. The unthought openness I wish to emphasize characterizes the 
world in its diverse processes of becoming, in the intimate enmeshment between earth-
lings and their environment which makes it difficult to even distinguish them. For all 
earthlings, being in the world means to be engaged in manifold processes of becoming-
with the world – of worlding – which are fundamentally open. Worlding is an enmesh-
ment in the open. For the Pacific Walruses, for Tigers, Giant Pandas and Mountain 
Gorillas, for Antarctic glaciers, seeds non-patented by Monsanto corporation as well 
as for collapsing capitalist societies, becoming means being open to their not-becom-
ing-anymore. 
Far from merely disclosing the abyssal nothingness that threatens the becom-
ings of the world, the ontological openness of our worldings is also the condition for 
their advent. While gnostic metaphysics leave no room to think the perpetual and im-
manent self-creation of the world, environmental philosophy requires a thought of 
emergence which the idea of openness might initiate. The trope of the openness allows 
us indeed to think both the arising and evanescence of multispecies processes of 
worlding, both the emergence and extinction of beings described by Jonas as “onto-
logical surprises”286. In the present environmental crisis, it bridges the world’s end 
with its possible birth, and echoes the image of an abyss to clear a space for what is 
not yet, what is not anymore, what comes and might not arrive, what is becoming. 
Translating a Turkish saying into French, the philosopher of complexity Edgar Morin 
writes that « les nuits sont enceintes, et nul ne connaît le jour qui naîtra » - the nights 
are pregnant, and no one yet knows the dawns to break287. The world is pregnant with 
an abyssal openness giving birth to ontological surprises whose becoming, arising or 
extinction, we are ontologically involved with. The acknowledgement of the openness 
of the world might thus prevent any ideology from claiming the end of history and 
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thereby jeopardize processes of becoming together. Calling upon our faculty to care 
for the emergence of the world and preserve a space of resilience, a blank space for 
creation, it ensures that the end is always where we start from. 
 
The end we start from, disclosing the openness of worldly being and the many 
beginnings that arise from plural perspectives of becoming. The provisory, ever-post-
poned end of times. The end of the world as we knew it, the end of the Holocene, the 
end of species, the end of a civilization – all porous entities enmeshed in other trajec-
tories of becomings – and the beginning of what in the world, from this ontological 
openness of being, overflows. Outlining the finitude of our precarious being in the 
world, the environmental mutation also throws light on the porous boundaries of our 
selves: they too are open, overflowing in each other. The image of the openness thus 
conveys a thought of the world as contingent event and untamable becoming, as well 
as it opens up a thought of our deep ontological entanglement with worldly processes 
of becoming. In this light, the openness appears indeed as the very condition of our 
encounter with other worldly becomings. Being, or becoming in the world is being 
opened by other becomings, penetrated and fecundated by their alterity. Shifting from 
the gnostic posture of a divorce from the world, and its emphasis on the abyssal gap 
insulating the human self from the radical ontological alterity of the world, the idea of 
openness embraces the metaxic in-between of worldly being as a space of encounter 
and creation. What kind of ontology might allow us to dwell in the openness of the 




B. The ontology of Gaia for a créole world 
 
Our lives extend beyond our skins, 
in radical interdependence with the rest of the world. 
 
  — Joanna Macy, Working through Environmental Despair. 
 
Each is a crowd 
  — Mona Chollet288 
 
 
The roots of the waves: worldly entanglement as blurring of dualistic 
boundaries 
 
Emphasizing the perpetual and dynamic emergence of the world, process phi-
losophy conveys a perception of worldly becoming as waves and allows us to approach 
the ontological flood arising with the environmental mutation. But this fluidity is an-
chored, the watery dimension of the world rooted: the streams of worldly becomings 
perceived by process thought are embedded in a web of connections, a fertile soil of 
encounters, and can only overflow what they are rooted in. Drawn from the eponymous 
hypothesis formulated by atmospheric chemist James Lovelock and evolutionary bi-
ologist Lynn Margulis, the development of the figure of Gaia in environmental hu-
manities marks the progressive articulation of a complexified thought of the rootedness 
of worldly beings. Before delving deeper into the Gaia hypothesis and the conse-
quences of its introduction for environmental philosophy and the ontology of the 
 
288 Mona CHOLLET, “L’emploi du temps”, Périphéries, 2007. 




world, I would like to pause and draw some preliminary reflections from the contem-
plation of the trope of the root. 
In her book Rootedness, Christy Wampole investigates the omnipresent meta-
phor of rootedness throughout the history of Western thought and how it pervades 
today’s philosophical, cultural and political narratives. As she contends that “figura-
tive language is the outlet for a deep-seated apprehension about permanent estrange-
ment from the context whence we came” and unfolds “the chronicle of a species at 
odds with itself”289, Wampole channels the gnostic trope of an existential estrangement 
resulting from an original rupture from Humanity’s true home. From the metaphor of 
the roots, she draws the primordial myth of a lost connection, a broken link: “if people 
think of themselves as rooted beings, it is due to an umbilical memory of an attachment 
to the earth, a memory that has been severed in more ways than one.”290 The author 
thus identifies in the image of the root “a figure of vital will and yearning – as it pushes 
through the soil, reaching for what it needs”291 prone to express the “nearly universal” 
longing for one’s home and the wandering towards an ultimate reunion. But as she 
perceives in the image of the root an integrating metaphor, Wampole proceeds to an 
interesting inversion of the gnostic trope of the unrooting. The image of the root, she 
argues, serves not only to express the drama of an estrangement from the world, but 
also weaves a wide web of belongings that “allows for connections to be made between 
past, present, and future, between remote geographic spaces, between neighbors, be-
tween the human and its ecosystem.292” Thus, the trope of the root may express both 
the existential alienation from one’s true home, so deeply felt by the Gnostics, and the 
umbilical connections binding one to the world through a plurality of ties. Wampole’s 
analysis even appears to echo the insights fostered by process thought, as she bridges 
the depiction of an arborescent structure of attachments with the complex entangle-
ment of trajectories of worldly becoming: 
 
289 Christy WAMPOLE, Rootedness: The Ramifications of a Metaphor, University of Chicago Press, 
2016, p.15. I emphasize. 
290 Ibid, p.18. I emphasize. 
291 Ibid, p.22. 
292 Ibid, p.15. 
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the root may serve as a metaphorical anchor to a geographic space … 
its structure approximates a map of countless unexploited possibili-
ties latent in each set of circumstances a person encounters.293 
 
Wampole suggests here that the metaphor of the root may describe a subterranean net-
work of attachments sustaining processes of worldly becoming. In this light, coupled 
with the consciousness of the fluidity of processes of worldly becoming, the botanical 
metaphor challenges modern notions of selfhood and agency as conceived within the 
framework of atomic individuality. Unfolding Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s in-
tuition of the “rhizomic”294 nature of worldly being, philosophers Isabelle Stengers 
and Bruno Latour have developed the figure of Gaia as a subversion of a dualist on-
tology unfitted for addressing planetary processes of becoming295. As it reformulates 
a thought of the world away from the dualist cosmology of Modernity, Gaia also ap-
pears to solicit and reframe the metaphor of the root. Let us now examine this idea 
more closely. 
 
 For Bruno Latour, “at first sight, nothing is simpler than the Gaia hypothesis: 
the living do not only reside in an environment, they shape it … the Earth’s whole 
biochemistry is the product of living organisms”296. What are the implications of this 
claim? Sébastien Dutreuil explains that the progressive acknowledgement of Gaia as 
a new scientific entity presides over the constitution, from the 1980s onwards, of the 
Earth system science. He writes: 
 
293 Ibid, p.16. I emphasize. 
294 In their project Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972 – 1980), the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari have developed the botanical concept of rhizome to oppose Modernity’s dualistic struc-
ture of thought and apprehend multiplicities in a non-hierarchical way. The rhizomic process thus des-
ignates an ecology of beings not subordinated to a higher entity, not organized by a set of transcendent 
laws, or gravitating around a center. 
295 See Isabelle STENGERS, In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism, trans. Goffrey A. 
Ann Arbor, Open Humanities Press, London, 2015 (2009). 
and Bruno LATOUR, Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime, Harvard University 
Press, 2017. 
296 Bruno LATOUR, “Comment j’ai rencontré l’homme qui a inventé Gaïa”, in Le Nouvel Observateur, 




the label “Earth system science” designates an important and pro-
found reconfiguration of earth sciences, aiming at bringing together 
disciplines which had thus far been kept separated – such as geo-
chemistry, climatology, global ecology, oceanography etc. –, by 
gathering them around the study of a same object: the Earth sys-
tem.297 
 
Gaia therefore appears as a figure of connection, bringing together processes and en-
tities set apart from each other – most notably, organisms and their environment. Doing 
so, it undermines the dualist edifice upon which modern sciences are erected – which 
Whitehead had diagnosed as a “bifurcation of nature” – and proposes to approach life 
phenomena in their overflowing complexity. To this extent, the framework provided 
by the Gaia hypothesis may offer a scientific articulation of Whitehead’s claim accord-
ing to which, in natural philosophy, “we may not pick and choose”. The author of the 
Concept of Nature writes indeed: 
 
For natural philosophy everything perceived is in nature. We may 
not pick and choose. For us the red glow of the sunset should be as 
much part of nature as are the molecules and electric waves by which 
men of science would explain the phenomenon. It is for natural phi-
losophy to analyze how these various elements of nature are con-
nected.298 
 
Whitehead defines here the task of philosophy of nature as an analysis of connections, 
an indepth inquiry into worldly processes and modes of existence entangled in one 
another. The responsibility of natural philosophy resembles one of translation that 
would allow the red glow of the sunset and the electric waves to correspond with each 
other. This work of translation echoes Latour’s AIME project299 – An Inquiry into 
 
297 Sébastien DUTREUIL, "James Lovelock and the Gaia hypothesis: ’a new look at life on Earth’ ... for 
the life and the Earth sciences." in M. Dietrich & O. Harman (Eds), Dreamers, Romantics and Vision-
aries in the Life Sciences, University of Chicago Press, 2017. I translated from the original manuscript 
in French. 
298 Alfred North WHITEHEAD, The Concept of Nature, p.29. 
299 See the AIME website : http://modesofexistence.org/ 
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Modes of Existence –, which aims at displaying the diversity of types of “veridiction” 
and expressions of experiences cohabiting within Modernity itself. Latour’s approach 
points toward an untamable tendency for connection – singular modes of existence, 
modes of expression and experience resolutely waving towards each other, fecundat-
ing each other as they evolve around each other. Latour identifies this yearning for 
connection in the “endless blurriness” of living organisms – the latter manifesting a 
strong objection to the bifurcation of nature. In the foreword to Stengers’ Thinking 
with Whitehead, he writes: 
 
if nature really is bifurcated, no living organism would be possible, 
since being an organism means being the sort of thing whose pri-
mary and secondary qualities – if they did exist – are endlessly 
blurred. Since we are organisms surrounded by many other organ-
isms, nature has not bifurcated.300 
 
In Facing Gaia, Latour interprets Whitehead's bifurcation of nature as a diagnosis of 
the dis-animation of one section of the world, declared objective and inert, and the sur-
animation of another section, declared conscious and free.301 He presents Gaia as a 
figure of subversion that, overflowing Modernity's ontological dualism, summons us 
to think the connections between the plural agencies of the world without thereby 
yielding to a holistic conception of totality.302 In this sense, Gaian philosophy channels 
an ontological pluralism acknowledging the coexistence of a plurality of modes of ex-
istence, or ways of inhabiting overflowing the frontiers of modern dualism. Embody-
ing the Deleuzian realization of the rhizomatic interconnectedness of worldly beings, 
Latour's Gaia furthermore articulates the idea of a dispersion of worldly agency and 
intentionality, and the dissolution in this process of the distinction between organism 
and environment.303 In this sense, the figure of Gaia submerges the distinction between 
 
Accessed 11.03.2019 
300 Bruno LATOUR, Foreword to Isabelle Stengers’ Thinking with Whitehead, p.xiii. I emphasize. 
301 Bruno LATOUR, Face à Gaïa, op.cit, p.107. 
302 Ibid, p.129. 
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inside and outside, culture and nature, organism and environment, individual and sys-
tem, thereby subverting the dualistic structure of modern cosmology: “there is no Earth 
superior to its Parts. And there are no Parts either."304 These words from Latour may 
remind us of Whitehead's oxymoronic litany on the relationship between God and the 
World: 
 
It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is 
immanent in the World. 
It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World 
transcends God.305 
 
As we can see, Whitehead's constant emphasis on relatedness in his philosophy of the 
organism also infuses his doctrine of God, where God and the world are described as 
two unalienable, interdependent poles of a common process of creative prehension. 
Isabelle Stengers, who brilliantly analyzed the centrality of Whitehead's theological 
speculations in his wider thought, seems to echo his antithetical insights as she de-
scribes Gaia  as an “unprecedented or forgotten form of transcendence” 306 and presents 
the brutal intrusion of ticklish planetary processes as stemming from within the imma-
nence of the world. Thus, for Stengers too, the ontological entanglement and blurring 
of boundaries figured by Gaia subverts traditional conceptual polarities, including the-
ological ones. Gaia appears indeed as that which garners both the roots and the waves 
of worldly being, that which conditions its overflowing, a “constant improvisation”307 
from the many processes of worldly becoming, a primordial and chaotic force of open-
ness, connection and eventful creation. She designates a plural rootedness that dis-
solves the modern narrative of nature and culture and discloses an unsettling propen-




305 Alfred North WHITEHEAD, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, ed. David Ray Griffin and 
Donald W. Sherburne, New York, Free Press, 1978 (1929). 
306 Isabelle STENGERS, In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism, op.cit. 
307 Bruno LATOUR, Face à Gaïa, op.cit., p.144 
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 Before dwelling further on the créolité of Gaia, fed by her yearning for con-
nection, let us shortly summon the contribution of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's bio-phe-
nomenology for a Gaian thought of the intertwining of worldly beings. The project of 
phenomenological inquiry envisions the possibility of disclosure of being as embedded 
in the relationship between consciousness and phenomena – in other words, between 
the self and the world. Phenomenology proposes to think the ontological entanglement 
of consciousness, its self-transcendence stemming from its being enmeshed in the con-
sciousness of others, and the immanence of an alterity that is always experienced and 
thus internalized. By establishing the primordiality of one such entanglement with 
other co-inhabitants and suggesting that there is no escape from this ontological rela-
tionship, which we have to confront and from which we must proceed, it points toward 
the embeddedness of consciousness in other processes of worldly becoming. In an ar-
ticle about the “living body”308, Carl B. Sachs confronts the intuitions of Hans Jonas 
developed in his philosophy of life with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the 
embodiment of consciousness. He shows how the perspective of bio-phenomenology 
articulates the inter-subjectivity of worldly beings with their inter-corporeality, 
thereby offering a serious way to bypass the Cartesian dichotomy between res extensa 
and res cogitans. Against this legacy, the coincidence of inwardness with outwardness 
manifested in the living body compels indeed an alternate way of thinking the world. 
This essential intuition of phenomenology, which Merleau-Ponty formulated in terms 
of the entanglement of the open life with the alien life309, I suggest, is crucial for the 
philosophical reflections initiated by the environmental crisis. One of these was for-
mulated by Bruno Latour, whose analysis of the ecological issue indicates that there is 
no Nature outside of Culture – a realization which had also been expressed in phenom-
enological terms as “there is no phenomena outside consciousness” – and vice versa. 
We dwell in between and amongst each other. In this light, the environmental crisis 
 







309 Maurice MERLEAU-PONTY, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith, New York: 
Routledge, 2002, p.412.  
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would signify the dissolution of boundaries and any ultimate authority contained in 
their confines, borders of sovereign empires to which we could have surrendered the 
unbearable course of our becoming. This dissolution of the boundaries discloses a 
worldly entanglement, a process of swarming310 characterized by a profusion of roots 
and trajectories. To this extent, the environmental crisis compels us to no longer phi-
losophize about the world, but within a plurality of worldly becomings. What remains 
once frontiers of worldly being are tumbling down, and old ontological boundaries are 
proclaimed obsolete? It seems that processes of becoming do not have anywhere to 
dwell but in the liminality of the world. 
 
 
The créolité of the world: inhabiting in-between the world 
 
Manifesting the obsolescence of modern dualistic cosmology, the ontological 
entanglement disclosed by the environmental crisis points toward the challenge of 
dwelling in-between. Dwelling in between worldly beings, their compelling presence 
and haunting absence, in between geological eras, times, continents, national borders, 
ecosystems, cultures and languages, to inhabit the world and embrace its manifold 
processes of becoming. Particularly sensitive to the overwhelming presence of the 
other, the Martiniquais poet and philosopher Edouard Glissant developed a Poetics of 
Relation311 which attempts to think the complexity, hybridity and nomadity of our re-
lationships, along with the particular sense of belonging that proceeds from them. Glis-
sant’s thought of the créolité thus engages with the event of the encounter as arising 
within the littoral, or liminal zones of being – across cultural and territorial frontiers, 
here and elsewhere, inside and outside, and across the porous boundaries of the self. 
In a particularly fruitful formulation, Jean Bernabé, a seminal figure of the créolité 
literary movement, writes: 
 
310 William CONNOLLY, Facing The Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the Politics of Swarming, 
2017. 




the literature of créolité is a literature that unveils the Here from the 
inside, without cutting it from its relationship to the Elsewhere.312 
 
Unveiling the Here through the immanent presence of the Elsewhere, the créolité 
movement echoes the Gnostic yearning for an Elsewhere, a beyond only determined 
by the desire to overcome the Here. Dominated by anxieties of place and belonging, 
the Carribean poetics of location and dislocation appears indeed to channel the gnostic 
being in the world. For Glissant, the trope of the island provides the symbol of home 
as a floating inbetweenness, surrounded by the threat of estranging seas. The créolité, 
however, seems to answer the nihilism of the Gnostic lament with an ethics of relation 
that teaches us to dwell in the sandy, intermediate space between island and sea, 
amongst worldly beings as well as in the liquid borderland between the here and the 
elsewhere. “Originally stamped with the wish of being domiciliated in the here of our 
being”313, the Créoles radically distinguish themselves from the Gnostics in that they 
aim to recover an alienated sense of situatedness, hanging on to the specific density 
and opacity of the locale314. Emphasizing littoral zones, the thought of créolité decon-
structs the idea of an absolute belonging and suggests that identity is constructed in 
relation – in the encounter with others. Edouard Glissant draws upon Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of « rhizome » to think the diversity of our rootedness and the entan-
glement of our identities: the poet defines the rhizome as a root that grows towards 
other roots, without repressing them but rather strengthening itself in the company of 
others. This image fosters an understanding of identity as a sharing rather than an iso-
 
312 Jean BERNABE, « De la Négritude à la Créolité : éléments pour une approche comparée », L’Amé-
rique entre les langues, Volume 28, numéro 2-3, automne–hiver 1992, p.37. 
  « La littérature de la créolité est une littérature qui dévoile l’Ici de l’intérieur sans le couper de sa 
relation avec l’Ailleurs. » My translation. 
313 Jean BERNABE, Patrick CHAMOISEAU & Raphaël CONFIANT, Eloge de la Créolité, 1993, Paris: 
Gallimard, p.20.  
« Originellement saisie du vœu de nous domicilier dans l’ici de notre être » My translation. 
314 J. Michael DASH in “Farming Bones and Writing Rocks: Rethinking a Caribbean Poetics of 
(Dis)Location”, p.67. 




lation and prepares us to approach the intense complexity unveiled along the creoliza-
tion of the world315. The authors of Eloge de la créolité describe the latter as "an an-
nihilation of false universality, monolinguism, and purity."316 The idea of créolité thus 
points towards an ethics of belonging rooted in relationality and hybridity, which J. 
Michael Dash calls a « relational rootedness »317, and which shall inspire our political 
reflection in chapter 5. If we dwell in littoral zones associated with indeterminacy and 
exposure, and if, for Glissant, the sense of place is uncircumventable318, then “où at-
terrir?” asks Bruno Latour319. Where should we dwell? Which land should we inhabit? 
We shall go back to this question as we engage in our next chapter with the political 
dimension of dwelling in-between. For now, let us focus on its philosophical unfold-
ings. 
As Glissant identifies a process of “archipelization of the world”, he describes 
the world as a profusion of islands floating amidst an ocean of inbetweenness. Being 
in the world as in an archipelago would thus imply to embrace its oceanic, abyssal 
inbetweenness. This thought echoes Voegelin’s analysis of Gnosticism, which sug-
gested that the cure to the gnostic pathological being in the world should include a 
rediscovery of our metaxic being in the world, that is, of our being in-between, with 
and within the world. Such a recovery involves bridging the gnostic abyss separating 
God from the world, as well as embracing our dwelling in the metaxic gulf, so as to 
mend the Voegelinian anoia – the forgetting of our ontological participation into the 
process of worldly being. This pursuit of a dwelling in-between in order to inhabit the 
world points toward the idea of wandering, so often praised in philosophical thought. 
Edouard Glissant conceives of wandering not as a boundless dispersion, but rather as 
the becomings and encounters we had not foreseen: 
 
 
315 Institut du Tout-Monde, Mondialité – Répertoire vidéo E. Glissant, 08.01.2013,  
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ttqh1iIk_pc 
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316 Jean BERNABE, Patrick CHAMOISEAU & Raphaël CONFIANT, op. cit., p.28.  
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translation. 
318 Edouard GLISSANT, Tout-Monde, Gallimard, 1993, p.29 : « Le lieu est incontournable. » 
319 Bruno LATOUR, Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime, Polity Press, 2018. 
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The thought of wandering is not the distraught thought of dispersion, 
but that of our unforeseen rallies, through which we migrate from 
the absolutes of Being to the variations of Relation, where Being 
reveals itself as beings, and where essence and substance, dwelling 
and movement are undistinguished. Wandering is not exploration, 
colonial or not, nor it is the abandoning to misguided ways. It knows 
how to be immobile, and how to carry away. Through the thought 
of wandering we refuse the unique roots that kill around them: the 
thought of wandering is that of solidary rootings and rhizomic 
roots.320 
 
Edouard Glissant offers here a compelling reflection tying together the thoughts of 
créolité, rhizomic rootedness and an apophatic philosophy of wandering. Wanderers 
are uncanny: unknowable, unclassifiable, undisciplined, they dwell in-between and 
perpetually overflow the borders of being as they overcome their origins and embrace 
the paths of their becoming. From their perpetual dwelling in-between, and from their 
créole resistance to identitary confinements, we might learn that worldly becoming 
discloses itself as an oceanic wandering and an overflowing of ontological segrega-
tions.  
 
C. A baroque world of overflowing  
 
Between the folds: the origami universe 
 
The reflections which inaugurated the present chapter focused on the potential 
contribution of process thought for a philosophy of the present environmental muta-
tion, and how the idea of openness might inform an alternative ecological thought for 
present times. The second section has explored the resources of Gaian ontologies to 
 
320 Edouard GLISSANT, Philosophie de la Relation. op.cit, p.61-62 : 
« La pensée de l'errance n'est pas l'éperdue pensée de la dispersion mais celle de nos ralliements non 
prétendus d'avance, par quoi nous migrons des absolus de l’Être aux variations de la Relation, où se 
révèle l’être-comme-étant, l’indistinction de l’essence et de la substance, de la demeure et du 
mouvement. L’errance n’est pas l’exploration, coloniale ou non, ni l’abandon à des errements. Elle sait 
être immobile, et emporter. Par la pensée de l’errance nous refusons les racines uniques et qui tuent 
autour d’elles : la pensée de l’errance est celle des enracinements solidaires et des racines en rhizome.» 
My translation and emphasis. 
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think the planetary entanglement disclosed by a global ecological crisis: we thus went 
from the openness of worldly becoming to its entanglement. From the manifold pro-
cesses of becoming, ontologically open to unforeseen trajectories of being, to their 
creolization, their fertile or infecund encounters, ambiguous enmeshment with each 
other. Are not these two ideas of open becoming and Gaian creolization both about 
openness? The former manifests a processual openness to trajectories of becoming, 
while the latter sanctifies an ontological openness to other beings or becomings of the 
world. Both the processes of becoming and the creolizing encounters with others are 
indeed conditioned by an openness which appears absolutely primordial to worldly 
being. How to articulate both movements? Which metaphor, which image might allow 
us to bridge the créole entanglement of the world, with its precarious, contingent, wa-
vering processes of becoming? 
Contemporary environmental scientists as well as philosophers of the ecological mu-
tation have pointed toward a shared process of creation at stake in the world. The evo-
lutionary biologist Lynn Margulis has thus coined the term of holobiont to designate 
ecological units as a superposition of beings folded into one another, all entangled into 
a common process of symbiosis321. More recently, Eric Bapteste has argued in his book 
Tous entrelacés322 that biological entities are all intertwined in each other, thereby 
challenging the notion of individual and even species. Pointing toward a complex pro-
cess of collective evolution, Bapteste’s work implies to recompose disciplines around 
these collaborative networks and thus to redefine the terms of the evolution theory. In 
Facing Gaia, Bruno Latour lays the groundwork for a political philosophy of the world 
embracing this pivotal realization of a shared, intermingled agency of worldly beings, 
which no figure of totality nor individuality could ever capture. In a lecture on the 
body politic, he writes: 
living forms are folded many times over because they have engulfed 
the outside world inside the provisional border of their selves. Fold 
is another name for overlap.323 
 
321 Lynn MARGULIS, Symbiosis as a Source of Evolutionary Innovation. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991. 
322 Eric BAPTESTE, Tous entrelacés. Paris, Belin, 2018. 
323 Bruno LATOUR, “Does the Body Politic Need a New Body?”, Yusko Ward-Phillips lecture, Univer-
sity of Notre Dame, 3rd of November 2016. 
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Before him, Gilles Deleuze had drawn upon the legacy of Leibniz’s thought 
and argued in The Fold that Baroque philosophy provides tools for analysing contem-
porary arts, politics and sciences. Deleuze argues that Leibniz anticipates contempo-
rary developments of philosophy, notably those in process thought and the philosophy 
of the event – Alfred North Whitehead indeed was inspired by the works of Leibniz. I 
suggest that the Leibnizian metaphor of the fold might enrich a reflection on the pro-
cess of creation happening in the liminal space between entangled worldly beings. The 
image of the fold articulates indeed the idea of a littoral interface between inside and 
outside, thereby echoing the debate on modern dualism and the irreducible process of 
co-penetration disclosed by the ecological crisis. In the first pages of the Fold, Deleuze 
thus calls for the contribution of someone “who can at once account for nature and 
decipher the soul, who can peer into the crannies of matter and read into the folds of 
the soul.”324 He contends further that the Fold intends to “fashion a way of representing 
what Leibniz will always affirm: a correspondence and even a communication between 
the two levels, between the two labyrinths, between the pleats of matter and the folds 
in the soul.”325 In this perspective, the Deleuzian-Leibnizian enterprise appears to 
merge with Whitehead’s wish to mend the bifurcation of nature, as well as with 
Latour’s dedication to bypass the modern nature-culture cosmology. As a metaphor of 
connection, the fold “radiates and ramifies everywhere in the geography of experience, 
such that we can imagine movement of light and sound, together, as folds of ethereal 
matter that waft and waver”.326 This omnipresence of the fold, leading Deleuze to de-
scribe the world as an origami universe, was also felt by the origami artist Paul Jack-
son, who notes in the Peabody Award-winning documentary Between the Folds that:  
 
If you look around the room or out of the window, and list how many 
things fold: this sweater, the skin, if I talk to you then the air is fold-
ing, even the galaxy wheeling around and folding itself over years 
 
324 Gilles DELEUZE, The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque, Continuum, 2006 (1988). p.3. 
325 Ibid, p.4. 
326 Ibid, xiii. 
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as it goes around. Mountains and valleys go through the same pro-
cess, even DNA is folded. You and I were born from folding.327 
 
For Deleuze too, the earth moves in flows and folds: the whole universe is a process 
of folding, unfolding and re-folding where inside and outside co-penetrate each other 
in a baroque process of creation. He sees in Leibniz a philosopher of habitat and ecol-
ogy, winding through organic and inorganic worlds. Through the Leibnizian metaphor 
of the fold, “an exquisitely sensuous view of the world”328 is thus obtained, or recov-
ered: it fosters indeed a sense of the world particularly sensitive to the creativity of 
beings folding each other into an “origami universe”, as well as an understanding of 
creation as arising from the porous space where inside and outside collide. The art of 
origami illustrates a direct engagement with this process, embracing the creative artic-
ulation of inside and outside and revealing its metamorphic dimension. Origami sim-
ultaneously exhibits the facts that all is tied together, and creation is entangled. In a 
revealing manner, the artists and scientists interviewed for Between the Folds consist-
ently draw upon the lexical fields of the possible, creation, complexity, chaos and co-
penetration as they reflect on the art of origamis. One of them observes that “the paper 
wants to fold itself”, noting the immanence of the creative process and the entangle-
ment of agencies in such a process. Throughout the documentary, and from the open-
ing quotation by Henri Matisse329, it is repeatedly suggested that limits, boundaries, 
entanglement are liberating and even condition the process of creation itself, folding 
and unfolding its way from nothing to something.  
 
The metaphor of the fold thus provides a way to think the twofold experience 
of an ontological entanglement and of an open, perpetual and reciprocal movement of 
 
327 Paul JACKSON in Between the Folds, dir. Vanessa GOULD, PBS Independent Lens, 2:12. 
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFrDN5eYPOQ  
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328 Gilles DELEUZE, The Fold, op.cit, xiii. 
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creation. It also appears as a particularly fruitful tool to articulate the form of connec-
tions woven by worldly beings and arising from the liminal, metaxic space of inbe-
tweenness in which they gravitate. The image of the fold points indeed toward an en-
tangled process of co-creation occurring in between, within or beyond boundaries of 
the inside and the outside. Doing so, it echoes the blurring of dualistic boundaries wit-
nessed by thinkers of the ecological crisis and outlines a dynamic of overflowing of 
such boundaries – just picture the movement of a sheet of paper folding itself and 
suddenly liberating an unforeseen dimension, disclosing a side which had until then 
remained hidden. In Clouds of the Impossible330, Catherine Keller bridges the aware-
ness of our planetary entanglement with the idea of an apophatic open, articulating the 
knowledge of a possibly catastrophic outcome with the haunting hope of an alternative 
and convivial inhabiting. An apophatic thought might indeed support our understand-
ing of the metaxic tension between entanglement and openness in which we find our-
selves. Keller’s approach reminds us of Glissant’s thought of a wandering conditioned 
by our créole rootedness. The metaphor of the overflowing, I suggest, ties together the 
density of our vernacular entanglement to the world with the open, indeterminate tra-
jectories of our becoming. Perpetually, indomitably, we overflow our roots as much as 
we are overflowed by them. 
 
 
Telling the world as rooted overflowing 
 
“The world always overflows nature”331 writes Bruno Latour. In Facing Gaia, 
he argues against the cosmology of nature as a holistic reduction of worldly beings’ 
agency. The concept of nature, as well as the whole cosmology built around it, would 
prove incapable to seize worldly processes of becoming and the creation at stake in 
them. The modern technicist and mechanist metaphors were indeed applied by modern 
cosmology to qualify the being of the earth, the living organisms and all life processes. 
 
330 Catherine KELLER, Cloud of the Impossible: Negative Theology and Planetary Entanglement, Co-
lumbia University Press, New-York, 2014. 
331 Bruno LATOUR, Facing Gaia, op.cit., p.122. 
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For Latour, the climate mutation calls for an alternative thought of the world, away 
from the dualistic pitfalls of the modern concept of nature. More precisely, the advent 
of a new climatic regime would summon us to think anew the connections between 
worldly agencies without thereby giving in to a holistic thought of totality. What is 
there more to the world than nature? What overflows in the world, and wherefrom? 
 
Other philosophers have pointed toward a thought of the overflowing before. 
Drawing from his thought of the créolité, Edouard Glissant contends that we are “un-
circumventable”, and thus cannot be contained. Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy of dis-
enclosure similarly describes a process of “dismantling and disassembling of enclosed 
borders, enclosures, fences” waving toward a “deconstruction of property – that of 
man and that of world.” 332 The French débordement literally designates a movement 
of going beyond the borders, of overcoming them, thereby indicating an irrepressible 
crossing of boundaries. In the introduction to this chapter, I proposed the metaphor of 
the flood to approach the present environmental crisis as an event overflowing our 
conceptual boundaries and submerging us with worldly beings and processes we had 
insulated ourselves from. The metaphor of the overflowing echoes and prolongates 
these introductory reflections. It flows from our analysis of the newly disclosed open-
ness, then créole rootedness of the world, and outlines alongside them a metaphorical 
trio for an alternative thought of the world: rooted in créolité, the world overflows 
through its ontological openness. A philosophy of the rooted overflowing, I argue, 
would reverse a gnostic being in the world primarily characterized by unrooting and 
thirst. 
 
As we learnt in the three previous chapters, the gnostic drama of being in the 
world is led by an unquenchable yearning for a beyond-the-world and is embodied by 
the existential posture of a devouring thirst. The gnostic narratives thus illustrate an 
incapacity to dwell in a world perceived as ontologically deficient – the gnostic theol-
ogy depicts indeed a world doomed by an original rupture from God and therefore 
 
332 Jean-Luc NANCY, Dis-Enclosure. The Deconstruction of Christianity, trans. Bettina Bergo, Fordham 
University Press, 2008. p.160-161. 
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agonizing under the absence of divine being. The gnostic cosmogonies recounted by 
Jonas and Voegelin are thus dominated by the lexical and metaphorical fields of the 
thirst, the yearning, the absence, the beyond, the elsewhere – as well as that of the 
strange and hostile. Yet, as Levinas noted with much perceptiveness, if « real life is 
elsewhere », « we are in the world »333. In the strange we must dwell, and from this 
groundless engenderment we were born. Emmanuel Levinas’ endeavor to locate the 
romantic desire for a beyond within the world itself echoes the gnostic expression of 
an existential in-between, which Voegelin proposes to illuminate through the classical 
concept of metaxy. Stuck between the world and the home, the gnostic wandering il-
lustrates what Voegelin defines as “the existence in the tension of the in-between”334. 
Insofar as it manifests the pitfalls of cosmological dualism and expresses a metaxic 
experience of an existence in the abyss, stuck in between isolated poles of being, it 
might point the way out of the dualist reduction while maintaining a sense of being in 
the world as tension and mediation. Both Jonas and Voegelin emphasize in their anal-
ysis of Gnosticism, as well as in the rest of their philosophical thought, a duality which 
should not be reduced but rather bypassed: between god and the world, spirit and mat-
ter for the former, between immanence and transcendence, time and eternity for the 
latter. Bruno Latour’s philosophical treatment of the nature-culture, object-subject, in-
dividual-whole, and even global-local polarities appears to fall within the same pattern. 
All three philosophers suggest that dualism simultaneously obscures and discloses a 
metaxic tension which resolutely overflows dualistic boundaries. In this light, far from 
expressing a thirst, the metaxic being in the world illustrated by the Gnostics manifests 
a metaxic overflowing: an overflowing of the in-between, a flood of the world sub-
merging the borders of being. This reversal of the gnostic being in the world, this sim-
ple transition from the trope of the thirst to that of the overflowing might turn out 
fruitful. It immediately unveils the world as an overwhelming presence rather than an 
excruciating absence. But then again, what overflows in the world? 
 
 
333 Emmanuel LEVINAS, Totalité et Infini, Éditions Le Livre de Poche, Paris, 1961, p. 21 
334 Eric VOEGELIN, Anamnesis, op. cit, p.294. 
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As he expands on the imperative of finding home amidst the present disorien-
tation and the problems of scale arising with the ecological mutation, Bruno Latour 
writes in Down to Earth that “we all are overflowed twice: by the too large as by the 
too small”335. Both the infinite complexity of our entanglements with the world and 
the perspective of its precarious becoming are overflowing the cosmological bounda-
ries of nature. Just as the Gnostics and their modern Existentialist siblings had sensed, 
the abyss of the world leaves no ground, no essence, no eternal landscape or still-life, 
no ultimate authority to which one could surrender – in a word, no nature. Being in 
the world is vertiginous in at least two ways: we are simultaneously rooted in a network 
of attachments and belongings, overflowed by the unrenderable créolité of our entan-
glements, and open to unprecedented trajectories of becoming. We are rooted and 
overflowed. The thought of such a rooted overflowing might enable us to better ap-
proach an environmental crisis which confronts us to a planetary entanglement and an 
utter openness in the possibility of the collapse of capitalist civilization or the extinc-
tion of life on earth. The ecological mutation manifests indeed at the same time our 
engenderment and co-dependency with worldly beings, as well as the openness and 
contingency of worldly becoming, standing on the edge of non-being as we approach 
global catastrophes. 
 
This emerging tension between two poles which I propose to name “rooted-
ness” and “overflowing” draws upon the words of Virginia Woolf, who expressed this 
dwelling in-between as she wrote in The Waves: « I am rooted but I flow »336. Unfold-
ing the metaphor of the liquidity of worldly existence, The Waves breaks down bound-
aries and blurs distinctions in quest for a fuller dwelling in the world: between worlds 
organic and mundane, between the characters’ lives entangled in one another, between 
childhood and adulthood, between natural and cultural rhythms. As the characters’ 
lives unfurl, framed by depictions of coastal scenes, Woolf illuminates with the meta-
phor of the waves the porosity of consciousness and deconstructs modern conceptions 
of self and community, along with the segregation between natural and cultural worlds. 
 
335 Bruno LATOUR, Où atterrir ? Comment s’orienter en politique, La Découverte, 2017, Paris. p.27. 
336 Virginia WOOLF, The Waves. Cambridge Press, New York, 1987 (1931), p.259. 
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Johnny Flynn leans upon the same watery metaphor as he sings in The Water: « the 
river is always my home », thereby conveying the sense of finding home amidst the 
fluidity and impermanence of worldly existence. This echoes again with the symbol 
mobilized by Romain Gary’s Goncourt winning novel, The Roots of Heaven, relating 
the story of a crusading environmentalist which takes on the dimension of a quest for 
the salvation of humanity: against the gnostic intuition of the otherworldliness of the 
divine, Gary’s novel suggests that the numinous takes roots in the world and distillates 
hope amidst the destructions left behind the procession of Modernity. While he pre-
sents the romantic yearning for an elsewhere as ingrained in the “human soul”, Romain 
Gary suggests that such aspirations – the roots of heaven – stem from the world: 
 
The roots were countless and infinite in their variety and their 
beauty, and some were deeply ingrained in the human soul – an un-
remitting and tormented aspiration oriented towards the heights – a 
need for the infinite, a thirst, a sense of elsewhere, an unlimited 
yearning.337 
 
Unfolding the metaphor of the root, the symbol of the tree furthermore appears to be 
particularly expressive: while its roots tend to entangle themselves around each other, 
the tree, rooted in the soil of the earth, overflows these roots as its spores are led to 
impregnate other beings beyond the porous boundaries of its own being. The roots of 
heaven might thus also symbolize this metaxic tension newly disclosed by the envi-
ronmental crisis – the rooted overflowing we have been reflecting on. 
 
To land, as we are summoned by Bruno Latour, in a world bathed in the new 
light of the environmental crisis, and thereby mend the gnostic alienation from the 
world, implies to preserve this metaxic tension which I propose to approach as a rooted 
 
337 Romain GARY, Les Racines du Ciel, Paris, Gallimard, « Folio », 1972 (1956), p.266.  
My translation. « Les racines étaient innombrables et infinies dans leur variété et leur beauté et 
quelques-unes étaient profondément enfoncées dans l’âme humaine – une inspiration incessante et tour-




overflowing. A tension which, as I hope to have shown in chapter three, gnostic cos-
mologies tend to hypostatize into two separate entities – God and the World, Culture 
and Nature, Spirit and Matter, Object and Subject, Eternity and History, etc. Latour 
thus identifies the necessity to be bound to a soil while preserving and cultivating the 
abundance of our attachments. The créolité of our attachments, connections and root-
edness oversteps the boundaries of the self, nations, species or cultures: it overflows 
an engenderment that cannot be contained within the monolithic borders of a single 
origin, but is perpetual and plural. Mending the alienated gnostic being in the world 
thus frames the challenge of a resilient inhabiting as that of dwelling in a rooted over-
flowing: to simultaneously root ourselves in the overflowing of worldly becomings, 
and to be overflowed by our créole rootedness. A rooted overflowing designates there-
for the type of metaxy unveiled by the present environmental crisis: a being suspended 
amidst a multiplicity of modes of existence, interlaced with worldly beings, interwo-
ven with their trajectories of becoming, a worldly entanglement blended with a worldly 
openness, a being penetrated and fecundated by beings who sow the world with us, a 
being in the world disclosed as a being and creating with the world. Ultimately, the 
ecological mutation also indicates the overflowing of sterile ontological categories 







What worlds are coming with the flood of the world? The reflections unfolded 
in this chapter have drawn upon the idea that the environmental mutation uncovers 
something about the world which has until then remained unthought by modern cos-
mology. Through the lens of a hermeneutics of Gnosticism, I have intended to draw 
from the phenomenological potential of the ecological crisis and approached the latter 
as an event embodying a mutation in the way we conceive of, and therefore also are in 
the world. The pivotal idea I attempted to articulate about the cosmological mutation 
induced by the environmental crisis arose as a paradox: something major about worldly 
being and our being in the world is being eclipsed by modern cosmology, which has 
intensified, if not engendered the advent of the present ecological crisis, the latter re-
veals precisely what had been obscured by the cosmology which gave rise to it. This 
cosmology, which I refer to as modern dualism, finds itself overflowed by what the 
ecological crisis so concretely manifests: the end of an ontological segregation which 
justified a monolithic, hegemonic and imperialist inhabiting, the dissolution of the 
frontiers of being between the self and the world, nature and culture, inside and out-
side, immanence and transcendence… and, through this dissolution, the opening to a 
créolité of worldly beings amidst whom we must inhabit. How can we learn to encoun-
ter all the beings which modern dualism had reduced and cohabit with them? Edouard 
Glissant claims that the contemporary “creolization of the world” is such that it re-
quires a change of narratives. Because the complexity of our entanglements is inextri-
cable and, to a certain extent, ineffable, the Martiniquais philosopher convokes the 
poets to work towards alternative imaginaries. A poetic dwelling might indeed pre-
serve the tension of our rooted overflowing, for poets encounter worldly beings and 
merge with their becoming without thereby diluting and losing themselves to the al-
terity of the world. 338 The cosmological challenge of preserving the metaxy of the 
world against the gnostic tendencies of Modernity thus appears closely tied to the act 
 





of inhabiting the world, and thereby unveils the political dimension of an ontological 
system.  
 
In an article on the Inquisition and the Disenchantment of the World, the his-
torian Andrew Keitt suggests that the development by religious and political authori-
ties of an ontological segregation between natural and supernatural realms coincided 
with a socio-political order committed to enforcing discipline upon its members: 
 
[The] conflation of the natural and the supernatural was a standard 
complaint of the Inquisition as well. The religious enthusiast was in 
essence guilty of a category mistake; by confusing causal categories 
the enthusiast threatened an ontological order increasingly dedicated 
to policing the boundary between the natural and the supernatural 
realms and at the same time a social order increasingly dedicated to 
policing the behavior of its members.339 
 
This observation reveals the theologico-political dimension of the modern concept of 
nature, arising from a theological segregation between worldly and divine realms of 
being, and thereby compelling an inhabiting of the world characterized by a sense of 
boundaries, rupture and disconnection – a being in the world previously referred to as 
gnostic. Mending the dualist rift between nature and culture, building bridges across 
the abyssal openness of worldly being and weaving the web of our planetary entangle-
ments thus appear as an eminently political task. Likewise, the consciousness of the 
contingency and precariousness of worldly processes of becoming compels an ethics 
of responsible inhabiting in the open, informed by the realization that being in the 
world is also becoming and creating with the world. What might be the contribution 
of alternative metaphors of worldly being like those presented in this chapter for a 
concrete, alternative inhabiting? What political potential bear metaphors of the open-
ness, the Gaian créolité, the fold or the rooted overflowing? For Bruno Latour, the 
 
339 Andrew KEITT, “Religious Enthusiasm, the Spanish Inquisition, and the Disenchantment of the 
World”, in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.65, No. 2, April 2004, pp.231-250, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, p.246. 
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figure of Gaia abolishes the idea of kingdom and shakes modern representations of 
power, order and authority:  
 
After Gaia, literally, there is no kingdom left: no living or animated 
being obeys a superior order which would dominate them or to 
which they ought to adapt – this is true of bacteria, lions as well as 
human societies. This does not mean that all living are free in the 
simplistic sense of individualism, for they are interlaced, folded, in-
tricated in each other. This means that the key-question of freedom 
and dependency equally concerns humans and the other partners of 
the natural world.340 
 
Gaia thus rises as the conveyor of a political as well as cosmological anti-imperialism. 
The sense of anarchist equality it carries, along with the subversive energy channelled 
by metaphors such as those of openness, créolité or overflowing, challenge not only 
modern perceptions of the world, but also the way we inhabit: “it is not about ecology: 
merely about the politics of the living”.341 
 
340 Bruno LATOUR, « Comment j'ai rencontré l'homme qui a inventé Gaïa », Bibliobs, May 2018. Own 
translation. 
« Mais après Gaia, littéralement, il n’y a plus de royaume : aucun vivant, aucun animé, n’obéit à un 
ordre supérieur à lui et qui le dominerait ou auquel il lui suffirait de s’adapter – cela est vrai des bactéries, 
comme des lions ou des sociétés humaines. Cela ne veut pas dire que tous les vivants sont libres au sens 
un peu simplet de l’individualisme puisqu’ils sont entrelacés, pliés, intriqués les uns dans les autres. 
Cela veut dire que la question clef de la liberté et de la dépendance vaut également pour les humains 











HOW TO DWELL? 
POLITICS OF THE INHABITING AND  





“The love in the world passes into the love in heaven, 
and floods back again into the world.” 
 
 —  Alfred North Whitehead,  
Process and Reality. 
 
 
“Love is a touch and yet not a touch” 
 —  J.D. Salinger, 
The Heart of a Broken Story. 
 
 
“The world is a verb” 
 —  Donna Haraway, 









Gnosticism and the political task of inhabiting 
How might our hermeneutics of Gnosticism inform present politics in the con-
text of the environmental crisis? Our reflection has thus far focused on the cosmolog-
ical dimension of Gnosticism, emphasizing how certain metaphors condition our per-
ception of the world, and thereby also our being in the world. Both in the analyses of 
Hans Jonas and Eric Voegelin, Gnosticism embodies an alienated relationship between 
humanity and the world, and designates a pathological inhabiting of the world. Draw-
ing upon their understanding of Gnosticism, I have suggested in chapter 3 that the lens 
of Gnosticism illuminates the way Modernity inhabits the world – throwing light upon 
one amongst many ways to inhabit, and articulating many dimensions of our inhabit-
ing: existential, spiritual, cosmological, poetic, ethical, political… Maintaining this 
focus on the inhabiting provided by the perspective of Gnosticism, I have then pro-
posed in chapter 4 some alternative metaphors of worldly being, this in the purpose of 
approaching the world through a lens different than Gnosticism and opening other ho-
rizons of thought, perception and experience that might nurture an alternative inhabit-
ing. This last chapter intends to uncover the eminently political dimension of Gnosti-
cism, by articulating the modalities of this alternative inhabiting. It presents itself as 
the political development of the cosmo-ontological approach proposed in the previous 
chapters, unfolding into a reflection on the consequences of a hermeneutics of Gnos-
ticism for contemporary political philosophy and for a politics of the present. I argue 
that the hermeneutics of Gnosticism, focusing on the liminal, tensional and kaleido-
scopic nature of our inhabiting, also reminds us of its inalienable political dimension, 
thereby redefining the art of politics as one of proper inhabiting of the common world. 
In this light, the environmental issue appears archetypical of the political: it raises in-
deed in the most acute manner the challenge of composing and inhabiting a world of 
precarious becomings amidst an overflowing alterity of worldly beings. I therefore 
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propose to explore the ways in which the advent of the present ecological crisis sum-
mons us to redefine the conceptual framework of politics, and how our hermeneutics 
of Gnosticism might support such a redefinition. 
 
This mutation of political philosophy can be broken into three main ideas 
which proceed from our ontological reflections: firstly, the environmental crisis un-
veils the apocalyptic scope of politics, laying emphasis on its profound liminality, its 
eschatological density and pointing toward the delicate task of inhabiting the event. 
Secondly, the imperative of an ethical thought and action amidst the entangled open-
ness of worldly beings calls out for politics as the art of responsibility, seizing the 
challenge of inhabiting with(in) others. Lastly, the gnostic complaint of a worldless 
wandering indicates the concern of finding home amidst the aquatic processes of 
worldly becoming, and ultimately uncovers politics as the art of inhabiting the world 
with love. 
 
Inhabiting the event of the environmental crisis, with other beings of the world 
and with love, all appear as attempts to dwell in the liminality of the world. In this 
chapter, I propose to explore different meanings this notion of liminality may take on, 
and examine its potential contribution for a political thought of the inhabiting. I shall 
prolong our reflection on the inbetweenness of worldly becomings and approach the 
political challenge of inhabiting the world as one of dwelling in transitions: between 
shifting times, places, borders, civilizations, species, beings of the world. A political 
thought of the liminal suggests that politics arises within a space of open inbetween-
ness allowing the encounter with an alterity – the space between worldly beings, be-
tween us and the world. It thereby also frames the challenge of metaxic inhabiting as 
a political task, where it falls upon the political to sustain the precarious tension of 
being in the world, and to secure a space of openness for this tension to abide. We may 
find in Bruno Latour’s notion of critical zones a variation of this idea. Referring to “a 
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spot on the envelope of the biosphere” 342, ticklish spots on Gaia’s skin reacting 
promptly to our actions, critical zones might offer a less paralyzing account of political 
processes than an essentializing notion like the Anthropocene. Insofar as they redis-
tribute the fluxes and cycles of various heterogeneous agencies without unifying them 
into single entities, critical zones “open politically many alternative courses of action 
that the face-to-face of Human and Nature does not allow.”343 The notion of critical 
zones also “entails an attention, a capacity to feel what happens and the necessity to 
be cautions, careful, clever and informed in a way that would be different if the zone 
was just a chunk of “space”.”344 The question of how to live in these critical zones and 
how to inhabit them could thus redefine the issue of political action in a context of 
environmental mutation with dominant political systems resistant to addressing it. 
Learning to inhabit critical zones with resilience and embrace the metaxic inbetween-
ness of the world in the catastrophic times of the ecological crisis situate political ac-
tion in the here and now of an event summoning us, against the gnostic worldlessness, 
to inhabit the world. 
 
342 Bruno LATOUR, “Some advantages of the notion of “Critical Zone” for Geopolitics”, Geochemistry 
of the Earth’s Surface meeting, GES – 10. 
URL: http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-169-GAILLARDET-pdf.pdf 
Accessed 11.01.2019. 





A. Politics of the ecological Apocalypse 
 
“The end is where we start from” 
 —  T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets. 
 
 
The Apocalypse seems a widespread mytheme in the narrative structure of 
civilizations, of which modern cosmology offers many variations. In environmental 
literature, ranging from environmental humanities to political ecology and sci-fi, the 
trope of the end of the world is omnipresent and allows us to bestow a cosmological 
meaning upon the contemporary political context. Which meaning does the trope of 
the Apocalypse convey for present politics? Why should we approach the present times 
through the lens of the Apocalypse, and how could a hermeneutics of the ecological 
Apocalypse contribute to the political philosophy of the environment? The theme of 
the Apocalypse articulates an organic link between politics and religion, and entails 
many possible configurations – some more reactionary than subversive. To this extent, 
and following Carl Schmitt’s famous claim according to which “all significant 
concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts”345, it 
invites us to mobilize the potential resources of the theologico-political for 
approaching the present ecological crisis.  
 
While the etymology of the word crisis, from the Ancient Greek κρίσις, 
indicates both a disruption and the paroxysmal instant of judgement and decision, the 
term “apocalypse”, from the Ancient Greek ἀποκάλυψις, refers to an event of unveiling 
and revelation. Endemic to the narratives of modernity, the theme of the crisis conveys 
the widespread idea that crises open opportunities in disruptions, resilience in 
 
345 Carl SCHMITT, Political Theology, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1985 [1934], p.36. 
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collapse346. In her Schock Doctrine, Naomi Klein thus argues that capitalism exploited 
national crises and disasters such as the Iraq war for the pursuit of controversial 
measures and to ensure the implementation of neoliberal free-market policies347. In 
this light, the contemporary ecological crisis seems to bear a rich potential for our 
politico-theological hermeneutics. What does the ecological crisis reveal when 
approached through the apocalyptical prism? What could a hermeneutics of the 
Apocalypse allow us to understand about the political landscape surrounding the 
ecological crisis? A hermeneutics of the ecological Apocalypse, I argue, might notably 
contribute to restore the present as ultimate political time and as framework for 
political action. It summons us to renew the thought of how we inhabit the present 
world and dwell in events and transitions. To this extent, the apocalyptic and 
eschatological themes confer to politics an ethical dimension which is radical in that it 
stems from the eschatological density of the present. The ecological apocalypse also 
redefines the temporality in which politics takes place, described by Günther Anders 
as endless end-times. In Theses for the Nuclear Age, the German philosopher called 
on his readers to “fight this man-made Apocalypse” by “doing everyting in our power 
to make the End Time endless” 348. In his Endtime and the End of Times, Anders even 
presents the scope of political action and human freedom as condensed in a perpetual 
deferral of the Apocalypse: “To delay the end, to win the fight against the end of time 
again and again, that is to say, to make the end times endless”349. From now on, such 








 Willem SCHINKEL, “The image of crisis: Walter Benjamin and the interpretation of ‘crisis’ in mo-
dernity”, Thesis Eleven 2015, Vol. 127(1) 36–51. 
347 Naomi KLEIN, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Knopf Canada, 2007. 
348 Günther ANDERS, “Theses for the Nuclear Age”, in The Massachusetts Review, Vol.3, No.3, Spring 
1962, p.493-494. 
349 Günther ANDERS, Endzeit und Zeitende, München: C.H. Beck, 1993, p.205. 
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Politics in the end-time  
 
 How late is it? According to the Doomsday Clock, we are two minutes away 
from the end of the world. The conceptual clock was created in 1947 by the Bulletin 
of Atomic Scientists to represent the threat of global nuclear war. While originally 
focused on the threat linked to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the clock has since 
evolved to also reflect the ecological crisis along with recent techno-scientific devel-
opments threatening to inflict irrevocable harm to humanity – ranging from climate 
change to the hydrocarbon industry and the geopolitics of oil, through developments 
in life-sciences and biotechnologies. The Doomsday Clock uses the analogy of the 
countdown to midnight to symbolize and denounce the growing danger of an anthro-
pogenic global catastrophe. Since January 2018, the clock is set at two minutes to mid-
night, the closest it has ever been to Doomsday, following “the failure of world leaders 
to address tensions relating to nuclear weapons and climate change issues”350.  
 
How to act with the urgency required? The Doomsday clock seems to bear 
witness to a global political inertia, an incapacity to act and adapt to a fiery context 
that compels large-scaled actions. Francis Fukuyama had anticipated this state of po-
litical lethargy in the End of History and the Last Man351, in which he argued that the 
worldwide advent of neo-liberal democracy and free market capitalism realizes the 
ultimate stage of humanity’s sociocultural development and the final form of political 
government. The end of history he describes, insofar as it repeals historical contin-
gency, thereby also abolishes the horizon of all political action: it represents an apoc-
alypse of the political. And yet burning events require our immediate political and 
ethical involvement to prevent a global catastrophe. Isabelle Stengers’ In Catastrophic 
Times captures her concern to resist the violence of the “coming barbarism” that rises 
with the convergence of illegitimate governance and political impotence towards the 
 
350 Science and Security Board Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Ed. John Mecklin, “It is two minutes 
to midnight”, 2018 Doomsday Clock Statement. P.7. 
URL: https://thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/2018%20Doomsday%20Clock%20Statement.pdf 
Accessed 11.01.2019. 
351 Francis FUKUYAMA, The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin Books, 1992. 
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organization of a global impasse. For Stengers, the expansion of capitalist regimes of 
extraction and private accumulation, along with the collateral destruction of ecosys-
tems and societies, constitutes the real barbaric catastrophe. “That things are ‘status 
quo’ is a catastrophe”352 claims Walter Benjamin. But if the world is ending, its end 
seems to have no end: “the end times have come, but that time is lasting!”353 The 
Apocalypse is coming and everything goes on. 
 
In End-time and the End of Time, Günther Anders analyses the temporality of 
the nuclear era as a perpetual end-time, unappealable condition under the irreversibil-
ity of the atomic threat. According to the German philosopher, the pending threat of 
the nuclear bomb interrupts the process of history and, by preserving eternally the pos-
sibility of the Apocalypse, puts humanity forever “just in the deadline of the end-time”. 
He writes: 
“Permanently” means that the time that remains is forever an end-
time: it can no longer be relieved by another time, only by the end.354 
 
This Apocalypse, which Anders radically differentiates from the original theological 
concept, is realized, “verweltlicht” – literally mundanized, “worldlified”. Engendered 
by men, it is an “Apocalypse without a kingdom”355, which fails to open any new 
horizons – neither the way forward of modern progress, nor the perspective of a revo-
lutionary utopia. For Anders, the only alternative offered by the nuclear era is a world 
or no world: the absolute threat of the nuclear holocaust reduces indeed the diversity 
of the possible worlds arising from the world, standing today on the edge of an abyss 
of non-being. Anders’ focus on the end-time and the ubiquitous threat of the annihila-
tion of worldly being does not leave any room for hope, nor even for the life that abides 
 
352 Walter BENJAMIN, Das Passagen-Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, Band V - I & II. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 
am Main, 1982. 
353 Bruno LATOUR, Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime, Harvard University Press, 
2017, p.173. 
354 Günther ANDERS, Endzeit und Zeitende, München: C.H. Beck, 1993, p.116. 
355 Günther ANDERS, La menace nucléaire (1981), trans. Christophe David, Le Serpent à plumes, Paris, 
2006 (1981), p. 294. 
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in the end-time356. The condition for practical resistance to the advent of the end lies 
in a concerned fear for the world, which inspired Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s enlightened 
catastrophism as a tool to absorb the presence of the Apocalypse and delay its occur-
rence357. Living in the end-time of a prophylactic apocalypse thus means caring for the 
indefinite postponement of the end of history. 
 
 Walter Benjamin, Günther Anders’ cousin, finds in history the “angel” that 
comes from the present to break with the status quo: for him, redemption is possible 
in the preservation of history358. Against the mechanized, unidirectional conception of 
time disseminated by Modernity and the evolution of the modern procession along the 
hegemonic itinerary of progress, Benjamin pleads for a deliverance from the catastro-
phe of an unending crisis as unsurpassable modern condition. The return of the apoc-
alyptical theme in the political sphere, first with the threat of a nuclear holocaust and 
then with the intensification of ecological issues, thus seems to bear a re-enlivening 
potential for the realm of politics. The scheme of the end of the world has indeed borne 
a wonderful dimension of liberation and emancipation, and movements such as liber-
ation theology, permaculture or transition towns can illustrate an ending world’s 
swarming potential for resilience. Away from Anders’ enlightening pessimism, Sten-
gers’ and Benjamin’s reflections simultaneously suggest that the end of the world 
sometimes appears disguised as a continuation, and that the end of a world and the 
disruption of the temporality sustaining it might prove a saving grace allowing for the 
emergence of resilience and creation. In this light, the horizon of politics in the end-
time would arise from the restoration of history as emergence and the immersion in 
the events born from it. 
 
 
356 Margret LOHMANN, Philosophieren in der Endzeit: zur Gegenwartsanalyse von Günther Anders, 
1996, Fink Verlag, München. p.44-46. 
357 Jean-Pierre DUPUY, Pour un catastrophisme éclairé: quand l’impossible est certain. Seuil, 2002. 
358 Walter BENJAMIN, Über den Begriff der Geschichte, Gesammelte Schriften, Band I - 2. Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1982. Translated by Dennis Redmond. 





The time that remains  
 
If we do live in an apocalyptical as well as ecological crisis – in the disruption, 
the assault that suspends a precedent continuity –, then it would seem like we are in 
history as Walter Benjamin conceived it, and that the end-time described by Anders, 
while offering a welcome insight on the present temporality, is not definitive in the 
sense of an absolute end of history. Against the modern conception of a “mythical 
history”, reducing history to a continuity, factuality and a “mortified past knowable 
only by its surviving victors”359, Benjamin offers an idea of history as single events 
and experiences which could not be essentialized or rationalized, a collection of here-
and-nows gathered by the angel of history: 
 
Where we see the appearance of a chain of events, he sees one single 
catastrophe, which unceasingly piles rubble on top of rubble and 
hurls it before his feet [...] That which we call progress, is this 
storm.360 
 
A single storm, a catastrophe repeating itself over and over again and bringing about 
new here-and-nows and new disruptions. Amidst this apocalyptical process, Benja-
min’s messianism consists of a preservation of creation and revelation, of the multi-
plicity and discontinuity within history. “It is grounded in an awareness of ‘in-be-
tweenness’”, as William Schinkel puts it, the metaxic intuition “of existing in-between 
revelation and redemption”361. This in-betweenness of our historical existence further 
echoes Giorgio Agamben’s reading of Paulinian messianism, where the Italian philos-
opher describes the gap opened by the resurrection of Christ as a time in-between, a 
 
359 Walter BENJAMIN, Das Leben der Studenten., Gesammelte Schriften, Band II – 1, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1977, p.75. 
360 Walter BENJAMIN, Über den Begriff der Geschichte, Gesammelte Schriften, op.cit., p.697-698. 
361 Willem SCHINKEL, art.cit. p.40. 
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threshold which he also refers to as the “time that remains”362. In The Time that Re-
mains, Agamben investigates the metaphor of the threshold to articulate two tempo-
ralities – the time preceding Jesus’ resurrection and the time of the Second Coming – 
around a third one – the “remnant”, the messianic time of the present: 
 
The remnant is, according to Agamben, an indefinite and indetermi-
nate portion of life in which what is at stake is nothing other, and 
nothing less than the reconstitution of a life which can only be fully 
experienced in another time.363 
 
Agamben’s analysis of the remnant does not fail to evoke our own time of ecological 
crisis, stamped by an enhanced sense of responsibility towards the perpetuation of life 
for future generations. It alludes indeed to a life that stands beyond our time and yet 
which we must enable, revealing the crucial agency characterizing life in the remnant. 
 
 In between what do we stand? What time shall our time engender, what world 
shall our world give birth to? Between past and present, a border and another, creole 
beings of the world, ecological thresholds, planetary boundaries and critical zones…: 
as the environmental crisis summons us to dwell in liminal times and spheres, it re-
minds us of the metaxic tension described by Voegelin, who struggled to embrace the 
perpetual in-betweenness of our existence. The concept of liminality expresses a sim-
ilar tension and might also assist us as we reach the spheres of transition and in-be-
tweenness characterizing the present environmental mutation. Cultural anthropologist 
Victor Turner first explored the idea of liminality during his fieldworks on rites of 
passage within the Ndembu tribe in Zambia, before delving into the importance of 
liminal experiences for a broader anthropological context. Turner argues that certain 
 
362 Giorgio AGAMBEN, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans. Trans. 
Patricia Dailey, Stanford: Stanford UP, 2005. 
363 Paolo BARTOLONI, “The Threshold and the Topos of the Remnant: Giorgio Agamben”. Angelaki: 
Journal of Theoretical Humanities, 13(1), 51-63, Taylor and Francis, 2008. p. 57. 
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rituals or celebrations put participants in liminal states insofar as they interrupt rou-
tinized spheres of everyday life and suspend their social status, thus allowing to either 
reaffirm or reorganize social relations (this is the case for instance of Carnival cus-
toms). In contexts of political or cultural changes, the concept of liminality describes 
a similar process of temporary dissolution of social hierarchies and structures clearing 
space for either the reinforcement of the established order, or the emergence of alter-
nate organizations. Laying emphasis on these precious times of transition as constitu-
tive of social phenomena, the concept of liminality calls into question the traditional 
representation of a linear development of societies and the myth of a great course of 
history. It allows us indeed to conceive of change not as a pathology of social order, 
nor as the exceptional interruption of a linearity which should have been preserved, 
but as an integral part of social and political life. Liminal times and spaces thus fulfil 
a social function of re-organization and re-integration, and the dissolution of order 
appears in this light as a fluid process, reminiscent of Zygmunt Bauman’s idea of liquid 
Modernity364,365. Turner’s analyses of the liminal might therefore inform the thought 
of our own transitional experience as we wander in a cultural limbo amidst the disso-
lution of former ideological and institutional structures, between decomposition and 
emergence. The unprecedented dimension of the present ecological crisis plunges in-
deed contemporary societies into an anomic situation where no rule applies, and no 
ethical norm has anticipated the present dilemma: it falls to us to elaborate new reflec-
tions to sustain new ways of inhabiting in common. 
 
Liminal states shelter beings in transition and becomings in creation which 
cannot be contained within fixed, pre-established structures and thus come to subvert 
them. To this extent, liminality takes on the fundamental, potentially fertile ambiguity 
of the interim between the not-anymore and the not-yet, clearing a space for the emer-
gence of what overflows categories and institutions. In Tools for Conviviality, the phi-
losopher Ivan Illich explores the potential for vernacular resilience in the pathological 
 
364 Zygmunt BAUMAN, Liquid Modernity, John Wiley & Sons, 2013 (1999). 
365 Here it must be noted that, while Victor Turner attributed a rather univocally positive connotation to 
liminal situations, perceived as ways of renewal, Zygmunt Bauman’s reflections on the liquidity of late 
Modernity recount increasing feelings of uncertainty, disorientation, a fleeting sense of self, and the 
unbearable burden of individual responsibility caused by a chaotic Nomadism. 
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context of an alienated institutionalization of society where technocratic elites have 
come to exert a radical monopoly, thus freezing the fluid liminality of life in society366. 
In this light, a rigid institutionalized society would prevent an apocalyptical dwelling 
in the event as kairos – the opportune time for action – and inhibit an engaged inhab-
iting of the present: staying in the openness of worldly being requires the perpetual 
break-down of socio-political institutions, in order to clear a space of vernacular com-
monality and resilience in which politics are embedded.  
 
If the ecological mutation appears as one such liminal state of transition, then 
what does it end? What is the environmental apocalypse breaking down, and what is 
it bringing about? The present crisis is named as such – a crisis – because it arises as 
an event which disrupts established processes and suspends unrestrained rhythms of 
extraction, production and consumption. How can we dwell amidst this disruption, and 
engage political actions rooted in the present event, within the time that remains? For 
Bruno Latour, the environmental mutation raises the radical question of durability and 
sustainability, and how to dwell in that which ends and continues: 
 
How can we manage to last, to maintain ourselves through existence, 
how can we master the time that flows? 
If there is a secret everyone desperately tries to solve, it is that of 
how to manage to dwell, to maintain, to obtain a continuity, a sus-
tainability of societies against the end of the world.367 
 
How to last in that which passes, and dwell in the time that remains? Such seems to be 
the present political challenge. In A World of Becoming, William Connolly describes 
the “human predicament” as the condition, both tragic and redeeming, whereby human 
 
366 Ivan ILLICH, Tools for Conviviality, Boyars, 1973. 
367 Bruno LATOUR, “Sur une nette inversion du schème de la fin des temps », paper for a conference on 
Les défis écologiques à la lumière du bien commun, Institut Catholique de Paris, April 2018.  
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temps qui passe. » « S’il y a des secrets que tout le monde cherche un peu désespérément à trouver, 
c’est celui de parvenir à durer, à maintenir, à obtenir une continuité, une soutenabilité des sociétés contre 
la menace d’une fin du temps. » My translation. 
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agency is driven by a feeling of an inert restlessness amidst the unpredictable becom-
ing of the world. Against this paralysis of our agency, Connolly reasserts the “urgency 
of today” and proposes developing our ability for “creative suspension”368 as a way to 
inhabit the unsettling pace of the perpetual apocalypse of the world. He thereby sug-
gests embracing the disruption introduced by the environmental crisis as a welcome 
space of resilience and creation, whose disclosure is enabled by the advent of the pre-
sent. 
 
For an eschatology of the present  
 
What type of eschatology do contemporary politics incarnate? Following the 
theologico-political postulate, modern secular political systems are the heirs of theo-
logical systems, the latter include eschatological developments concerned with the fi-
nal ends of history and the ultimate purposes of human actions. In both theological and 
secular cosmologies, eschatology is often closely linked to soteriology, the doctrine of 
salvation. Hans Jonas and Eric Voegelin’s analyses of Gnosticism indicate for instance 
that gnostic eschatologies situate redemption in the annihilation of the present world, 
preceding the final advent of the realized eschaton – the post-historic world of God's 
apocalyptic reign. The two philosophers highlight the tendency of gnostic eschatolo-
gies to escape the present world, and their failure to anchor the advent of the final ends 
in it. 
 
In The New Science of Politics, Voegelin notoriously conceptualized Gnosti-
cism as the drive to immanentize the eschaton, that is, the desire to implement a policy 
in the purpose of overcoming the disorder of the world and fulfilling history. Voegelin 
identified indeed the root of the Gnostic impulse in the belief that lack of concord 
within society is the result of an inherent evil in the world, and that the disorder of the 
world can be transcended and finally overcome by the implementation of a certain 
policy or the consecration of a specific political realm. While the understanding of the 
 
368 William CONNOLLY, A World of Becoming, op. cit., p.104. 
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immanentization of the eschaton as an attempt to “bring heaven down to earth” has 
served politically conservative purposes, as its popularization by conservative spokes-
man William F. Buckley can illustrate369, there seems to be more subtlety to Voege-
lin’s insight than what the latter formulation suggests. The Voegelinian claim ex-
presses the diffuse feeling that modern politics, reduced to the application of a trans-
cendent plan onto reality, has become the substitution of a non-world, a utopia, for the 
present world. But what exactly is wrong in the immanentization, the becoming-im-
manent of something transcendent such as the Christian eschaton? For Voegelin, 
whose political philosophy is infused with a concern for the preservation of the met-
axic tension of existence, the immanentization of the eschaton is another name for the 
pathological belief in an eidos of history, a meaning of history as an objectified 
whole370. For him, the problem of the eidos of history lies in the reduction of a matter 
of faith – the unknown course of history, the Christian transcendental fulfilment – to 
an immanent rationalization, thereby subjugating the mystery of existence and losing 
the metaxic tension between immanence and transcendence. As we have seen in chap-
ter 2, the immanentization of the eschaton aborts the metaxic tension insofar as it ab-
sorbs the transcendent in the immanent, thus putting an end to the tenuous tension of 
worldly existence. 
 
As we engage with this difficult insight of Voegelin’s, we should avoid at all 
costs the gnostic pitfall of interpreting the fallacy of the immanentization of the escha-
ton as lying in the movement of immanentization itself: incarnation, embodiment, 
worldly being is not evil. It is an inescapable grace and miraculous condition, of which 
immanence and transcendence are two irreducible and indivisible dimensions. The im-
manentization of the eschaton is indeed fallacious because it annihilates the transcend-
ence in the eschaton: but the transcendentization of the eschaton would be as fallacious 
in subsuming its immanence! The illusion in the immanentization of the eschaton is 
thus precisely the belief that it needs to be immanentized, which implies that it is not 
 
369 See William KRISTOL, “The Indispensable Man”, New York Times, 3.03.2008. 
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/opinion/03kristol.html 
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immanent yet. But the eschaton, the ultimate end is immanent as much as it is trans-
cendent to the world: it is eternally, perpetually present. 
 
Hans Jonas’ critique of modern nihilism, enriched by his perception of the lin-
gering spectrum of ancient Gnosticism, also draws upon an analysis of the eschatology 
of modern politics. His need for a reflection on the meaning of worldly being – why 
should there be a world and how should it be?371 – leads him to foster a philosophy of 
finality maintaining the presence of ends within nature. The Jonassian teleology of 
nature thus proceeds from a critique of modern dualistic eschatology, which he be-
lieves was inherited from a gnostic temporality opposing past fall and future redemp-
tion and resulting in an escape from the present.372 Jonas’ ethics of responsibility forces 
us to break with a nihilist temporality pervading modern philosophy and systematically 
opposing present and non-present, whether the latter is idealized into a glorious past 
or a future redemption. Such an eschatology, Jonas suggests, insofar as it perpetuates 
an understanding of human existence as projected into a non-present, prevents us from 
perceiving the eschatological openness of the present world, and thereby also from 
experiencing the imperious sense of responsibility binding us to it. The dualistic es-
chatology of modern cosmology thereby sanctions a rupture between the sphere of an 
incomplete present and the horizon of a future – necessarily non-present – redemption. 
It thus situates the telos, the ends in a future world whose only determination is to not-
be. But this eschatological temporality opposing a vitiated present to a redemptive fu-
ture is not inherent to all eschatological reflection on the final ends of worldly being. 
Jonas pleads for an eschatological thought which would not surrender to a gnostic 
conception of time, and summons us to bypass the binary opposition between present 
and non-present through a thought of eternity. In his lecture on “Immortality and the 
modern temper”, Jonas maintains that an eschatological thought of eternity conditions 
the necessary revalorization of the present against the contemporary “evanescence of 
 
371 Hans JONAS, Philosophische Untersuchungen und Metaphysische Vermutungen, Suhrkamp, 
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the present as the holder of genuine content”373, for “the loss of eternity justifies the 
loss of an authentic present” 374. The Jewish philosopher aims to maintain the impera-
tive of an eschatological thought while overcoming the nihilistic, inherently gnostic 
temporality of modern eschatology exemplified in the philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger375. 
 
This modern eschatological dynamic highlighted by Jonas is particularly man-
ifest in utopianism, which the philosopher assimilates to the modern ideology of pro-
gress and therefore analyses as the pursuit of a fundamentally technicist and totalitar-
ian enterprise. Jonas criticizes above all the paralyzing effect of utopianism which, 
perpetually projecting fulfilment into an idealized future, renders it unable to anchor 
one’s existence in, and to exert one’s responsibility towards, the present world. Uto-
pian ideologies not only situate the eschaton in the future, that is, in a world non-
present, a non-place, but also approach the final ends of worldly being as projected 
and implemented by human agency, thereby displaying a twofold nihilistic stance. Jo-
nas denounces the danger of utopian idolatry in its blindness to the presence of the 
eschaton within the world, as well as in its totalitarian tendencies obscuring the funda-
mental openness and perpetual emergence of worldly being. This idea can be found 
again in the philosophy of Jacques Ellul who, drawing upon Gabriel Vahanian’s cri-
tique of technique, compares the techno-scientific utopia to a “fraudulous ersatz of 
eschaton”376 hindering its irruption in the present. In substantializing the yearning for 
 
373 Hans JONAS, “Gnosticism, Existentialism and Nihilism”, Epilogue to The Gnostic Religion, Beacon 
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375
 Jonas argues that Heidegger’s existential analysis, borrowing its temporality from an eschatological 
scheme characteristic of modern thought, contributes to an escape from the present and ultimately leads 
to its annihilation: 
“The same cause which is at the root of nihilism is also at the root of the radical temporality of 
Heidegger's scheme of existence, in which the present is nothing but the moment of transience from 
past to future. If values are not beheld in vision as being (like the Good and the Beautiful of Plato), but 
are posited by the will as projects, then indeed existence is committed to constant futurity, with death 
as the goal; and a merely formal resolution to be, without a nomos for that resolution, becomes a project 
from nothingness into nothingness.” 
Hans JONAS, “Gnosticism, Existentialism and Nihilism”, op,cit, p.338. 
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another world and situating the latter in a future beyond, utopianism would condemn 
the metaxic openness of worldly being and subsume the tension between immanence 
and transcendence. The mistake of utopian ideologies would lie in their failure to per-
ceive, behind the realm of injustice dissimulating it, the hopeful eschatological pres-
ence of the world. Jonas’ insight suggests that modern utopianism is driven by a gnos-
tic hatred of the present world rather than by a loving concern for the world or a thirst 
for justice towards it. Utopianism embodies in Jonas’ eyes the gnostic yearning for a 
beyond-the-present-world, which he analyses as an escape from the responsibility to-
wards a world thirsty for our caring inhabiting. As we elucidate Jonas’ critique of uto-
pianism as an instance of modern nihilism, it becomes clear that his opposition to Ernst 
Bloch’s philosophy of hope is not radical, but rather suggests that the principle of re-
sponsibility conditions the hope for future generations, and that no better world could 
ever arise without the committed exercise of an ethical responsibility towards the pre-
sent world. 
 
In “Immortality and Modern Temper”, Jonas unfolds an eschatological thought 
conferring upon human action an eternal reach which transcends a merely linear per-
ception of history. He thereby goes against a certain historical conception of eschatol-
ogy, as promoted by Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Hegel or Karl Marx, who all situate 
the irruption of the eschaton in the horizon of a future time.377 In asserting the eternity 
of historical action, Jonas’ eschatology dissolves the dualistic opposition between time 
and eternity and unveils the eschatological tension of the present. Jonas proposes in 
his lecture an understanding of the present as emerging at the crossroads between a 
horizontal, immanent time and a vertical, transcendent eternity. For the philosopher of 
the ethics of responsibility, the contemporary context of the end-time offers an unprec-
edented opportunity to seize this eschatic dimension of the present: 
 
And in [the agony of infinite risk], eternity and nothingness meet in 
one: that the 'now' justifies its absolute status by exposing itself to 
the criterion of being the last moment granted of time. To act as if in 
 
377 Hans JONAS, Prinzip Verantwortung, op. cit., p.227. 
201 
 
the face of the end is to act as if in the face of eternity, if either is 
taken as a summons to unhedging truth of selfhood.378 
 
The only moment granted of time – the present –, as the vertiginous moment of reve-
lation, decision and action, is the eschatological event. While the experience of the 
banality of absolute evil abolishes the idea of providential justice, Jonas takes on the 
urgent task of conceiving an eschatology of the present committed to this present 
world by unveiling its eschatological tension.379 This revalorization of the present in 
Jonas’ eschatological thought directly leads to a heightened sense of ethical responsi-
bility towards the world and the preservation of one such tension. We find in the the-
ological thought of Jacques Ellul the same idea of an « eschatic present »380 invested 
with an eschatological eminence and imminence in light of the unprecedented reach 
of our technical power. Unfolding the Jonassian legacy, Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s “enlight-
ened doomsaying” also pleads for a rupture with Modernity’s linear temporality, ren-
dered urgent by an ecological crisis summoning us every day to clear space for an 
eschatological action within an apocalyptical present381. 
 
Drawing upon Hans Jonas and Eric Voegelin’s analyses, my reading of Gnos-
ticism shines a light on contemporary political phenomena as variations of a common 
negation of the eschatological presence of the world, in the wake of the modern man-
ifestations of Gnosticism identified by our two philosophers in utopian and totalitarian 
movements. While progressist utopias tend to externalize the eschaton into a trans-
cendent beyond disengaged from the present world, as exemplified in the ideology of 
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growthism, other forms of modern totalitarianism internalize it within the rationalized 
course of a strictly immanent history, as manifest for instance in the liberal dogma of 
development. I have highlighted the gnostic repression on a political level of a tension 
concurring with its existential and cosmological correlates, which I argue both Jonas 
and Voegelin’s accounts of Gnosticism emphasize in their respective ways. This po-
litico-ideological repression of the metaxic tension lying at the core of Gnosticism, I 
suggested, reveals itself in the eschatological narratives conveyed in contemporary 
politics – for instance in the political ideologies of progress, development, or economic 
growth382. Contemporary political eschatologies, I argue, are motivated by and articu-
lated around a radical yearning to escape the present world and the eschatological pres-
ence of the world. As such, they cultivate a numbness towards the wild and perpetual 
emergence of worldly beings which results in an existential, cosmological and political 
alienation from the world. But such worldless ideologies thereby also wave toward the 
perspective of dwelling within a tensional present, embracing its apophatic unveiling 
and rooting ourselves deep into the obscure wilderness of the world as an alternative, 
subversive, potentially resourceful and resilient way of inhabiting, grounded in the 





382 The post-development theory provides a critical perspective upon the ideology of development, ex-
hibiting the colonial origins of development policies and analysing the imperative for countries to “de-
velop” as an imperialist dynamic aiming at the expansion of a western, neo-liberal agenda. 
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The Apocalyptical Imperative of Politics in the Open  
 
Dwelling in the open present 
 “You have no right to despise the present” wrote Charles Baudelaire as a pre-
cept in his famous essay “The Painter of Modern Life”383. As he advises his contem-
poraries not to succumb to a modern temperament of disdain for the present world, the 
poet appears to capture the very existential stance of Modernity. This modern spleen 
of the present, as well as what it entails for contemporary politics, I have been striving 
to approach throughout this dissertation from the symbolic framework of Gnosticism. 
I have argued that gnostic forms of eschatology condition a political inhabiting deter-
mined by the longing to escape present worldly being, and that one such longing shines 
a light on our involvement in the present ecological crisis. I have further suggested in 
the first section of this chapter that a return to the theologico-political category of the 
Apocalypse might enlighten our engagement with contemporary political mutations 
and inform an alternative inhabiting of a world of becoming focused on the present. 
 
“Proche est l’instant” – near is the moment that comes: in his translation of the 
Apocalypse of St John384, Jean-Yves Leloup interprets the revelation of the Apoca-
lypse as the unveiling of what comes amidst the destructions, what arises in the col-
lapse. His reading of St John’s Apocalypse highlights a hopeful and untameable pres-
ence in the ever-nearing catastrophe, ever-advening apocalypse of the present ecolog-
ical crisis. This presence revealed by the Apocalypse, I wish to illuminate as the topos 
and telos of politics. The question of belonging to this present is one that arises from 
the gnostic mal-être au monde, and the failure to dwell within worldly being and em-
brace its metaxic becomings. Reflecting on Michel Foucault’s project to capture the 
task of modern philosophical thought, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari observe that  
 
 
383 Charles BAUDELAIRE, Le peintre de la vie moderne. Œuvres complètes, tome III : L'art romantique , 
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when Foucault admires Kant for posing the problem of philosophy 
in relation not to the eternal but to the Now, he means that the object 
of philosophy is not to contemplate the eternal or to reflect History 
but to diagnose our actual becomings: a becoming-revolutionary 
that, according to Kant himself, is not the same thing as the past, 
present, or future revolutions.385  
 
What is this « becoming-revolutionary », distinct and irreducible to past, present or 
future revolutions? « What becomings pass through us today? 386 ». Dwelling in the 
open presence of the world implies at once to embrace this interrogation while accept-
ing that the answers to such questions shall always elude us. It therefore implies re-
nouncing the gnostic appetite to conquer revolutionary becomings of worldly being – 
to rationalize, anticipate or implement them. A politics of the open present would ra-
ther summon our capacity to care for the perpetual collapse, advent and blooming of 
the world. Therein lies the revolutionary character of its becomings: in its perpetual 
ending and emerging. Dwelling within the revolutionary processes of worldly being 
would thus foster an apocalyptical openness to the presence of the Now – the Kairos 
which eschews the sequential, historical Chronos – and might thereby restore a digni-
fied, eschatological dimension of our inhabiting. For Bruno Latour, the apocalyptic 
turn of the ecological mutation brings us back to an eschatological present as it sum-
mons us to “be in time and therefore in a condition of possibility”, to reclaim the pre-
sent as time of the action, “against the idea of duration imbedded in practices of pro-
gress.”387 The eschatology of the ecological mutation thus not only brings us down to 
earth, but also back to the present. 
 
Acting nonetheless 
Following his critique of Gnostic nihilism as generating an ethical disengage-
ment and a tendency to escape the world, Jonas’ philosophy faces the major challenge 
 
385 Gilles DELEUZE and Felix GUATTARI, What is Philosophy? London: Verso, 1984. p. 112-113. 
386 Ibid. p.113. 
387 “Anthropologists are Talking – About Capitalism, Ecology and Apocalypse”, in Bruno LATOUR, 
Isabelle STENGERS, Anna TSING & Nils BUBANDT, Ethnos, 2018, 83:3, pp. 587-606. Here p.18. 




of elaborating an ethical thought that includes a reflective confrontation of evil without 
thereby falling into a rejection of the world. Namely, how to think an “ought” without 
denying the “is”, and how to condemn the evil deeds of this world without falling into 
the utopian pitfall that would celebrate an alternate world? Such is the challenge that 
arises from the Jonassian critique of dualistic eschatology mentioned earlier. Jonas 
intends indeed to think the immanence of the eschaton so as to grasp the intrinsic value 
of the earthly. The ethical transcendence of the eschatological imperative sketched in 
Jonas’ reflections roots itself indeed in the immanent presence of the world. The 
thought and implementation of one such ecological eschatology appears conditioned 
by a posture of caring openness towards the unceasing emergence and fulfilment of 
the ultimate purposes of worldly agency, this openness preventing the imposition of a 
monolithic ethics disengaged from the presence of the world and at odds with the al-
ways unprecedented conditions of worldly being. 
 
Now – how to act and what to do? How to not despise the present, and how to 
resist the urge to break with it in order to escape a vitiated world? In a World of Be-
coming, William Connolly presents the postmodern project as an effort to reach what 
Frank Chouraqui terms “an ambiguous awareness”388, and which we could understand 
as the metaxic experience of our inability to ground our actions into certainty, while 
gathering the strengths and hope necessary to act nonetheless. So how do we maintain 
such an awareness and move from our eschatology of the present to practical ethics 
informing a concrete inhabiting? The politics of the Apocalypse laid out in the first 
part of this chapter points toward a reconfiguration of the modern dialectic of imma-
nence and transcendence. For Bruno Latour, the task is to “combine anew the figures 
of immanence and imminence, the ancestral sanctity of the world and the new urgency 
of not letting it disappear.” 389 This recombination of the figures of immanence and 
transcendence in an eschatology of the present arises along a blurring of the inside-
 
388
 Frank CHOURAQUI, Review of “Pluralistic Sense-Making: A World of Becoming”, by William E. 
Connolly, The Agonist, Journal of the Nietzsche Circle, Fall 2011. p.3. 
389 Bruno LATOUR, « Sur une nette inversion du schème de la fin des temps », art.cit. 
« Combiner à nouveaux frais les figures de l’immanence et celles de l’imminence, la sainteté ancestrale 
du monde et l’urgence nouvelle de ne pas le faire disparaître. » My translation. 
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outside polarity manifested with a particular intensity by the environmental crisis. Re-
vealing acutely the deep entanglement of our actions and horizons of becoming, pre-
sent ecological phenomena challenge the categories of our ethical thought – such as 
what defines the individuality and freedom of an agency, or how to frame the perimeter 
of its repercussions. With his imperative of responsibility, Jonas thus presented an eth-
ical framework for the entangled agencies of worldly being. His contribution to an 
ethics for the technological age anticipates some of the challenges of Gaian politics in 
the ecological apocalypse: what should we do when the spectrum of our actions over-
flows our capacity of representation, and the framework of traditional ethics is ren-
dered obsolete by the unprecedented magnitude of our actions? How to act ethically 
from within an entanglement that overflows us? 
 
 
B. What we are bound to: ethics and politics of the earthbound390 
 
While embracing the ethical imperative stemming from worldly being, the idea 
of the apocalyptical presence of the eschaton in the world does not evict the unbearable 
ethical question of how to inhabit the latter. Rather, it radicalizes it by perpetually 
renewing it. The politics of the apocalypse laid out in the previous section contains 
indeed the twofold challenge of avoiding both: 
-the temptation of a gnostic parousianism, understood as the expectation of the 
deliverance from evil through the advent of a superior state of immanent being – a 
second coming that would absolve the sins and sufferings of the present world, but 
also justifying a posture of apathy towards the latter. 
 
390 In his Gifford Lectures, Bruno Latour coins the term « earthbound » to designate those beings whose 
attachments lie in the Gaian processes of the earth. He thereby aims to bypass the cosmological segre-
gation between humans and non-humans, and unveil the political divisions and conflicting concerns 
dissimulated behind the notion of a unified humanity. See Face à Gaïa, op.cit, p.320. 
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-and the moral indeterminacy that follows from the abyssal openness of the 
present, as incarnated in the experience of an existential vertigo and threatening to 
descend into an ethical relativism. 
Both possibilities exemplify a common ethical nihilism rooted in a disentanglement of 
the self from the rest of the world, an alienation conveyed in the gnostic trope that 
worldly being is ontologically flawed, lacking goodness, structure or meaning. This 
dilemma outlines the eminent challenge of recovering the ontological generation of 
ethics within the openness of worldly being – in other words, of recovering a sense of 
ethical responsibility, an ethical bond across the abyss separating the modern self from 
the world, bridges built upon an endless river.  
 
Again, a major risk in this colossal enterprise would be to crystalize worldly 
becomings into an immutable ground for ethics, thus ignoring the latters’ radical open-
ness and perpetual overflowing. Hypostatizations of the world and of a “non-world” 
alike exemplify variations of a same nihilism: some justifying the current state of the 
world as standing beyond all moral consideration, for the “laws of nature” provide 
themselves a standard of ethics, thereby falling into a blind and corrupted inertia solely 
preoccupied with the perpetuation of a deceptive worldview; others driven by the 
dream of a world that does not exist and committed to its advent  – all failing to per-
ceive the ethical call of the present world. This offers a glimpse of the difficulty of 
Donna Haraway’s injunction of “staying with the trouble”391 – of not escaping the 
ethical tension whilst the interpellation of worldly beings reaches through us. In this 
light, the grounding of ethics simultaneously appears as its failure for it also means its 
closure, a mummification draining all life out of an unremitting process of tying ethical 
bonds. And yet the omnipresence of the callings – irrepressible, which cannot be kept 
quiet. How to respond to them? What can we possibly answer to the funerary proces-
sion of the bereaved orca who relentlessly carried the corpse of her dead infant for 
weeks through a sea of shameful indifference? How to honour the memory of the Ar-
gentine farmworker Fabian Tomasi, who succumbed on the 7th of September 2018 to 
 
391 Donna HARAWAY, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene. op.cit. 
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the severe toxic polyneuropathy he contracted after a life-long exposure to agrochem-
ical agents, including the popular glysophate-based herbicide “Roundup” widely com-
mercialized by the agrochemical firm Monsanto? How to accept the judgment pro-
nounced by the International Criminal Court of LaHaye, condemning Ecuador to in-
demnify the multinational oil corporation Chevron as the latter refuses to claim re-
sponsibility for the irreversible environmental and social damaged caused by oil spill-
age and the contamination of water in Amazonia? The Constitutional Court of Ecuador 
had indeed endorsed a court decision in favour of a collective of indigenous villagers 
engaged in a legal fight against the oil company for 25 years.392 Examples of calls like 
these summoning our responsibility abound and pour every day.  
 
For William Connolly, responsibility arises as the only response to this pre-
vailing moral nihilism. The political theorist summons us to face the planetary so as to 
“counter the “passive nihilism” that readily falls into place after people reject climate 
denialism”, by which he means “the formal acceptance of the fact of rapid climate 
change accompanied by a residual, nagging sense that the world ought not to be orga-
nized so that capitalism is a destructive geological force.”393 Connolly does not fail to 
emphasize the organized dimension of such a nihilistic posture, interwoven into a web 
of various systematized strains as he indicates that “passive nihilism folds into other 
encumbrances already in place when people are laden with pressures to make ends 
meet, pay a mortgage, send kids to school, pay off debts, struggle with racism and 
gender inequality, and take care of elderly relatives.”394 Strains and alienations which 
turn us away from our worldly entanglements and prevent us from recovering a ver-
nacular inhabiting. Connolly denounces the political organization of an estrangement 
from worldly processes along with the institutionalized obliviousness of our planetary 
entanglement through systematized mechanisms of distraction: “it is easy to become 
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distracted from the implacable imbrications of capitalist and planetary processes as TV 
scandals, terrorism, action films, economic meltdowns, electoral circuses and ugly im-
perial wars draw attention away.”395 Connolly thereby reports a process of coloniza-
tion of our capacity for moral judgment and action – our response-ability –, an es-
trangement similar to the mechanism of alienation and exploitation Marx described in 
the “reserve army of labour”, ensuring the workers’ submissive obedience to the cap-
italist organization of labour. Connolly suggests here that the imperative of responsi-
bility follows from our planetary entanglements, and that a recovered sense of these 
entanglements conditions a morally responsible inhabiting of the world. 
 
 
For an ethics of Entangled Responsibility 
 
I propose to consider the notion of responsibility as a potential resource in the 
immense challenge of responding to the moral interpellation stemming from our fellow 
worldly beings in the contemporary context of the Anthropocene. I argue that the idea 
of responsibility might prove an essential pillar for Gaian politics, and point toward a 
cardinal virtue to be cultivated in our times. Hans Jonas’ ethics of Responsibility fol-
lows indeed from a realization of the extended scope of our actions and from a recov-
ered sense of both the interconnectedness and precariousness of life on earth. For 
Bruno Latour, the “irruption of Gaia” in the Anthropocene acts as a colossal interpel-
lation by heterogenous beings reminding us of our entanglement and stating their claim 
to existence. Furthering this perspective, Donna Haraway’s notion of response-ability 
expresses the urgency for us to become able to respond to what we add to, or take away 
from this Gaian world. Her emphasis on the overlapping subjectivities of the multi-
species beings of a “wounded Terra” 396 suggest an alternative ethical paradigm artic-
ulated around the imperative of co-presencing, remaining open and responsive to the 
sufferings of the others. Haraway’s ethics of response-ability thus implies to cultivate 
 
395 Ibid, p.13. 
396 Donna HARAWAY, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2016, p.115. 
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sensitivity towards the others, a “praxis of care and response”397 in the fragile contin-
gency of our plural encounters. Donna Haraway summons us indeed to “make kin”398 
– to become and compose with, tying ties with other earthlings. 
 
In this light, the ethics of responsibility appears as an ethics of alterity, ap-
proaching the uncanny presence of unexpected Gaian others by embracing their trans-
cendent immanence, the entanglement of their alterity with our identity, and the 
strange intimacy arising from our encounters. Like in Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy 
of alterity, which explores the empirical experience of a transcendence stemming from 
face-to-face encounters and approaches it as transcendence-in-immanence399, the tran-
scendence of the ethical imperative of responsibility is alive and arises in the interper-
sonal confrontation with worldly others. Embracing the immanence of the other and 
the transcendence of the self, the Gaian ethics of responsibility proposes to dwell fur-
ther in the abyssal depth of our worldly entanglements without succumbing to their 
reduction in polarities of immanence and transcendence, inside and outside. Amidst 
the abyssal openness unveiled in the Anthropocene and the climate of “indecisive ag-
itation”400 it arouses, the ethics of Gaian response-ability ties bonds, weaves the earth-
lings closer together and celebrates the ontological surprises of their embroideries. 
Such Gaian ethics might thus bridge the overwhelming ontological interdependency 
of worldly beings with their vertiginous openness, espousing in our engagements with 
other earthlings both the intimacy, alienness and openness of Gaian becomings. I wish 
to suggest that this idea of the joint intimacy, alienness and openness of Gaian entan-
glements offers a refuge to the junction between eco-philosophy and theology. It res-
onates indeed with an approach to the religious in terms of connection, embracing one 
of its potential etymological roots in the Latin “religare” – to bind, to tie together. 
Michel Serres proposes adding to this meaning another etymology in the Latin “reli-
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the worldly.401 This concern for worldly entanglements thus convoked by the term 
religion – the concern to bridge the gap and mend the intimate distance firstly experi-
enced in our engagements with worldly beings, and simultaneously caring for that very 
distance as the condition for a vital alterity – seems to concentrate the problematic of 
Gnosticism as I have proposed to approach it throughout this dissertation. The Gnos-
tics faced the task of inhabiting a metaxic world of open entanglements as much as the 
Gaian beings of the Anthropocene now do. As they attempt to clarify the yet-to-be 
acknowledged complexity and originality of Gaia, Bruno Latour and Timothy Lenton 
qualify Lovelock and Margulis’ invention as apophatic402 – a term usually employed 
to express the ineffable and yet so intimate, so deeply felt distance from the divine. It 
appears that the same question of the link to the world, and how to inhabit this entan-
glement, haunts the Gnostics as much as it haunts the Gaians. Much of the ethical 
question arises from this interrogation – how am I to act when I am entangled? Latour 
and Lenton suggest that the figure of Gaia renews the dialectic between freedom and 
necessity, thereby reframing traditional debates in ethics: 
 
Any human trying to situate oneself as “part” or “participating” in 
[the history of Gaia] can no longer be defined only as “free”, but, on 
the contrary, as being dependent on the same sort of intricate and 
intertwined events revealed by Gaia. More freedom in the domain of 
necessity is fully matched by more necessity in the domain of free-
dom.403 
 
In the light of Gaian entangled becomings, free and dependent do no longer appear as 
antonyms. Like any modern dualism targeted by Latour’s philosophy, they are one. 
Consequently, “freedom” can no longer be understood as a burden weighing upon the 
shoulders of the humans, alone emancipated from the realm of necessity. The paradig-
matic shift introduced by Gaia lies indeed in its confluence of what I have proposed to 
think in terms of entanglements and their overflowing – a rooted openness merging 
 
401 Michel SERRES, The Natural Contract, trans. Elizabeth MacArthur and William Paulson, 
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402 Bruno LATOUR and Timothy M. LENTON, “Extending the Domain of Freedom, or Why Gaia is so 
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intimacy with distance, inside with outside, alterity with identity. Only their conjunc-
tion justifies the ethical imperative of responsibility in our entanglements: without a 
link, without an echo to our being, nothing to be responsible for – without a distance, 
no one to respond to. In their article, Latour and Lenton depict the distance between 
Gaian life forms not as the one, hermetic and paralyzing, erected between the realms 
of nature and culture, but the delicate, shifting and creative distance allowing for earth-
lings to meet and do politics.404 I propose that an ethics of entangled responsibility – 
an ethics embracing the metaxic experience of our interdependent freedom and inti-
mate distance – might bridge the apocalyptico-political imperative of an eschatology 
of the present with the rooted overflowing of Gaian becomings. Emphasizing a free-
dom that blossoms upon our entanglements and along the extended scope of our 
agency – no longer approached in terms of individual entities but rather as ever un-
folding connections – the ethics of entangled responsibility unleashes a breadth of ac-
tion, and thus also of moral accountability, unanticipated by traditional ethics. It re-
stores the abyssal depth and apocalyptical meaning of our inhabiting – without para-
lyzing us with the existential burden of an unbearable responsibility, but spreading it 
onto all earthlings and thereby empowering us as the fellow weavers of Gaian becom-
ings. The threads we contribute to weaving – we are responsible to. It is a collective, 
entangled responsibility. It is an ethics that proposes to redraw the connection, to mend 
the segregation of Gaian becomings interwoven into each other, to build bridges across 
worldly processes, and to care for the roots of the overflowing. In a reflection in moral 
philosophy published in the anthology Responsibility and Judgment, Hannah Arendt 
argues that evil has no roots. More specifically, it is the absence of roots and the failure 
to sustain and nurture a link which would allow evil to arise: 
 
The greatest evildoers are those who don’t remember because they 
have never given thought to the matter, and, without remembrance, 
nothing can hold them back. For human beings, thinking of past mat-
ters means moving in the dimension of depth, striking roots and thus 
stabilizing themselves, so as not to be swept away by whatever may 
occur - the Zeitgeist or History or simple temptation. The greatest 
evil is not radical, it has no roots, and because it has no roots it has 
 
404 Ibid, p.23. 
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no limitations, it can go to unthinkable extremes and weep over the 
whole world.405 
 
Arendt points here towards an ethics of the roots as what binds, what grounds and 
“stabilize”, what imposes limits to our actions. Surely the consideration of other Gaian 
becomings and the consequences of our trajectories upon them would provide certain 
ethical limits to our agency. Like the present day’s evils, the “greatest evil” Arendt 
struggled to think was a political one, one that still engages a collective responsibility. 
What kind of politics could assume the responsibility of entangled becomings – sus-
taining the roots of their overflowing? 
 
 
From Gnostic towards Gaian politics  
 
In many regards, Gaia inaugurates a new definition of politics and polity, rais-
ing anew some of its fundamental questions: what constitutes a political entity, what 
cohesive force brings its participants (human and non-human) together, to what extent 
fellow citizens of the world are bound to each other, which processes should we be 
attentive to? What is to be cared for, and by whom? The founding interrogation of 
political philosophy always revolves around the challenge of inhabiting a common 
world. Today the figure of Gaia revives such an interrogation. The task of unfolding 
the political meaning of a Gaian paradigm and its diverse consequences for the way 
we think and do politics goes way beyond the ambition and scope of this doctoral 
research. However, I do sense that the intrusion of an alternate cosmological paradigm, 
along with the proclamation of a new geological era, has to do with the unsustainability 
of the gnostic way of inhabiting the world which has been prevailing throughout Mo-
dernity. The metaphor of Gaia shakes indeed modern representations of power, order 
and authority in so far as it abolishes the idea of dominion often conjured in modern 
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systems of thought. Latour and Lenton thus remind us that the trope of the global is 
integrated into a political cosmology articulated around the medieval metaphor of the 
Body Politic:  
 
Any allusion to the Global is immediately fused with a social and 
political metaphor of the Body Politic. To see the polity as a big 
organism made of parts obeying the dictates of the whole, will be 
conjured at once in every description of order and system.406 
 
Against this backdrop, Gaia disseminates the anarchist and radically democratic sense 
that living beings, while intricated with another, neither obey nor tend toward any su-
perior order. In Gaia, living beings are proclaimed free and interdependent all at once, 
and are left to navigate the subtle and profound distance between each other. Accord-
ing to its originator Lovelock, Gaia summons us to learn how to be “partners in a very 
democratic entity”407 – a very non-anthropocentric democracy. Gaia puts an end to 
man’s dominion over the earth and suggests instead a politics of the earthlings in-
formed by an ethics of entangled responsibility and infused with the awareness of the 
créolité of worldly processes of becoming which untameably overflow borders of be-
ings, species, nations, territories. Lynn Margulis fought relentlessly against the idea of 
isolated individual life forms, arguing with her holobionts that life forms cannot be 
separated from their outside, nor can life be approached as an atomic entity within its 
own distinct boundaries.408 Subverting political boundaries as well as cosmological 
segregation, Gaia as a figure of anti-imperialism provides a conceptual resource for 
cultural resistance to what erects walls and enforces an order that thrives on enclosures 
and confinements. As it unveils the presence of an overflowing profusion of complex-
ity and alterity in the world, Gaia dismantles the construction of uniformity institution-
alized in modern societies, along with the repression of alterity, the dis-animation of 
worldly being and the prosecution of all deviances. It invites us to sustain the presence 
of an unsettling alterity and to maintain the creative tension of our entanglement with 
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407 James LOVELOCK, Gaia: A new look at life on Earth, Oxford University Press, 1979, p.145. 
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them. Doing so, the figure of Gaia echoes the anticolonialism of Glissant’s philosophy 
of creolité, as well as his critique of the monolithism of European civilization409: 
against the monolithic hegemony of the Global spreading a diffuse alienation from the 
world, Gaia inspires a politics of belonging and inhabiting rooted in hybridity and re-
lationality. The approach of micro-politics might notably assist those committed to 
mobilize such entangled agencies to recover their vernacular political power and sub-
vert a centralized, uniform and unrooted source of authority. 
 
Summoning us to “immerse ourselves in instead of emancipating ourselves 
from the world”, Gaia rises as a metaphor of the anti-Gnostic as it reverses the gnostic 
yearning for a deliverance from our worldly entanglements and calls us to “learn to 
depend”410 on such processes. Unveiling an “emerging attachment to a multiplicitous 
world that exceed the stories” narrated in Modernity, Gaia entices a “creative rebel-
lion”411 against the gnostic narratives which debilitate our engagement with and im-
poverish our inhabiting of the world.  
 
409 On Edouard Glissant’s critique of Europe’s monolithism and its systematic failure to integrate the 
other, see his interview by Rue89, 26.05.2008. 
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eCMvmY7qaRA 
Accessed 11.01.2019. 
410 Bruno LATOUR, “Sur une nette inversion du schème de la fin des temps », art.cit.  
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C. Politics of radical love: the subversion in reclaiming a loving inhabiting 
of the world 
 
"Do not love the world or anything in the world. 
If anyone loves the world, love for the Father is not in them.” 
 —  John 2:15-16 
 
 
“Love will save this place” 




Dwelling with the trouble: embracing the world as home 
 
In this final section I wish to elucidate a hypothesis that has been emerging 
from the present research: the idea according to which the love of the world, in a cul-
tural landscape so influenced by Gnosticism, is insurrectional insofar as it reverses the 
pervasive gnostic being in the world described in the first three chapters of this disser-
tation. I suggest that loving the world and weaving an intimacy with it across the gnos-
tic estrangement appears as a condition for reclaiming a resilient inhabiting. This love 
of the world may take on diverse forms. I propose to see one of them in the commit-
ment to dwell – a verb I summon multiple times in this chapter: dwelling amidst 
worldly becomings, dwelling in transitions, dwelling in the endtimes… Dwelling in 
the sense of finding home in a world of estrangement, depletion and exile, in an earth 
which Donna Haraway describes as “full of refugees, human and not”, awaiting the 
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times that shall “replenish refuge” 412. In her account of the pioneering rewilding pro-
ject that took place in West Sussex, Isabella Tree echoes this claim as she writes that 
“our skies have emptied” and “we are living in a desert”.413 To dwell, also, as becom-
ing present to an ongoing Gaian process of inhabiting as co-penetration, as becoming 
sensitive to what we are inhabiting and what is inhabiting us. The verb itself appears 
to contain a certain polysemy. The meaning I propose to explore here lies in the action 
of staying: staying with the trouble, staying and accepting to be overflowed by the 
vertiginous openness of unknown worldly becomings, between the not-anymore and 
the not-yet. This kind of dwelling echoes the metaxic being in the world described by 
Eric Voegelin, one that resists the temptation to seize, to conquer, to reduce, to petrify 
and thereby escape the mystifying wilderness and confounding alterity that character-
ize processes of worldly becoming. According to William Connolly, “the challenges 
of today solicit both an embrace of this unruly world and new political assemblages to 
counter its dangers.”414 – I submit that a major challenge to our contemporary inhabit-
ing lies precisely in the urgency of our involvement in the world and the simultaneous 
surrendering to its overflowing trajectories of becomings. This echoes the reflections 
on the apocalyptic configuration of contemporary politics laid out in the first section 
of the present chapter: if the ecological apocalypse calls us to action, it also summons 
us to some extent to stop acting, to suspend some of the processes we have been in-
volved in so as to clear a space for what is being unveiled. This idea, to which I will 
return later, sheds light upon the tension contained in the kind of dwelling that is being 
called for. This tension, I suggest, is to be dwelt in: namely, the urgency to act and stop 
acting. The necessity of our active commitment to the cessation of destructive behav-
iours and of our complicit involvement in them. In this venture, dwelling with the 
trouble – to echo Donna Haraway’s invitation to stay with the trouble and making kin 
in the Chtulucene – also means resisting the gnostic urge to escape this unruly world 
by substituting for its enduring presence the quest for another world. Through con-
sciously deciding to dwell within tumultuous worldly becomings, we might find that 
we need not domesticate, master, or subdue the world in order for another world to 
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arise: rather, the world is already full of the many worlds it contains, awaiting our 
involvement, full of an insurrectional love for the world, to blossom. Eschewing the 
gnostic ecophobia manifested in a globalized distrust for anything earthbound, envi-
ronmental thinkers and activists have unanimously called for a re-localization of our 
inhabiting, a “coming down to earth” notably in our agricultural activity, as the per-
maculture model illustrates. Based on an ethics of care and fair share, the core tenet of 
permaculture is to cultivate a sustainable, self-sufficient and harmonious engagement 
with local ecosystems. The model developed by David Holmgren and Bill Mollison 
thus provides a concrete example of an inhabiting fuelled with a love for the world and 
the diverse life forms that bloom with it. Ecovillages and transition towns offer further 
examples of an alternative inhabiting anchored in grass-roots community projects and 
aiming to achieve resilience and self-sufficiency in the fulfilment of fundamental 
needs such as housing, food-and energy- sovereignity, social interaction, work and 
leisure while preserving natural ecosystems. Their inhabitings represent fruitful at-
tempts to reclaim a peaceful and sovereign engagement with worldly processes across 




Weaving an intimacy with the world 
 
“I only went out for a walk and finally concluded to stay out till sundown, 
 for going out, I found, was really going in.” 
 —  John Muir,  
John of the Mountains: The Unpublished Journals of John Muir 
 
 
How to inhabit the world without thereby falling into an objectifying reduction 
of overflowing processes of worldly becoming into a monolithic and petrified concept? 
The pitfalls of the modern concept of nature warn us against one such temptation. The 
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figure of Gaia, on the other hand, proposes to take again into account the complex 
agencies of earthlings which the concept of nature had dis-animated as a prelude to the 
modernization project. One crucial challenge arising from the confrontation of the cos-
mology of nature with a Gaian perspective thus lies in the renegotiation of our inhab-
iting and the deployment of our agencies now that the agency of others is to be 
acknowledged and respected. It is not only a matter of finding a sense of home and 
belonging amidst the abiding strangeness of worldly processes of becoming, in a world 
suddenly filled with the enduring presence of others. It is rather a deep movement of 
co-penetration and co-inhabiting which the figure of Gaia reveals. Of this world of 
becoming, William Connolly writes that it is “neither our oyster nor our servant. Ra-
ther we inhabit it, and we are inhabited by its multiple stabilities and volatilities” 415. 
In the Chtulucene, Gaia is not only asking: “what and who do we inhabit?” but also 
“what and who inhabits us?”. What does it mean to find ourselves contained in and 
overflowing planetary processes which are reciprocally also contained in and over-
flowing our own trajectories of becoming? How to dwell in this chaos? Edouard Glis-
sant argues that the modern colonial enterprise of globalization is driven by the fear of 
the dissolution and absorption of the self into the other. He proposes to subvert the 
subjugating dynamic of the mondialisation through the idea of mondialité, or worldli-
ness, which dismantles the myth of a monolithic self and embraces differences and 
diversity as what brings us together in the Tout-Monde. Glissant thus claims that “we 
will have to come to this idea that, going to the others and changing with the others is 
not losing oneself, is not corrupting oneself”, before adding: “I believe the poets are 
leading this fight”.416 
 
Inhabiting the créolité of a Gaian world suggests a form of mutual inhabiting 
somehow reminiscent of the relationship between the divine and the world described 
by process philosophers and theologians as one of creative co-fecundation bypassing 
the traditional polarity between immanence and transcendence. Whitehead expresses 
 
415 Ibid, p.7. I emphasize. 
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this tension inherent to cosmological dualism in his famous formulation of the ultimate 
contrasts characterizing the relationship between the concepts of God and the world: 
 
It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is 
immanent in the World. It is as true to say that God transcends the 
World, as that the World transcends God.417 
 
I submit that the figure of Gaia today translates Whitehead’s intuition about the mutual 
inhabiting of God and the World into the terms of planetary, intra-worldly processes: 
this may appear even more clearly if the reader substitutes “God” by “the self” in the 
former quotation (which per se does no more than simply unveil the repartition in 
modern cosmology of divine attributes to the human self). Like Whitehead’s philoso-
phy of process, the Gaia hypothesis provides a way out of the traditional issues of 
modern dualism, the latter struggling to characterize the miraculous interactions be-
tween the hermetic realms of nature and culture, necessity and freedom, visible and 
invisible, rationality and morality etc. It suggests that these difficulties stem from the 
erroneous postulate of an estranged relationship, an estranged cohabitation between 
concepts perceived as antithetical. Hans Jonas thus advocates for an unsuspectedly 
“more intimate relationship between inside and outside which has to be imagined at 
the root of modern dualism”418. Likewise, when Donna Haraway imagines her Ter-
rapolis, she creates a world in which “natures, cultures, subjects and objects do not 
pre-exist their intertwined worldings”419 – a world in which Terran processes of “be-
coming with”, of “kin-making” are freed from such segregational conceptual struc-
tures. The multi-species worlding she describes thus appears as a commitment to em-
brace an ontological intimacy with all things and attune to processes of world-com-
posing, to “the old-art of terraforming”420 in which companion-species are engaged. 
 
417 Alfred North WHITEHEAD, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, ed. David Ray Griffin and 
Donald W. Sherburne, New York, Free Press, 1978 (1929). p.348. 
418 Hans JONAS, Organismus und Freiheit: Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie, Vandenhoek & 
Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1973, p.184. 
419 Donna HARAWAY, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, op.cit., p.13. I 
emphasize. 
420 Donna HARAWAY, SF: Science Fiction, Speculative Fabulation, String Figures, So Far, Acceptance 
speech for the Pilgrim Awards, 07.07. 2011. P.10. 
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The “always too much connection”421 of Donna Haraway’s Terrapolis directly con-
fronts the sterility of a segregational structure of thought articulated around a cardinal 
abyss, a primordial rupture at the roots of dualism. Hers is an inter- and intra-inhabiting 
bridging the estranged being in the world of the Gnostics and echoing Virginia Woolf’s 
account of the fluidity and permeability of being in the world. 
 
According to Alan Chih-Chien Hsieh, Woolf’s first novel The Voyage Out ima-
gines an alternative mode of inhabiting set against the colonial context of the early 20th 
century and the ambient narrative of Western triumphalism. The literary critic analyses 
in the protagonist Rachel and her relationship to the world the embodiment of an “es-
tranged intimacy with the world”422: 
 
By estranged intimacy, I mean a close relationship with the world, a 
togetherness, that is at the same time estranged because this being-
in-the-world, emerging from encounters with others, is never an en-
closed space but an open whole. Rachel’s estranged intimacy with 
the world thus anticipates the unexpected possibilities of life arising 
from our being-in-the-world, our situatedness within the living-
world, our embodied experiencing of the world. 
 
It is always an intimacy, a coming-together, and at the same time an 
estrangement, an openness, that keeps the singularity of each being 
and retains contingency of every encounter. In her novels, Woolf is 
always in search of an interpersonal (even transcendental) connec-
tion that does not curb the singularity of each being, a connection 
that I term an estranged intimacy with the world. 
 
Alan Chih-Chien Hsieh suggests that Rachel’s experience of life and her quest for 
connection registers a planetary love which embraces the process of becoming with 
the others, of both affecting and being affected by them, and remaining open to the 
 
URL: https://people.ucsc.edu/~haraway/Files/PilgrimAcceptanceHaraway.pdf  
Accessed 11.03.2019. 
421 Ibid. 
422 Alan CHIH-CHIEN HSIEH, “An Estranged Intimacy with the World: The Postcolonial Woolf’s 
Planetary Love in The Voyage Out”, in Virginia Woolf: Writing the World. Ed. Pamela L. Caughie and 
Diana L. Swanson. Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2015. pp.116-21. p.119. 
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contingency of these becomings. Rachel’s initiation into colonial civilization ex-
presses the irreducible experience of the indissolubility between interior and exterior: 
as she walks through a native village, Rachel’s encounter with the natives collapses 
the self-other binary. The planetary love Alan Chih-Chien Hsieh describes goes be-
yond the restraints of traditional romantic love and the suffocating conception of bour-
geois marriage: it arises rather from the estranged intimacy with the world, an “inter-
connected yet indeterminate relationship with the world”423. Chich-Chien Hsieh draws 
upon the notion of “planetary” proposed by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose Death 
of a Discipline urges us to imagine ourselves as planetary creatures rather than un-
rooted global agents. She writes: “the globe is on our computers. No one lives there. It 
allows us to think that we can aim to control it. The planet is in the species of alterity, 
belonging to another system; and yet we inhabit it, on loan.”424 Mais nous sommes au 
monde425. Spivak’s thought of the planetary affirms the ineluctable alterity of that 
which we inhabit and which inhabits us in return, a transcendental alterity which “re-
mains underived from us” but “contains us as much as it flings us away426”. Her ap-
proach thereby reverses the gnostic posture of an ontological estrangement of the self, 
isolated amidst the radical strangeness of the world, and reasserts our embeddedness 
in the strangeness which contains us, which we contain and to which we belong. In-
habiting the planetary is to be “intended toward the other”427, and the planetary love 
Alan Chih-chien Hsieh suggests is binding Rachel to the world is one rooted in her 
indeterminate relationship with other beings and the radical openness of worldly be-
comings emerging from it. It is indeed a metaxic love embracing the twofoldness of 
our open entanglement with other planetary becomings and summoning us to maintain 





423 Ibid, p.220. 
424 Gayatri CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, Death of a Discipline, 2003, p.72. I emphasize. 
425 Emmanuel LEVINAS, Totalité et Infini. Essai sur l’extériorité, Poche, 1987, p.21. 




In praise of weeds: clearing a space for hope in the world 
 
“We can have hope only in what is without remedy” 
 —  Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community. 
 
 
On January 17, 2018, French Prime Minister Edouard Philippe officially an-
nounced that the French government had given up on pursuing the highly controversial 
project of building a new airport in Notre-Dame-des-Landes, western France. This de-
cision came as the crowning achievement of five decades of a political, economic, 
legal and environmental struggle to protect a 2,000 acres-land of preserved forests and 
wetlands from awaiting colossal urban development projects. The site became a Zone 
a Défendre (ZAD)– zone to defend: what began as a small protest camp grew into a 
rural space of resistance and autonomous experimentation around a self-sufficient and 
sustainable inhabiting. Kept at bay for years by the collective movement, unprece-
dented operations of destruction of the ZAD and eviction of its residents were launched 
by the government during the night of the 9th April, deploying an immoderate appa-
ratus of militarized state violence illustrated in interminable lines of armored vehicles, 
tear gas, and some 11,000 offensive grenades thrown by the police within less than a 
week. The police announced that reporters were strictly forbidden throughout the op-
eration and blocked their access to the site. 
 
What might possibly legitimate the deployment of such a disproportionate vi-
olence against a thriving community drawing upon permaculture to harvest the land 
and restore a flourishing biodiversity? How could a grassroots community with its own 
bakery, cheesemonger, brewery, a weekly pay-what-you-want market, theatre spaces, 
newspaper, library and even a pirate radio station, represent such a threat to the state 
authority that it required to be repressed through one of the largest military operations 
deployed on the French territory since the students-protest of 1968? According to Da-
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vid Graeber, what emerged from the ZAD was unbearable for it manifested the persis-
tence of hope. A symbol of resistance to infrastructural projects and centralized power, 
the ZAD developed a laboratory of social experimentation on what a post-capitalist 
inhabiting could look like. In the violent repression of this peaceful and resilient in-
habiting, the French state exhibited the totalitarian magnitude of its intolerance to any 
alternative form of inhabiting. Reciprocally, the commitment to live freely in a disci-
plinary society uncovers the pervading omnipresence of oppressive structures. In 
“Hope in Common”, David Graeber describes the organized destruction in our cultural 
imaginary of all alternative trajectories to that consistently pursued by the global ne-
oliberal governance for the past few decades. The anthropologist claims that the failure 
to imagine an alternative to the present status quo draws upon the edification of a vast 
bureaucratic and ideological apparatus ensuring the permanence of hopelessness.428 
Against this institutionalization of hopelessness, the ZAD sowed hope and bloomed 
like weeds inside the walls of bureaucratic governance – resilient, persisting, local, 
versatile, free. Other weeds like the ZAD swarm everywhere, relentlessly overflowing 
the web of standardization and uniformization which, maintaining that there is no al-
ternative, struggles to repress their presence. In praise of weeds, their manifesto calls 
for the spirit of resilience to spread with “the desire to open cracks everywhere”, em-
bodying thereby the politics of the apocalypse which had introduced this final chapter: 
 
Cracks in the frenzy of security measures, cracks in the ecological 
disaster, cracks in the tightening border regimes, cracks in the om-
nipotent surveillance, cracks in a world that puts everything up for 
sale. In these disenchanted times, the ZAD and all that it represents, 
like the struggles of yesteryear and elsewhere, is a glimmer of hope 




428 David GRAEBER, “Hope in Common”, 2008. 
URL: https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/david-graeber-hope-in-common  
Accessed 11.03.2019. 
429 “Defending the ZAD”, digital booklet written by the inhabitants of the ZAD. My emphasis. 




The hope sowed by the resilient inhabiting of the ZAD is a hope that bloomed in what 
was without remedy, mending an alienated relationship with the world in the face of 
the irreparable and reinventing horizons of possible in the absence of alternative. The 
love of the world embodied in their inhabiting appears as a faith in the world, a “loving 
openness” in Voegelin’s words, an unyielding hope trusting worldly becomings to re-
cover and create again. In Wilding: the return of nature to a British farm, Isabella Tree 
recounts the leap of faith cardinal to the “Knepp experiment”, the pioneering rewilding 
project of her farm in West Sussex using free-roaming grazing animals as a way to 
restore an extraordinary flourishing wildlife. Stepping back from unsustainable prac-
tices of intensive farming degrading the land’s biodiversity, Isabella Tree proposes to 
explore alternative forms of inhabiting informed by a posture of letting be, withdrawal 
and surrendering. “Rewilding”, she explains, “is restoration by letting go”, a process 
the author describes as “full of surprises”. “Extremely rare species, including turtle 
doves, nightingales, peregrine falcons, woodpeckers and purple emperor butterflies, 
are now breeding at Knepp, while populations of other species are rocketing. The de-
graded agricultural land has become a functioning ecosystem again, heaving with life 
– all by itself.” 430 Isabella Tree’s Wilding presents the love of the world as a posture 
of trust, faith and hope in its capacity for resilience, a love embracing the estranged 
intimacy of our inhabiting and clearing a space for other worldly becomings to emerge. 
In chapter 10 of This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate, Naomi Klein 
investigates local communities’ growing distrust towards the fossil fuel industry, sus-
tained by a cultural concern before the extractive threat and the damages it would in-
flict to the ecosystem. She quotes a goat-rancher from Montana, working together with 
indigenous people for the anti-fracking movement and their fight to protect south-east-
ern Montana from mining companies such as Arch Goal:  
 
that connection to this place and the love that people have for it, 
that’s what Arch Goal doesn’t get. They underestimate that. They 
don’t understand it, so they disregard it. And that’s what in the end 
 
430 Isabella TREE, op.cit. 
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will save that place. It is not the hatred of the coal companies, or 
anger, but love will save that place.431 
 
As she engages with local communities involved in the fight for divestment, Naomi 
Klein uncovers a common concern arising across traditional political boundaries, a 
land-care pledged to the place they inhabit, and finds that what drives the people united 
against the oil pipeline project is a radical love for the world. Realizing the subversive 
power of this love, she warns those who might underestimate our attachment to the 
world: “when the extractive industry’s culture of structural transience bumps up 
against a group of deeply rooted people with an intense love of their homeplace and a 
determination to protect it, the effect can be explosive.”432 Politics begin in this love 
of the world, in the commitment not to resign from it: love is where we start from. 
 
431 Naomi KLEIN, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate, Simon & Schuster, New York, 
2014, p.296. 







COUNTERSPELLS FOR A RESILIENT 






 The counter-spell is simple: tell a different story 




In a talk about the potential contribution of ecofeminism to the thought of the 
Anthropocene433, Emilie Hache affirms the need to relate differently the world we in-
habit, what is happening to us, how we came to this point. With ecofeminism, she 
proposes to tell different stories. Stories, she claims, weave the world, constitute our 
inner architecture, make us stand. But sometimes stories fail to make us stand or be-
lieve: they sometimes prevent us from moving as they distillate the belief that “there 
 
433 Emilie HACHE, « Se réapproprier le champ de la longue durée. Contribution écoféministe à une 
histoire après l’anthropocène ». Séminaire « Esthétiques et pratiques de la terre » organisé par Thierry 








is no alternative”, no way but forward, no other path than the one we have been walk-
ing. Stories paving our imaginary tell us that history is over434 - that there will be no 
more stories, that everything has been told. Doing so, they dictate a posture of obedi-
ence, conformity and resignation. As we are prevented from recounting or inventing 
other stories, we are also prevented from inhabiting the world as well, as fully and as 
freely as we could aspire to. 
 
This thesis embraces the belief that new narratives and practices can arise from 
and through thought. It emerges as a celebration of poiesis, the creative potential of 
our intertwined worldings, unexpected encounters becoming fecund, resilient wander-
ings. It has sought to investigate the significance of this creative potential for political 
life. Karl Marx taught us to always consider the primordiality of the material structure 
of society, social change being conditioned by specific modes and relations of produc-
tion. His dialectical materialism emphasizes the radical entanglement of historical pro-
cesses of emergence in a practical network of socio-economic ties. It thereby also re-
asserts how much of our individual as well as collective trajectories is affected by the 
diverse constraints imposed upon us by a politico-juridical superstructure serving the 
interests of the dominant class. Yet this indisputable entanglement, our metabolic root-
edness in worldly processes, as I have suggested in this thesis, is one that overflows 
dualistic thought patterns and could not as such discriminate the material from the 
ideal435. In The Ecological Thought, Timothy Morton thus contends that ecology dis-
turbs the old regime of mind and matter.436 The dialectical dance between the concrete 
conditions of our inhabiting and the stories that both weave and recount them unveils 
a radical intimacy between the cultural and the ecological – an ontological hybridity 
 
434 Francis FUKUYAMA, The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin Books, 1992. 
435 The Marxist theory of social change identifies a dialectical relationship between structure and super-
structure, or between matter and ideas, which is perpetually overflowed by the advent of transformation. 
Far from describing a deterministic and unidirectional relationship between discrete entities, where the 
economic base would exclusively dictate the political and cultural superstructure, Marx and Engels an-
alyse a dialectical process of historical change involving “innumerable intersecting forces” in a recip-
rocal causality : as violent as our enslavement to material conditions of subsistence may be, it remains 
nonetheless, at least to some extent, open to the contingent emergence of things that have never been. 
Friedrich ENGELS to Joseph Bloch in Königsberg, London, September 21, 1890, in Historical Materi-
alism (Marx, Engels, Lenin), Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 295. 
436 Timothy MORTON, The Ecological Thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2010. 
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that resists modern practices of purification. A reduction of this playful intimacy to the 
idealism – materialism debate would reveal a failure to appreciate the entangled com-
plexity and creativity of processes of becoming, where thoughts arise with matter: 
through their surprising and enmeshed unfolding. Emphasising the immanence of 
spirit in matter and refusing their opposition in the binaries of Cartesian metaphysics, 
the New Materialist approach invites us to explore the monism of Baruch Spinoza as 
a fecund philosophical way. My engagement with the environmental transition pro-
poses to dwell amidst the ruins of collapsing dualisms – including the one between 
idea and matter – and embrace the inextricable mystery of our metaxic worlding. An-
alyzing the complex interrelations between discourse and matter, the discipline of Ma-
terial Ecocriticism thus postulates that “all matter is a storied matter” and argue that 
material phenomena can be read and interpreted as stories437. The world both inspires 
our stories and emerges from them, as manifested in the way modern tales of progress 
are now inscribed in the sedimentary layers of the earth438. In this regard, the environ-
mental crisis illuminates the kaleidoscopic dimension of our inhabiting in-between 
realms, where ideas meet matter, and summons us to explore unpaved roads in thought 
as well as on earth.  
 
What have we learnt from this hermeneutical journey in Gnosticism? Through-
out this dissertation, I hope to have suggested something similar to what Emilie Hache 
is pointing toward in her talk: that it is possible to tell other stories. As it bathes our 
present cosmologies in an unexpected light and emphasizes the importance of meta-
phors and narratives in our engagement with the environmental crisis, my hermeneu-
tics of Gnosticism indicates that it is possible to renew the structures and categories of 
our thought. The perspective of Gnosticism contributes indeed to unveil both the 
 
437 Serenella IOVINO and Serpil OPPERMANN (ed.), Material Ecocriticism, op.cit, p.1. 
438 Jan ZALASIEWICZ, Colin N. WATERS, Juliana IVAR DO SUL, Patricia L. CORCORAN, Anthony D. 
BARNOSKY, Alejandro CEARRETA, Matt EDGEWORTH, Agnieszka GAŁUSZKA, Catherine JEANDEL, 
Reinhold LEINFELDER, J.R. MCNEILL, Will STEFFEN, Colin SUMMERHAYES, Michael WAGREICH, 
Mark WILLIAMS, Alexander P.WOLFE, Yasmin YONAN, “The geological cycle of plastics and their 





strength and the contingency of the narratives ordering our inhabiting of the world. 
Throwing light upon a cultural imaginary of contempt for and estrangement from the 
world organized around a dualistic cosmology, my hermeneutics of Gnosticism invites 
us to reclaim the power of tropes both in uncovering present narratives and creating 
ones able to subvert the present order. If, as Bruno Latour and Timothy Lenton note 
while contemplating “why Gaia is so hard to understand”439, it appears as difficult to 
invent objects as it is to dis-invent them in order to repopulate the earth with new ideas, 
such seems to be the task of philosophy: to invent, dis-invent, and invent anew, to un-
think and then start thinking again. The Gaian philosopher and the professor of Earth 
System Science write together: 
 
That we have no good concepts to describe [the present] situation is 
a proof that we relied too much on the usual repertoire coming from 
older amalgamation of political and biological order.440 
 
The frustration that comes with the difficulty of telling new stories from within 
the tales of an obsolete order signals the limits of these narratives and the presence of 
a looming idea that is arising with the ecological mutation. In Gnosticism as in Gaia, 
what is worth thinking is precisely what eludes us: the fluttering tension, the unspeak-
able riddle. In this chiaroscuro arise the monsters441, Gramsci tells us. But what do 
 
439
 Bruno LATOUR and Timothy M. LENTON, “Extending the Domain of Freedom, or Why Gaia is so 
hard to understand”, art. cit. 
440 Ibid. 
441 Antonio GRAMSCI, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. Quintin Hoared, trans. Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith, New York, International Publishers, 1992. p.175-176. 
This popular quote by Gramsci is a liberal translation from the original Italian: “La crisi consiste appunto 
nel fatto che il vecchio muore e il nuovo non può nascere: in questo interregno si verificano i fenomeni 
morbosi piú svariati”. A more literal translation would read as such: “Crisis consists precisely in the 
fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born, in this interregnum a great variety of morbid 
symptoms appears”. While Gramsci’s reflection was written between 1926 and 1935 during his 
incarceration by the Italian fascist regime in Turi’s prison, his words do not fail to evoke the present 
ecological transition arising along contemporary phenomena of collapse and burgeoning, of lingering 
fascist tendencies across the world, declining state authority and rising popular protests, environmental 
loss and resilience, decomposition and recomposition. The open horizon described by Gramsci in a time 
of political inbetweenness echoes the liminality of the present times, as environmental destruction 
suspends the trajectory of many worldly beings over an abyss of uncertainty. The term “monsters” is 
particularly evocative of the tentacular creatures of the Chthulucene, uncanny more-than-human 
companions of chaos with whom we must learn to dwell within the precarious multi-species worldings 
left open by the environmental crisis.  
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these monsters tell us between an old world and the new? My approach to the present 
ecological mutation through the mythological perspective of Gnosticism is also a way 
to divert from a certain tendency to hold on to reason as the only way to possibly 
engage with the world. Taking one step back from the rationalist paradigm infusing 
modern approaches to the environment, my hermeneutic approach to the ecological 
issue suggests embracing another type of engagement with the world, informed by an 
apophatic posture. Latour and Lenton thus observe that studying Gaian phenomena 
parallels the study of God, notably in the feeling of awe-inspiring ignorance they might 
arouse:  
 
Strangely, defining such a phenomenon requires a sort of “negative 
geology” reminiscent of the apophatic ways that theologians had 
recourse to when trying to probe God’s uniqueness. 
 
 
Just like God, the Gaian world disclosed along the environmental mutation cannot be 
quite said, nor can it be exhausted. A major profanation of the gnostic cosmology I 
hope to have at least instigated in this dissertation is thus to bring together these two 
unreconcilable poles that are God and the world. This radical dualism between God 
and the world is indeed one main tenet of Gnosticism which I argue needs to be 
deconstructed and overcome. As Latour’s study of Gaia shows, when opponents to 
Gaia discard Lovelock’s invention for adding life, agency or even divinity to earth 
processes, they betray their own preceding operations of dis-animation and de-
divinization of the world – what Voegelin described as a beheading of being. What 
makes the divinization of the world so blasphemous to the contemporary opponents of 
Gaia? Could it be the ethical imperative that would directly flow from this 
reconciliation, that of a radical responsibility binding us to the world? In her foreword 
to the French translation of John Baird Callicott’s Genesis442, environmental 
philosopher and ethicist Catherine Larrère mentions Modernity’s estrangement from 
both the ideas of God and the world. She suggests that the contemporary reluctance to 
engage with these two ideas indicate the explosive and subversive potential held by 
 
442 John Baird CALLICOTT, Genèse. La Bible et l’écologie, Wildproject, 2009. 
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the possibility of their union. For Gilles Deleuze, the remedy and “our most difficult 
task” 443 is “to discover and restore belief in the world, before and beyond words” 444. A 
transcendental belief in the miracle of life on earth, a faith, an intimacy, a hope, a love 
of the world that was lost somewhere along the way. My research raises this question: 
how did we lose faith in the world? How might the hermeneutics of Gnosticism 
provide an answer? 
 
Against a gnostic culture of rupture, distance and estrangement, a systematic 
devaluation of the world and a permanent, insatiable longing for an elsewhere, I have 
proposed to embrace what is overflowing in the world through a resumption of the 
modern dialectic of inside and outside. « A more intimate relationship between outside 
and inside has to be imagined at the beginning of dualism445 » advises Hans Jonas. In 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La Transparence et l’Obstacle, the literary critic Jean Staro-
binsky formulates the hypothesis that western Modernity is driven by a hatred of me-
diation, of the abyss separating the meaning from the sign.446 This hatred of mediation 
resembles the Gnostics’ fear of the opacity, of the space left open, the distance between 
things and the liminality characterizing our inhabiting of the world. I have suggested 
in this thesis that what is repressed in Gnosticism indicates the potential resources of 
the in-between, of the metaxic, the queer – everything that overflows and subverts 
modern binaries. The significance of the hermeneutics of Gnosticism presented in this 
research unfolds right there, hinges on the gnostic aversion to our metaxic entangle-
ment in the world. Proposing to elucidate the gnostic obsession with dualistic segre-
gations, with a systematic practice of purification between the sacred boundaries of 
being, the hermeneutics of Gnosticism dives in the abyss of metaxy and offers to delve 
in the obscure liminality abhorred by the Gnostics. The hermeneutics of Gnosticism 
thus becomes creative and resilient when it offers to explore what gnostic narratives 
 
443 Gilles DELEUZE and Felix GUATTARI, What is Philosophy? London: Verso, 1994 (1991), p.75. 
444 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, London: 
Athlone Press, 2000, p.172.  
445 Hans JONAS, Evolution et liberté, Payot & Rivages, Paris, 2000, p.236.  My translation. 
446 The biography examines the life and writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau through the prism of the 
tension between the quest for transparency and the necessity of obstruction, that is, between the open-
ness towards the other and the withdrawal within, between the pull towards social life and the familiar 




tend to obstruct, when it lingers over the cosmological repression disclosed in Gnosti-
cism. What I have termed the hermeneutics of Gnosticism investigates gnostic tropes 
which reveal as they conceal, asks how they might cooperate, lending themselves to 
perpetual reinterpretation to perhaps illuminate the present allegories of our inhabiting.  
 
The Hermeneutics of Gnosticism presented in this research aims to offer an 
interpretation of Modernity where the gnostic tropes of a radical estrangement from 
the world reveal an obsessive fear of the in-between and our intimate involvement in 
it. A major contribution of my analysis is to connect the gnostic contempt for the world 
with a cosmological dualism organizing a structural estrangement between worldings, 
traditionally isolated in polarized realms (such as nature/culture, object/subject, organ-
ism/environment, self/other etc). I have suggested that the segregative tropes pervad-
ing modern dualism disclose the ever-present challenge of inhabiting in-between these 
realms, in other words, of dwelling in the watery trajectories of becoming through 
which the world is being created. In this regard, the reflections unfolded through the 
prism of Gnosticism inquire into the depth of the dualistic abyss and what it gathers – 
revealing as it aims to conceal the depth of a world of chaos and creation. Gnosticism 
invites us to a mirror game, a play of light and shadow around polarities and what they 
both disclose and obstruct: with Jonas, it draws our attention to the issue of dualism as 
one of inhabiting the world; with Voegelin, it helps us to diagnose a cultural repression 
of the “metaxic tension”, shedding light upon a cosmological inhibition which also 
arises as an obsession. The hermeneutics of Gnosticism thus tells a story of the queer, 
a deeply-felt in-betweenness, omnipresent in the modern imaginary – albeit under the 
mode of repression. Following Catherine Keller, who dwells upon the watery depths 
of creation and exposes a cultural fear of the deep pervading the western Christian 
tradition447, I suggest that gnostic narratives disclose a fear of the in-between. Leaning 
over the edge of an abyss, mesmerized by an obscure openness, Gnosticism draws our 
attention to our unfathomable entanglement in the world and the creative overflowing 
of the deep in-between. 
 
447 Catherine KELLER, Face of the Deep: a Theology of Becoming, op.cit. 
234 
 
The movement embraced by the Hermeneutics of Gnosticism is therefore not 
a beyond, nor an overcoming: rather, it digs deeper within, chooses to stay with the 
trouble, to dwell further in the tension and inhabit this ubiquitous in-between. It com-
mits to explore a chaotic openness as the dark side of modern dualistic cosmology, to 
venture in the obscure and embrace the repressed.  
 I regard the figure of Gaia as one eminent example of the alternative stories 
which can arise to embrace a radical experience of entanglement which Gnosticism 
abhors. Gaia offers an alternative to the gnostic narratives of estrangement from the 
world: an enthusiastic decomposition of the traditional categories of dualism, it tells 
the dissolution of the boundaries between life and its environment. For Bruno Latour, 
Gaia is a figure of pluralism superseding the nature-culture dichotomy with the prolif-
eration of non-human and hybrid agencies. Dispersing intentionality and eventfulness 
beyond the human realm, Gaia embodies the resistance to the dis-animation of the 
earth. Doing so, it collapses the political cosmology of nature along with its truncated 
vision of the alterity of the world. The tale of Gaia therefore provides a prominent 
illustration of a narrative that dwells in the chaotic inbetween and embraces the limi-
nality approached in our hermeneutics, specifically unraveling the organism-environ-
ment, parts-whole and inside-outside dichotomies. It articulates the queerness, the con-
fuse profusion of our attachments and the hybridity of our entangled worldings. An 
allegory of heterarchy – an organization where the elements are unranked or possess 
the potential to be ranked different ways –, Gaia also allows to politically navigate this 
liminality through weaving anarchist reflections into the collective challenge of an 
ecological transition. 
 
The hermeneutics of Gnosticism and Gaia are thus complementary narratives. The 
former modestly presents a diagnosis, points toward a few cosmological mechanisms 
that hinder the unfolding of a sustainable inhabiting, suggests the ubiquitous challenge 
of inhabiting in-between and summons the cardinal dimension of metaphors for think-
ing through this perpetual challenge. The prism of Gnosticism also teaches us to dis-
mantle unmoveable certitudes and appeals to a collective and continuous movement 
of creation renewing the modalities of our inhabiting at the edge of uncertainty. Gaia 
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initiates a cosmological reconstruction through a reconfiguration of the figures of 
earthly agency, away from the modern order of nature. The treatment of Gaia by au-
thors such as Bruno Latour or Isabelle Stengers exemplifies what a metaphor or a 
mythological figure can summon in terms of philosophical and political reflections 
around the ecological transition. Through the metaphor of a rooted overflowing, I also 
submit my own trope in the hope of expressing the tensional condition from which and 
through which we emerge and inhabit these Gaian trajectories of worlding – in a cloud 
of possible, deep entangled and wide open.  
 
I have also argued that a transdisciplinary approach to a complex world of 
overflowing was required to subvert the disciplinary structures dictated by modern 
dualism and resist the pervading ways in which we are being continuously divided. 
Disciplinary confinements are political, insofar as they sustain segregational infra-
structures of power. One of these confinements, as we have seen, isolates the religious 
from the secular. I have suggested throughout this thesis that religious and spiritual 
modes of inhabiting assume a cardinal role in generating new narratives and practices 
in response to the ecological transition. Committed to a re-sacralization of the world – 
human and non-human – and embracing the language of metaphors, contemporary pa-
ganism cultivates diversity in the perception of the divine. Goddess-centered religions 
subvert for instance the templates of patriarchal oppression through the celebration of 
a divinity that divert from the traditional attributes of patriarchal authority – unique, 
distant, abstract, disciplinarian, transcendent – to offer a figure of abundance, healing, 
nurturing, diversity, immanence and sensuality. In her Gaia and God448, Rosemary 
Radford Ruether draws upon the legacy of the Christian cultural heritage to illuminate 
an “ecofeminist theology of earth healing”, summoning the transformative and biophi-
lic elements in this heritage as a precious legacy that should be isolated from the fall 
into patriarchy and sacralized domination. When they engage morally and politically 
for the ecological transition, contemporary spiritualities as well as mainstream reli-
gious traditions bear the potential for a substantive subversion to the secular order. The 
 
448 Rosemary Radford RUETHER, Gaia and God. An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing, Harper-
Collins Publishers, New York, 1992. 
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Alliance of Religions and Conversation was thus founded in 1995 with the aim of 
fostering collaborations between the world’s major faiths and key conservation organ-
isations, encouraging the development of faith-based environmental programmes re-
flecting a diversity of beliefs and practices. Empowering religious institutions and peo-
ple of faith to advocate for the changes they wish to implement in society, the Green-
faith coalition claims furthermore that “protecting the Earth is a sacred act, and that 
environmental stewardship is a moral responsibility”.449 Initiatives like these illustrate 
the potential for resilience held in religious and spiritual modes of inhabiting: they 
display a recovered sense of our common earthboundedness and operate at the junction 
between ideas and practices. As the ecological transition opens a space for dialogue 
where opportunities arise for fecund encounters between beliefs contained on the 
fringe of the secular order, it also summons a diversity of traditions and modes of 
inhabiting – as illustrated in multi-faith climate gatherings – to crusade for that to 
which they hold dear. Their ecospiritual commitment to “reconnecting with the sacred 
and the earth”450, provided it sustains a dedicated care to preserve a diversity of ways 
of inhabiting and resists the modern tendency to unify the earth, appears as a vow to 
Gaian worldings.  
Ecofeminism arises as another successful attempt to address the gnostic suspi-
cion toward mediation through its dedication to weaving knots and building bridges 
across a culture of distance. The Women’s Pentagon Action in November 1980 is em-
blematic of this movement of mending, as some 2.000 women peace activists marched 
to the Pentagon to weave yarn across the entrances of the building to symbolically 
reweave the web of life. This peaceful weaving constituted an ultimate act of defiance 
to the workplace of an imperial and nuclear power threatening life on earth through a 
predatory relationship to the world. In their aptly named unity statement, the women 
who rose to defend and protect an endangered world declare: “we understand that all 
is connected… we are connections made of blood and bone. We women are gathering 
because life on the precipice is intolerable.”451. The women of the Pentagon Action 
 
449 Greenfaith website. 
URL: https://greenfaith.org/mission#  
Accessed 02.02.2020 
450 Ibid. 
451 Unity Statement of the Women’s Pentagon Action, November 1980. 
URL: http://www.wloe.org/WLOE-en/background/wpastatem.html  
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appear to have fully embraced the subversion of reclaiming their connection to the 
world and their caring love of life. Rising to celebrate and defend what binds us to-
gether and to the world, they sought to literally heal the rupture organized from within 
the Pentagon and recover from an alienated relationship to the earth. “Life on the prec-
ipice is intolerable” – life on the edge of the abyss, in the ruins of capitalist destruction, 
life in the end-time. As she reflects on the possibility of life in capitalist ruins and the 
modalities of inhabiting these ruins through collaborative survival within multispecies 
landscapes, Anna Tsing proposes to see the present environmental collapse as a love 
affair gone bad between humans and plants452. What a perfect depiction of the impos-
sible love affair between Gnosticism and the world! Our dwelling in the world is a 
continuous love affair – one that can be resumed and mended, one we can grow from. 
How to “create hope on the edge of the abyss”453? Uncovering the gnostic time 
of progress as one of constant projection into the non-present, my reflections culminate 
into a call to heal our estranged inhabiting through reconnecting to the world we in-
habit here and now. This call is echoed today notably by ecofeminists and people iden-
tifying as witches. The ecofeminist witches presented by Emilie Hache454 as a figure 
of redemption for our times propose to reclaim a connection with what was separated 
by capitalism in order to dissolve its power, finding and recreating a proximity with 
the world we live in. She writes: 
 
reactivating the history of the burning of witches during the Inquisi-
tion as a way of engaging the Anthropocene reminds us that the dou-
ble denigration of women and nature lies at the heart of th[e] chang-
ing world [of Modernity]. It reminds us that capitalism does not like 
women – free, independent, powerful; nor does it like us to sacralise 




452 Anna LOWENHAUPT TSING, The Mushroom at the End of the World. On the Possibility of Life in 
Capitalist Ruins, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2015. 
453 Isabelle STENGERS, « Fabriquer de l'espoir au bord du gouffre. A propos de l'œuvre de Donna 
Haraway », La Revue Internationale des Livres et des Idées n°10, mars-avril 2009. 
454 Emilie HACHE, « Tremblez, tremblez, les sorcières sont de retour! Ecrivaines, philosophes, activistes 
et sorcières écoféministes face au dérèglement climatique. Récit écoféministe de l’anthropocène », Col-
loque Comment penser l’Anthropocène?, 5‐6 novembre 2015. 




For Emilie Hache, the figure of the witch embodies the survival of a resistance 
against the stories and practices imposed upon us, namely against the modern imagi-
nary enforced by the Inquisition and the alienated relationship to the world it dictates. 
In her words, the ecofeminist witches claim that « the phobias of the Moderns and of 
Capitalism are not ours, and do not correspond to anything anymore. Everything is to 
invent again in the new ecological situation that is ours. 456» With her and with them, 
I summon us to resist the barbarous becomings of today and create other possibles by 
casting counter-spells against the gnostic imaginary that pervades a toxic inhabiting of 
the world: by reclaiming our power to think, create and tell other stories. 
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